The Effect of Foreign Aid on Political Violence: Learning From Case Studies of Nigeria and Sierra Leone

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The Effect of Foreign Aid on Political Violence:
Learning from Case Studies of Nigeria and Sierra Leone

By:
Charlotte Rohrer

April 29, 2019

Submitted to the Faculty of Ursinus College in fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the Department of Politics and International Relations
Abstract

Policymakers in OECD countries regularly cite reducing political violence as a fundamental purpose of foreign aid. For example, countries such as Pakistan and Iraq have received considerable amounts of aid meant to address the root causes of political violence. This project analyzes quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess whether foreign aid can reduce political violence. The quantitative and qualitative analyses study Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone to focus on regional and country-wide political violence. The study further focuses on aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria as a means to reduce or curb this violence. This paper finds evidence for aid projects playing a significant role in reducing political violence or reconsolidating a country after a conflict. However, this is highly contingent on the projects addressing and adequately understanding the needs in these countries.

Note: This honors thesis began as a Ursinus College Summer Fellows project in June/July 2018. Sections on the following pages are taken from Rohrer (2018): pgs. 7, 14-16, 22
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**Abbreviations**

CPRP – Community-Based Poverty Reduction Projects  
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
ECOMOG – Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group  
ESP – Education Sector Plan  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
GER – Gross Enrollment Ratio  
GIZ – German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  
GPE – Global Partnership for Education  
IOM – International Organization for Migration  
JTF – Joint Task Force  
JTF ORO – Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order  
M & E – Monitoring and Evaluation  
MODOP – Ministry of Development and Economic Planning  
NCDDDR – National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization  
NPC – National Planning Commission  
NPFL – National Patriotic Front Liberia  
NPRC – National Provisional Ruling Council  
NSA – National Security Agency  
NRC – National Reformation Council  
REDiSL - Revitalizing Education Development in Sierra Leone  
RUF – Revolutionary United Front  
SLPP – Sierra Leone Peoples Party  
Ulimo – United Liberation Movement of Liberia  
UN – United Nations  
UNAMSIL – The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone  
UNICEF – United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UN ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNIOISL – United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
Introduction

Foreign aid has been an essential tool to combat terrorism and political violence at least since World War II (USAID 2017). It has become an integral component of efforts to combat terrorism and political violence (Young & Findley 2011). The United States, as well as other OECD countries, provide substantial foreign aid to countries with a high number of terrorist incidents such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq based on the assumption that doing so will reduce political violence and advance post-conflict reconciliation. However, there is no consensus within the existing scholarship on the effects of foreign aid. Some scholars argue that foreign aid decreases political violence while others argue that foreign aid increases political violence. This paper weighs in on this debate by studying the impact of foreign aid on political violence in the specific cases of Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The study includes both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative study researches the impact of aid projects on terrorism and overall human well-being in Nigeria as well as on post-conflict reconciliation after the Sierra Leonean civil war. The quantitative study focuses on descriptive statistics and local data in both cases.

Can aid reduce political violence? Existing literature

Why people engage in political violence: Theories on relative deprivation

When studying the relationship between aid and political violence, it is key to understand why people engage in political violence before investigating whether and how foreign aid may mitigate violence. This section, therefore, focuses on leading theories on the motivation and grievances of people participating in political violence. Identifying the root causes of political violence would help develop targeted policy and development projects to curb these motivations and grievances, yet theoretical and empirical studies on the causes of political violence identify
different root causes. While there is a common focus on relative deprivation, scholars disagree about whether economic deprivation or discrimination along ethnic or religious lines is more important. In addition, scholars differ on the question of whether political violence is associated with poverty and weak state capacity or if the availability of resources increases incentives and opportunities for rebellion. Finally, other scholars argue that any account of political violence should examine subnational differences in economic and other grievances.

The most widely known and influential scholar on the sources of political violence is Ted Robert Gurr, whose 1970 book “Why Men Rebel” is considered a landmark work in political science and is still highly relevant. According to Gurr (1970, 20-23), to understand political violence, the individual has to be understood. Gurr’s argument primarily argues that relative deprivation refers to a gap between expectations and what people actually receive. He argues that the primary source of violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Once the expectation and reality of an individual do not match, this individual is more likely to rebel (Gurr 1970, 23-25).

Gurr distinguishes between three forms of relative deprivation that can all lead to political violence. The first form of relative deprivation is decremental deprivation. In decremental deprivation, people become angered and violent as their value expectations stay the same, but their value capabilities decrease. In other words, the loss of what they once had or thought they had can lead to violence. An example of this kind of deprivation is when immigrants take over unskilled jobs, lowering job prospects for native-born unskilled workers (Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the value capabilities stay the same while expectations rise. In this case, people feel they have no way or means of attaining their new goals, leading them to be angered. Lastly, the third form of
relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form, value expectations increase with value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For instance, when people get used to long-term, continued improvements in their lives and these suddenly come to a halt, people have trouble adjusting their expectations. This can happen after an economic depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). The relative deprivation hypothesis, however, is based on the perception of the individual, which an outsider may not see or perceive differently (Gurr 1970, 24).

According to Gurr, it is essential to understand someone’s grievances to comprehend their actions. To recognize these grievances, we must study people’s social and economic status and their perception of it (Gurr 2011). In the end, all these factors impact each other. For instance, understanding a group’s beliefs and ideologies can shed light on their mobilization processes. Once these beliefs and ideologies are understood, the role of government becomes essential. According to Gurr, governments that respond to grievances with new policies are often not targets of political violence. This is because they can recognize these grievances and respond to them before they become a bigger problem. Therefore, the government can be the key to causing or solving a conflict.

