Counterfactual Situations and Moral Worth

Authors

Kelly Sorensen, Ursinus CollegeFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2014

Abstract

What is the relevance to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of what one would have done in other, counterfactual circumstances? I defend a moderate form of actualism: what one would have done is important, but less so than what one actually does.

Comments

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Journal of Moral Philosophy in 2014, available at Brill Online. DOI:10.1163/17455243-4681034

Recommended Citation

Kelly Sorensen (2014). Counterfactual Situations and Moral Worth. Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 294-319. doi:10.1163/17455243-4681034.