In more concrete detail, many factors such as ethnic, economic and political deprivation can cause relative deprivation. For instance, economic grievances of particularly marginalized groups can increase terrorism and may be stronger in marginalized groups (Piazza 2011, 339). Piazza also finds that ethnic disparities, as well as economic disparities, go hand in hand. Similarly, Ghatak and Gold (2017) find that minority discrimination may lead members of aggrieved groups to join or support terrorist organizations when they are excluded from public goods. This is also likely when minority groups are excluded from the political system and
denied opportunities to redress their grievances there. In an extensive study of terrorism in 130 countries between 1981-2005, Choi and Piazza (2014) find that the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is strongly associated with an increase in domestic terrorist attacks (Choi and Piazza 2014). The lack of political opportunity as well as unresponsive institutions may increase political violence as well (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Government oppression leaves less opportunity for citizens to exercise rights and air grievances through channels such as the courts or protests (Piazza 2017, 105; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384) which makes political violence a last resort (Krueger 2007, Crenshaw 1981, Li 2005, Choi 2010).

These grievances and motivations for participating in political violence are difficult to pinpoint in an individual or group; however, socioeconomic conditions such as lack of education, poverty or repression help recognize individual motivation and underlying causes of violence. Aid projects can then help curb circumstances that create grievances.

**Why people engage in political violence: Theories on religious and ethnic motivation**

Political violence is also commonly attributed to religious and ethnic motivations or flares up around ethnic or religious lines. For example, 64% of civil wars to date have had a component of ethnic or religious conflict. However, most ethnic groups have not experienced a civil war (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 1-8). Conflicts that appear to be ethnic or religious often have other underlying factors. For example, the conflict in Ukraine is fought as an ethnic conflict while motivations are economical. Political violence can appear around ethnic or religious lines, with underlying factors such as grievances. This marks an essential difference in the motivation of political violence. A conflict merely motivated by religion or ethnicity are complicated to address and alleviating grievances, in this case, would not help. Grievances, however, can flare up around one ethnicity or religion as they often experience the same political
or economic struggles. It is therefore vital to understand the difference between violence motivated by grievances forming around one religion or ethnicity or violence motivated by ethnicity or religion. This becomes especially hard to assess as both forms of political violence use ethnicity and religion for recruiting. Religion or ethnicity may simplify recruiting for violent groups because people of the same ethnic group or religion tend to live close together and share the same identity (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 10-12). Along those lines, religious or ethnic cohesion within a group makes it easier to retain members in the group and to ensure allegiance.

After a civil war, it is also essential to understand how political violence can be prohibited in the future. If political violence were only motivated by religion or ethnicity, curbing more political violence would be nearly impossible. However, as ethnicity and religion only frame the underlying cause, such as grievances, post-conflict reconciliation becomes vital. Ensuring equal political and economic opportunity after a civil war, for instance, can make the difference between a second civil war and a peaceful country (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 15-16). The argument of religion and ethnicity has received much traction in recent years, mainly through the media. However, grievances one experiences rather motivated political violence than religion and ethnicity itself.

Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on opportunity costs

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that rebellions are more commonly associated with greed rather than grievance and they point to their empirical finding that the availability of certain natural resources (oil, diamonds) increase the likelihood and duration of the conflict. Such resources may make the state a lucrative prize for capture, especially in poorer countries where low average income decreases the opportunity costs for would-be rebels. Collier and Hoeffler argue that grievances are generally not strong enough to trigger conflict so that the
opportunity cost of initiating and sustaining conflict becomes decisive. Natural resource wealth can be used to reduce opportunity costs and finance rebellions.

**Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on subnational inequality**

Whereas Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation “implies that grievance-induced discontent because of the marginalization of certain groups is a major determinant of violent political mobilization [but] … inequality is among the grievance factors largely dismissed by recent large-N country-level studies of civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Fearon and Laitin 2003),” (Hegre et al. 2009, 602). Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh call for studies of the neglect of the group aspect of inequality. They forward a “horizontal inequality argument” that states that inequalities coinciding with regional differences and cultural cleavages may enhance group grievances and increase political violence. Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh propose that the poverty or deprivation of subnational groups relative to other groups in the population may be more important for their support of rebel movements than their absolute poverty: “Support can thus derive from an unequal geographical distribution of welfare. The local population is likely to feel frustration and antagonism, especially when their deprivation is the result of the government’s exploitation and discrimination” (Hegre et al. 2009, 603).

**Theories on the relationship between foreign aid and political violence**

Literature assessing the impact of foreign aid on political violence can be broken down in two schools of thought. One school of thought describes aid as a tool used to prop up one side in a conflict, thus increasing political violence (Azam 1995 and Grossman 1991/1992). In his theoretical argument, Azam (1995) cites proxy civil wars supported by the United States and USSR through aid. He argues that these two former superpowers ignited political violence
through aid to fight the Cold War on foreign territory (Azam 1995, 174). Azam finds that political violence can be mitigated by sharing spoils to opponents of the ruling government as well as redistributing funds across regions (Azam 1995, 174). Foreign aid can have an essential role in distributing these spoils who can have an impact on decreasing violence. Through these spoils, incentives decrease which in turn mitigate the emergence of political violence (Azam 1995, 174). Grossman (1991/1992) argues that aid can increase political violence as it increases possible payoffs. Grossman’s research demonstrates that rebels become dissatisfied with payoffs from the government and seek violence to capture the aid, instead of settling for payoffs.

Meanwhile, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that aid decreases political violence. They claim that aid can prevent civil wars through increasing economic growth and military capacity as well as reducing the reliance on primary commodity exports. By reallocating funds to underfunded sectors in a country, aid can further alleviate political violence.
Economic grievances and their role in political violence

In line with Gurr’s relative deprivation theory discussed above, economic deprivation can have a grave impact on political violence and a number of scholarly studies point to poverty, poor economic growth and economic discrimination as the leading cause of terrorism and other forms of political violence (Piazza 2011, 339; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384). Piazza, for instance, finds that economic grievances of particularly marginalized groups can increase terrorism (Piazza 2011, 339). In a related argument, Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana find that high-income, democratic countries can experience an increase in terrorism when faced with economic contractions, as terrorists find it more promising to engage in terrorism at those times (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana 2004, 463-477). Hegre et al. (2009) discuss the scholarly argument that there is a direct link from economic development to domestic peace. The authors find that relatively wealthy areas played a more significant role in the Liberian civil war than relatively poor areas. For instance, rebel groups continuously recruited from the same wealthy areas in Liberia (Hegre et al. 2009, 619-620). This is interesting as the argument concerning economic development and political violence usually links poverty to the recruitment of the terrorists and fighters. However, Hegre et al. scholarship show that recruitment can happen from wealthy areas just as much. The authors note that their findings tend to support the opportunity arguments of scholars like Collier and Hoeffler; however, they also note that the Liberian government had minimal capacity at this time.

Aid, economic growth and economic shocks

To address economic grievances that lead to forms of political violence such as terrorism, economic growth can be a useful tool. Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that aid can dampen the effects of economic shocks on the economy and therefore the population. They use Collier and
Hoeffler’s (2002) argument that aid can decrease political violence and instability indirectly by increasing economic growth and reducing dependence on primary commodity exports (Savun and Tirone 2012, 370). Savun and Tirone find that even a little increase in aid can have an enormous effect on political and economic stability. They find that foreign aid can help sustain a certain level of national spending to maintain institutions while these countries go through times of economic hardship (Savun and Tirone 2012, 389). Some scholars highlight additional revenue from foreign aid as a valuable tool in rebuilding a country’s economy and to reducing economic grievances by increasing economic growth. Scholars such as Hadjimichael et al. (1995) find that foreign aid indeed does have a positive effect on economic growth using a cross-national study (Hadjimichael et al. 1995, 610). These studies, therefore, suggest that economic growth can have a considerable positive impact reducing political violence.

**Aid, political violence and politics**

**Aid and Political grievances**

While economic grievances are a critical factor to keep in mind when studying the impact of foreign aid on political violence, political grievances and oppression should be kept in mind as well. Political grievances can include the lack of representation of a specific ethnic group, lack of political rights such as exercising the right to vote or even a lack of the rule of law. Studies focused on the effectiveness of specific foreign aid launched through organizations like USAID or World Bank in redressing grievances have found mixed results. For example, an evaluation of INVEST, a program that provided Afghan youth with training as well as cash, found that this aid reduced the recipients’ willingness to back the Taliban. However, recipients who only received training did not have an impact, and those who only received cash proved were more likely to back the Taliban (Lyall et al. 2018, 10-15, 18). USAID reports have shown that some projects
aimed at reducing terrorism target the wrong people. An evaluation of the Tunisia Transition Initiative showed that the program did not target youth at risk of joining terrorist networks or engaging in political violence (USAID 2014). This shows that while foreign aid can address economic grievances, political violence may persist due to political grievances.

*Aid and the role of institutions and poverty*

Research on the effectiveness of foreign aid in combatting poverty and reducing political violence suggests that foreign aid does not necessarily achieve these goals. On the one hand, foreign aid may not be effective in helping the poor. On the other hand, alleviating poverty may not address other causes of political violence. Nonetheless, there is a reason to explore the impact of foreign aid on terrorism further. As von Hippel notes, a number of extremist groups have been able to broaden their appeal by providing the poor with social services such as schools and hospitals; lack of government-provided services and international donor support create an opening for such groups by leaving marginalized communities vulnerable and susceptible to extremist appeals (von Hippel 2010, 53-55). In addition, while terrorist leaders often come from the ranks of middle and upper classes, poor education and poverty have convinced (or pressured) ordinary foot soldiers to join terrorist organizations (von Hippel 2010, 56-60). Nevertheless, foreign aid and development projects can have a more profound impact in a community beyond merely addressing poverty. Foreign aid and development projects can strengthen institutions by alleviating problems such as lack of representation or difficulties with the rule of law, or community-based projects can be implemented, promoting cooperation across different ethnic and socio-economic groups.
The role of aid in post-conflict reconciliation

Donors are not only focused on states currently experiencing political violence but also on post-conflict nations. Poor institutions and socio-economic structures are often all a country is left with after experiencing conflict or political violence (Mlambo 2009). Aid can become significant in post-conflict reconciliation and community building. Most of these programs are focused on improving institutions to aid in social reconciliation (Fearon et al. 2009, 287). Fearon et al. study the effects these programs have on social interactions and the community and find that they can have a substantial impact. Development aid post-conflict can introduce and alter patterns of social cooperation even after these programs have concluded (Fearon et al. 2009, 291). Foreign aid can also become vital in post-conflict reconciliation by aiding in poverty reduction. Poverty is another instance of relative deprivation and can lead to economic grievances (Chayes 2016). However, these conflicts often leave damaged institutions behind, meaning they need to be rebuilt first to reconstruct the state (Mlambo 2009, 58-59). While rebuilding the country and during post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, it has proven effective to focus on rebuilding the state and its institutions, renewing the economy and rehabilitating communities (Mlambo 2009, 61). Foreign aid can play a vital role as long as it is tailored to the country’s needs and aims to rebuild pivotal institutions (Mlambo 2009, 65).
Negative effects of aid

Aid increases the duration of political violence

On the other hand, aid has sometimes been found to worsen political violence and may increase the frequency of violent engagements between rebels and the government (Narang 2015, Strandow et al. 2016, Wood and Molfino 2016). This can happen as foreign aid increases uncertainty about the relative strength on both sides of a conflict, which in turn prolongs civil wars. In particular, dispersed aid is more likely to cause dispersed, irregular conflict, while centralized aid is more likely to contribute to current territorial disputes (Strandow et al. 2016). The different types of aid matter as well, as humanitarian aid shows an increase in political violence, while other types of aid do not (Wood and Molfino 2016). For instance, food aid does not have a negative effect on conflict. The impact of aid on the duration of political violence is also bound to timing (Dippold 2016, viii). Dippold finds that the provision of emergency aid can increase localized conflict while non-emergency aid does not. Therefore, a sudden spurt in aid may increase political violence.

Is foreign aid effective in the presence of corruption?

Some scholars argue that foreign aid may not be as effective as intended, as corruption and lack of accountability plagues many receiving countries (Knack 2004, Winters 2010, Eubank 2011). This is important to consider, as countries that experience political violence may also be susceptible to corruption, impacting the effectiveness of aid. Accountability of the government is essential to establish institutions supporting foreign aid (Winters 2010, 218). Skeptics of foreign aid argue that it reduces governments’ need to rely on their citizens for tax revenues, raising the same kind of problem with rentier states that has been applied to oil-rich authoritarian governments (Moyo 2009). In turn, this reduces accountability, as citizens lose power they can
exercise through taxation (Eubank 2011, 465). Much like the natural resource curse, scholars have found a negative connection between foreign aid, democracy, and economic growth. The aid curse implies that foreign aid hinders nations from democratizing or improving economic growth, the exact opposite effect foreign aid is intended to have. Some scholars such as Djankov argue that the aid curse is bigger than the natural resource curse, creating even more obstacles to democracy and economic growth than oil (Djankov 2008, 169). Similarly, Knack’s (2000) cross-country research suggests that higher aid levels reduce the quality of governance and in turn hurt growth (Knack 2000, 20). Alesina and Weder (1999) found that more corrupt governments receive more foreign aid, while this aid is not able to reduce corruption.

However, other studies show that foreign aid may lessen corruption assuming that countries do not start with high levels of corruption and can provide necessary institutions (Okada & Samreth 2012, 240). Tying aid to the implementation of specific rules and imposing conditionalities may be able to lessen corruption if these rules and conditions require more transparency (Tavares 2002, 104). Thus, regime types and institutions in place can mitigate the aid curse (Collier 2007, 103). According to Collier as well as Burnside and Dollar (1997), aid has shown to be more effective in nations where governance and policies are already sound (Collier 2007, 103; Burnside and Dollar 1997, 4). Harford and Klein (2005) discuss the possibility of bringing in the private sector to ensure the full-intended effects of foreign aid in the recipient countries (Harford and Klein 2005).

While the apparent effect of corruption is that foreign aid does not have its intended impact on the economy, it can have even more dangerous effects on terrorism and political violence overall. Corruption in a country may have adverse effects on terrorism and political violence. Corruption may exacerbate poverty and increase income inequalities, fueling economic
grievances that can lead to political violence, as discussed above. Therefore, corruption affecting aid can implicate and increase violence, although intended to decrease it.

**Summaries of theory-generating literature**

*Table 1: Theory generating literature*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary of Main Findings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nielsen et al.</td>
<td>Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>aid shocks can have negative effects on political violence and lead to outbreak of armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strange et al.</td>
<td>Tracking underreported financial flows: China’s development finance and the aid–conflict nexus revisited</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Chinese development aid provides an alternative when ‘traditional’ funding is withdrawn, therefore conflict decreases. This research highlights the importance of understanding alternative aid to understanding aid and conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savun &amp; Tirone</td>
<td>Exogenous shocks, foreign aid, and civil war</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>foreign aid is essential in sustaining a certain level of spending if and while countries go through economic hardship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narang</td>
<td>Assisting uncertainty: how humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>foreign aid increases uncertainty of each combatant’s strength prolonging civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasgupta et al.</td>
<td>(When) Do antipoverty programs reduce violence? India’s rural employment guarantee and Maoist conflict</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>poverty reduction can address political violence when sound institutions are in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahir</td>
<td>Does aid cause conflict in Pakistan</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>mixed results, finding a positive relationship between aid on terrorism however no relationship between aid and armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strandow et al.</td>
<td>Foreign aid and the intensity of violent armed conflict</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>the increase in foreign aid increases political violence. Dispersed foreign aid causes dispersed, irregular conflict while concentrated aid contributes to conventional territorial battles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Theory

Basics of relative deprivation and its forms

The emergence of political violence and relative deprivation are often tied together (Gurr 1970, 8). Relative deprivation happens once the expectation and reality of an individual clash and no longer match (Gurr 1970, 15). This deprivation, however, is based on the individual and their perception. There are three different forms of relative deprivation, which are decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation, progressive deprivation. The first form of relative deprivation is decremental deprivation. In decremental deprivation people become angered and violent as their expectations stay the same, but their capabilities decrease. Expectations of an individual can range from anything like the belief of achieving something in particular to what they believe they are entitled to have. Capabilities, however, reflect the real outcome. In other words, the loss of what they once had or thought they had can lead to violence. This can be seen in a society when a status quo can no longer be attained, such as a decline in the capabilities of the political elite or economic output (Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the value capabilities stay the same while expectations rise. In this case, people feel they have no way or means of attaining their new goals, which angers them. This can manifest itself when a new political order or justice is sought after or also in the form of greed, wanting to have more material goods (Gurr 1970, 50). Lastly, the third form of relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form value expectations increase with value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For instance, when a long run continued improvement in people’s life suddenly comes to a halt, people have trouble adjusting their increasing expectations. This can happen after an economic depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). These forms of deprivation are essential to
Relative deprivation can be successful in mitigating these forms of relative deprivation, both at different phases of violent political contestation.

Relative deprivation and aid

Relative deprivation can arise from different instances. It can occur when economic or political opportunities decrease, increase and then decrease or when they were never there. Aid can mitigate these instances by increasing economic rights and growth and political rights. This, violence can be decreased by mitigating relative deprivation (Gurr 1970, 3-12). One argument therefore is that foreign aid decreases political violence as it opens up opportunities for economic growth, helps countries sustain spending levels during economic hardship and helps alleviate oppression and create social programs (Savun and Tirone 2012, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Hadjimichael 1995, Collier 2007, Lyall et al. 2018, von Hippel 2010).

Nevertheless, aid can have negative effects and therefore increase political violence instead. Foreign aid may fail to meet its intended effects due to corruption or prolong civil wars as it increases uncertainty (Winters 2010, Knack 2004, Eubank 2011, Narang 2015, Strandow et al. 2016). Therefore, the contrasting and second hypothesis is that foreign aid increases violent mobilization.

Relative deprivation after a conflict

After a conflict relative deprivation can still be present or be in the process of emerging. Poor institutions and socio-economic structures is a major struggle for many countries after a conflict (Mlambo 2009). Deprivation can be caused by the lack of or dysfunctional institutions, a political process, and a sound economic system. Conflicts also often destroy communities, depriving individuals of social interactions and a safe community (Mlambo 2009). Institutions most affected often include political authority and a sound economic system as well as necessary
infrastructure. Aid programs post-conflict can help rebuild institutions, revive the economic system and help integrate communities (Mlambo 2009). After this, these programs can develop and create economic growth, political rights but also social stability and the rule of law. These factors are all vital in post-conflict reconciliation as these programs can help alleviate deprivation and prevent future conflicts. Foreign aid can, in turn, fail to reconstruct a country and alleviate future violent engagements when aid project implementation is done incorrectly and country specific details are ignored (Grant 2005, Fearon et al. 2009).

**Hypotheses**

The theoretical arguments outlined above lead to the following hypotheses.

H1: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a strengthened rule of law.

H2: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see an increase in the prevention of future violent engagement by rebuilding institutions, reviving the economic system and re-integrating communities.

**Research Design**

**Sierra Leone and Nigeria: The cases**

This research includes a qualitative and quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis examines Sierra Leone and Nigeria as case studies to assess the relationship statistically as well as beyond the data and to investigate case evidence. The level of analysis for this is the country as well as specific regions. The qualitative analysis of each case examines different aspects of aid. The case of Sierra Leone studies aid as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation. The case of Nigeria studies aid as the means to reduce or prevent political violence. Both countries suffer from poverty, making foreign aid a central tool to address such grievances. Nigeria and Sierra Leone have one of the highest poverty rankings in the world. In Nigeria, about half of the population lives in poverty (Adebayo 2018). In Sierra Leone, sixty percent live below the poverty line (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Both states have suffered from political violence and grave death tolls as a result of it. Researchers estimate the death toll of political violence in Sierra Leone between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 20,000 people as of 2013 (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Another, more recent source estimates the death toll to be around 50,000 (Thomas 2018). Similarly, researchers estimate the death toll of political violence in Nigeria between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 50,000 people. More recent estimates suggest the death toll be around 60,000 people for the time period of 2011 to 2019 (Campbell 2019).

However, Sierra Leone and Nigeria are distinct in two aspects. While Nigeria is currently struggling with terrorism, Sierra Leone is moving towards a more stable future. Sierra Leone is becoming freer, at least statistically speaking. In 2001 Freedom House score was partly free with individual scores of 4.5 out of 7, seven being the worst, in freedom rating, 5 in civil liberties and 4 in political rights (Freedom House 2001). In 2018 these scores had improved with 3 out of 7, in freedom rating, civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House 2018).

Additionally, GDP per capita in Sierra Leone has increased since 2001. In 2001 the GDP per capita in Sierra Leone was 230.09$, and in 2017 it was 499.42$ (World Bank FRED Database 2018). For the purpose of this study, I study the onset of political violence in Nigeria and post-conflict reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Nigeria has suffered from political violence in the forms of terrorism. Starting in 2009 the terrorist organization Boko Haram began to use violent tactics (Felter 2018). 2009 marked the first significant incident by Boko Haram with an
armed uprising as the result of police crackdowns (Felter 2018). Boko Haram is not only responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks but also insurgency and controlling territory (Felter 2018).

Meanwhile, Sierra Leone has suffered from political violence in the past, with no recent events after 2002/2003 (Sundberg and Melander 2013). The main perpetrator of political violence in Sierra Leone was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was not only responsible for starting the Sierra Leonean civil war but also for the illegal trade of conflict diamonds, used to finance the civil war as well as using child soldiers during the war (Brummel 2006). Studying post-conflict relations in Sierra Leone may be crucial to study the effect aid has on post-conflict reconciliation. In addition, natural resources such as the diamond trade in Sierra Leone may contribute heavily to economic growth.

**Quantitative Analysis**

While the hypotheses only point towards a country-wide study the quantitative analysis examines variation within countries. The quantitative analysis focuses more specifically on a regional analysis and national analysis. The regional analysis focuses on local differences between foreign aid and political violence in certain regions. This is mostly achieved through a description of spatial patterns in aid and violence.

Meanwhile, the national analysis focuses on the overall question of the impact of foreign aid on violence and is analyzed using descriptive statistics. Both analyses study Nigeria and Sierra Leone starting in 1990 and continuing to 2014. This period is able to incorporate the full period of the Sierra Leonean civil war, which ranged from 1991 to 2002, as well as Boko Haram activity which was founded in the 1990s.
Data & Methodology

To examine the relationship between foreign aid and political violence, the quantitative analysis uses several databases combined into one dataset. To put together a quantitative analysis that I could study, I needed data that measured foreign aid and political violence, on the national and regional level. To operationalize foreign aid, I chose to utilize the dataset AidData. I chose AidData, as it records all amounts of multilateral and bilateral aid including but not limited to non-governmental organizations or multilateral organizations (Tierney et al. 2011). AidData includes aid flow as reported from the donor perspective and is the most comprehensive database on foreign aid and development finance (Tierney et al. 2011).

Further, I chose AidData as it included comprehensive and detailed spatial information about aid projects and transactions both on the regional as well as national level. The unit of measurement for AidData is the amount of aid given to a country in a given year in U.S. dollars, and the data ranges from 1947 to 2013. The variable of projects was chosen as it directly relates to the qualitative analysis, focusing on individual projects. Projects are also able to give us a different idea on resources put into the country, apart from monetary. However, the variable transactions were still incorporated to understand the amount of money flowing into one country and its impact. For the purpose of this research, three different AidData datasets are used. One, the core research release which details aid from one organization or country to another country. The other two datasets specifically record the amount of aid in the provinces and states of Sierra Leone and Nigeria. In order to understand the impact of aid on the local level, these different datasets are used.

In order to test the amount of political violence, this research uses both the UCDP and ACLED databases. The ACLED database includes battles, violence against civilians, remote
violence, protests, riots as well as non-violent events. The unit of measurement of the database is the single event, and the database ranges from 1997 to 2018. The ACLED is the most comprehensive database on political violence, which is why it was chosen. For the purpose of this study, these datasets include the UCDP dataset, which also analyzes the single event of political violence (Croicu and Sundberg 2017). The UCDP includes political violence events starting in 1975 and is, therefore, able to encompass the temporal parameters further. The dataset breaks down events of political violence as non-state violence, one-sided violence as well as state-based violence. In order to operationalize the study, the number of events was studied as a variable. I chose this variable as it can tell us more about the terrorist's motivation of how often they choose to strike and when.

Variables

<table>
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<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Database</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Political Violence</td>
<td>Violent Events (count)</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td>ACLED, UCDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Aid given to a country in a year (in million U.S $), projects in a year</td>
<td>independent</td>
<td>AidData</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Variables in quantitative study*

**Dependent Variable**

The primary dependent variable of interest is domestic political violence. For the purpose of this paper, political violence is defined as the use of force for political reasons by non-state actors. The ACLED definition of political violence informs this definition: “(...) the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. ACLED defines political violence through its constituent events, the intent of which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of political disorder, expressed through violence and demonstrations, within and across states. A politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups
toward a political end” (ACLED 2017). This definition is taken from the ACLED codebook to have a cohesive definition throughout the project, matching with the events coded in the ACLED database. The ACLED definition is also coherent with the definition of the UCDP, the other database used to study political violence.

Further, the ACLED codebook also mentions non-violent instances included in the dataset “to capture the potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict” (ACLED 2017). However, these non-violent instances are not included in this research as they do not fit the definition of “the use of force (…)”. This decision was made as the research aims to identify the initial relationship between aid and the event of political violence and how this relationship can help alleviate political violence and post-conflict reconciliation. The definition for this research does not include state violence. I chose to omit state violence, as the goal of this research paper is to understand the effects individual aid projects and aid can have on a country and its people and therefore also its terror organizations. State violence does not fall under this as they often do not experience the same amount of grievances as the general population. The purpose of this research is to study the effect of aid on the initial emergence of political violence as well as post-conflict resolution. State violence is often perpetuated in response to this initial emergence of non-state violence instead of the initial factor. The effect aid can have on ending conflict is greater than it can have on ending state violence.

For the purpose of this research, defining the instance of an event is essential as it is used as the unit of measurement in both the UCDP as well as ACLED databases. The UCDP database defines an event as “an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a specific date” (Croicu and Sundberg 2017).
**Independent Variable**

In order to assess the role of foreign aid and other variables in explaining increased or decreased political violence, I use the amount of money that countries receive in developmental assistance as my primary independent variable. To measure this, I use indicators from AidData, the most comprehensive as well as an updated source of data on foreign aid, with commitment information for over 1.5 million developmental finance activities between the years 1947 and 2016 (Tierney et al. 2011). This dataset includes data from 96 donors and includes official developmental assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF), equity investments as well as export credits. ODA, as used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, includes all aid undertaken by official sectors that are intended for economic development and given under concessional financial terms. The OECD defines ODA as “Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded from ODA. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. The aid includes grants, "soft" loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of technical assistance.” (OECD 2018). OOF refers to official flows to developing countries that do not meet the criteria of ODA since they are not necessarily designed to promote economic development or given under concessional financial terms. Equity investments refer to money invested in a firm by stockholders with no return in normal business course and export credits offer a financing arrangement provided to foreign buyers to assist in the purchase of goods and services from national exporters.
This study uses descriptive univariate statistics instead of correlations between aid and violence. Descriptive statistics are used in this case to further explore the extent of aid, projects, and violent events as well as to understand the average of such in a year further. While regression analysis is used to study the relationship between two variables, using this analysis does not lend itself to this study. However, the regression analysis would raise some problems. While regression analysis can study short term and long-term effects, this would go beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, using regression without accounting for short-term and long-term effects would leave this project with limitations in terms of temporal parameters, leaving the study unable to define the temporal impact of aid on violence. This would leave the study with problems of which events to include or which to omit, as they are connected to the year, they occurred in. In addition, a regression would be unable to account for regional research such as looking at spillover of aid into different states or regions. All these questions and problems could be answered with different statistical tools, however for the purpose of and the scope of this research I decided to describe basic patterns of the relationship and then explore the possible impact of some projects in the qualitative analysis.

**Qualitative Analysis**

In addition to the quantitative analysis, this research also encompasses a qualitative analysis. Sierra Leone suffered from the civil war from 1991-2002, while Nigeria suffers from the violent activities of Boko Haram currently. The qualitative analysis includes temporal parameters from 1990 to 2018. The temporal parameters in the qualitative analysis encompass more years as the availability of quantitative data does not constrain the analysis. A comparative analysis and regional analysis are used to study the cases of Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The variant (or variable studied) in this analysis is the amount of foreign aid and its impact on
political violence and post-conflict resolutions. The qualitative analysis aims to analyze grievances levels pre, during and post-conflict. These levels can be poverty levels, GDP per capita or ethnic grievances. The emergence of the RUF in Sierra Leone and the eventual end of the conflict is studied with regards to the impact of aid in both the beginning and end of the conflict.

**Background on Case Studies**

**Motivation of Boko Haram Members**

The biggest pool of recruits for Boko Haram consist of young boys that either attend Islamic school or no school at all. Nigeria has the highest number of non-enrolled school children with 70% of the population illiterate and one in three schoolchildren not going to school. This is especially grave in Northern states (Comolli 2015, 70). Many almajirai, or boys that have attended Islamic school end up as recruits for Boko Haram. This is mostly due to the lack of opportunity both for employment and higher education, as the education in these school solely focuses on memorizing the Qur’an.

Further, this materializes and progresses when these youths find themselves in complicated financial situations (Comolli 2015, 73). Interviews with young Boko Haram recruits show that they are all at least partly motivated by financial compensation or for financial reasons (Comolli 2015, 78). A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark levels of unemployment, as well as economic need, often play a significant role in the recruitment of new members. While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it certainly aids terrorist organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55). Boko Haram is also active in neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and even Mali. State officials of
Nigeria state that most Boko Haram members today are foreign nationals (Comolli 2015, 84-105).

**Boko Haram Funding**

In the beginnings of Boko Haram, most funding came from agriculture, small trading activities as well as local small businesses set up with microloans by Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 78). Further, funding comes from members who are expected to pay a membership fee of 100 Naira (0.8$) per year, from donations including from politicians as well as ties to other terrorist organizations and money from robberies, ransom money, and protection money. Boko Haram is also involved with Al-Qaeda, which helps fund Boko Haram and provides technical support (Comolli 2015, 80). Many Boko Haram members are also part of the local government and collect taxes for Boko Haram. However, this has stopped with the 2013 state of emergency (Comolli 2015, 80-82).

**A military response to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government**

Nigeria has started to deploy the military with the help of the police as early as 2003 and has since been in frequent contact with Boko Haram. Nigeria has the best equipped and best-funded military in West Africa with 80,000 troops, and the emergence of Boko Haram increased the Nigerian defense budget (Comolli 2015, 109-110). Further struggles in the North of Nigeria, especially Borno led to the emergence of the JTF ORO, Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order in 2011. The task force’s activity led to Boko Haram’s relocation to Yobe state. As a result, the government deployed the JTF ORO also to Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Adamawa. However, the JTF ORO had several problems, including difficulty to obtain intelligence due to the refusal of locals to cooperate and the extensive borders (Comolli 2015, 110-115).
Then in 2011, the first state of emergency was declared. This affected Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau states. More importantly, though, this also granted emergency powers including the ability to detain a suspect, taking control of any property in the emergency area as well as entry and search of any promises to the Nigerian military (Comolli 2015, 115-117). In response, Boko Haram gave Christians in the North a three days’ notice to leave the area and announced that Boko Haram would be ready to fight the government. Boko Haram then launched attacks in several states, against Christians and Muslims almost daily and President Goodluck Jonathan received much criticism as a result from both Muslims and Christians alike. In 2012 the state of emergency was lifted; however, Boko Haram’s violence did not stop. Boko Haram continued to cause violence by destroying several dozen cell towers, killing foreign workers including health workers.

As a response, in November 2012 the government put an N50 million bounty on Shekau and lesser sums on individuals believed to be with Shekau (Comolli 2015, 120). Negotiations between the government and Boko Haram then started with the government offering amnesty for fighters willing to renounce violence. Meanwhile Boko Haram was negotiating for the freedom of all detained members. Further attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram led to the murder of the point in contact, Babakura Fuggu, the brother in law of Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 123). In 2013 another state of emergency was declared, and the largest military deployment since the Nigerian Civil War was recorded. Additional curfews, entry and search and detention powers were granted to the military. This removal of constitutional rights arguably made matters worse, decreasing trust in the government, military, and police (Comolli 2015, 125). The JTF was then again deployed into the North of Nigeria, setting up a communication blackout and rounding up Boko Haram members as well as innocents, many were killed.
Nevertheless, Boko Haram continued to attack, now especially schools. However, locals were said to fear the JTF more than Boko Haram. Fed up with this many young men started “Civilian JTFs,” to identify and point out real Boko Haram members to the JTF (Comolli 2015, 125-127). Boko Haram responded to this by declaring war on the civilian JTFs and killing many.

In late 2013, the Army 7th Infantry Division replaced the JTF. This was partly due to the JTF being controversial and only somewhat successful. This was also because Boko Haram evolved as an organization, using women and children as spies and smuggling explosives and IED’s. The state of emergency was then extended until 2014 (Comolli 2015, 128). In 2014, the most known associated event with Boko Haram happened. Boko Haram kidnapped school girls in Chibok, Borno. This happened for several reasons, including financial gain through human trafficking, to upstage the Nigerian government’s authority, to provide brides for fights and as Comolli argues for bargaining power and as retaliation to the JTF arresting and detaining many children and wives of Boko Haram members. In response, the Nigerian government released some of these wives, including one of Shekau’s wives. This also prompted a massive international response with military support from the UK, USA, Canada, France, China and Israel (Comolli 2015, 130).

*Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria*

Human rights abuses in Nigeria have especially increased with the military response to Boko Haram. The Nigerian military engaged in many extrajudicial killings during raids in Nigeria, primarily due to a lack of trust in the rule of law (Comolli 2015, 131). Military raids with the goal to hunt down Boko Haram have also destroyed buildings, homes and killed innocent civilians. The JTF ORO has been especially controversial as they often engaged in harassment and rape during raids as well as taking bribes during vehicle checks (Comolli 2015,
Amnesty International has reported that over 950 people have died in military custody in 2013 (Comolli 2015, 136).

**A non-military approach**

While the Nigerian government has heavily responded to Boko Haram with the military, some softer approaches have been taken as well. Some non-military approaches have included community programs and strengthening the rule of law. The Nigerian National Security Advisor office has plans to counter the radicalization of the youth in Nigeria through community programs and to work with the local government as well as NGOs. In order to flush out extremism in church and education, a register of “good” imams and radical one has been created (Comolli 2015, 136). The Nigerian NSA established a program and goals focused on education and preventing radicalization before it emerges but also in prison, as well as alleviating poverty all with the help of NGO’s, the UN, and civil organizations. These projects were implemented in 2013 and 2014, with plans such as creating new curriculums for schools. However, this often faces challenges such as the lack of schools, to begin with and targeting the wrong group of teens (Comolli 2015, 135-141). These challenges are associated with a lack of funds as well as implementation.

*( Forced) Recruitment of RUF fighters*

Recruitment of RUF fighters involved the RUF breaking into homes, tying up parents and shooting them in front of their sons. The sons are then captured and forced into fighting for the RUF. Ex-RUF fighters testified at a trial against Sankoh that they were forced and coerced into fighting for the RUF using violence and fear. Eventually, many of the RUF fighters developed familial ties to Sankoh, most likely due to losing their own families at the hands of the RUF as well as their young age (Gberie 2005, 62-63). Girls and boys of captured towns were also forced
to help and fight for the RUF. However, others joined the RUF willingly, fed up with the Momoh regime.

*After the war*

After the war the British forces withdrew most of their troops, leaving behind a military training team. UNAMISL also dismantled most of their troops, completely withdrawing from Sierra Leone in 2005 ((Gberie 2005, 105). The successor of UNAMISL was the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOISL). The Sierra Leonean civil war left behind mass atrocities. Over 50,000 people died as a result of the war (Gberie 2005, 6). After the war, Kabbah was re-elected President for another five-year term. The political party of the RUF, RUFP, had little support and did not have a single seat in parliament (Carter Center 2003). The atrocities committed at the hands of the RUF during the war was long and grave. The RUF was responsible for several massacres of civilians, the drafting of underage soldiers, mass rapes and mutilations were committed (Gberie 2005, 125; Oosterveld 2013, 235). The forcible recruitment of children in the war led to many children brainwashed and drugged resulting in withdrawal symptoms and left with no families.

Additionally, over two million people were displaced, and villages were destroyed (Kuiter 2001). In 2003, the Special Court of Sierra Leone issued indictments of war crimes to several key figures in the civil war including Sankoh, Hinga Norman, and Charles Taylor. Sankoh then died in prison in July 2003 (Farah 2003).

**Sierra Leone today**

While human security has improved in Sierra Leone, the state is still weak with damaged institutions and a general distrust of politics (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Civil society and
communities are also weakened, with high unemployment and former child soldiers needing a new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). The collapse of the legal system, corruption, poor service delivery of essential goods like water and lack of transparency are all characteristics of the weak state of Sierra Leone. The general state of the infrastructure is poor, and the Sierra Leonean military has been decreased to 13,000 troops (Robertshawe 2010). High levels of poverty and deprivation, as well as a weak judiciary, also contribute to high levels of crime. Another factor of human rights violations is female genital mutilation, which has grown to be a prominent practice in Sierra Leone (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Little funds for public resources such as education has also weakened civil society. Especially women have been marginalized in Sierra Leone both during and after the war. Another marginalized group in Sierra Leone are the youth, including former child soldiers. Many emerged from the war without any job prospects with 58% of young people being unemployed. Poor schooling and forced displacement into cities contributed to this. However, life is not much better in rural areas, where domestic violence is high, and around 80%-90% of girls undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). Young men are often forced into modern-day slavery as they are required to work, for several years, for the family of a girl they may want to marry (Kaldor and Vincent 2006).

Moreover, the economy has suffered throughout and after the war. Sierra Leone’s GDP decreased by more than half during the war, partly due to the immense destruction of infrastructures such as markets, stores, rice fields, and mining fields. While economic growth has increased after the war, the country is highly indebted and dependent on foreign aid. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world with 82% of the population living on less than $2 a day.
Quantitative Analysis

Nigeria

This section explores the data showing the distribution of violent events and aid in Nigeria.

**Descriptive Statistics**

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<th>Std. Error</th>
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</table>

*Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for violent events and aid for Nigeria, sources: GED, ACLED, AidData*

Table 3 shows that the average of GED and ACLED events are around 8. This comes with a standard deviation of 23 and 18 events, showing how many events, on average, are higher or lower than the average amount of events. The mean for aid tells us the average amount of aid, being 611 million U.S dollars. The mean for projects tells us that the average amount of projects is 4.8.

**Violent Events**

In Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source: GED database it becomes clear that violent events as recorded by the GED database increased around 2010 and continuously increased up to 2015. This indicates the emergence of Boko Haram around 2008/2009 (Felter 2018).
Furthermore, the difference in a number of events pre and post-2010 is stark. This is interesting considering that Boko Haram was active before. However, the numbers reflect important events as well as a change in leadership well. While Boko Haram emerged at the University of Maiduguri in 1995, the sect did not become fully radicalized until Mohammed Yusuf took over in 2002 (Comolli 2015, 47). From late 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly dormant re-emerging after a violent clash with the security forces, JTF ORO (Comolli 2015, 51-52). After the capture and extra-judicial kill of Yusuf in 2009, a new leader emerged in 2010, Abubakar Shekau, the second in command to Yusuf took over. Shekau is known to be even more radical than Yusuf and altered the movement to be even more violent. This coincides with the enormous surge of violent events in 2010. With the new leadership also came new splinter groups to Boko Haram as well as recruits from neighboring countries, increasing the violence. The increase in violence, especially around 2009 and 2010 and the continuous increase can be explained by the change of leadership in Boko Haram, making the organization more radical.

![Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source: GED database](image1)

![Figure 2: Violent events per state in Nigeria in from 1990-2014 using satellite view, source: GED](image2)
Figure 2 further shows the number of violent events in Nigeria per state in total. This includes all violent events in Nigeria from 1990 to 2014. The graphs show clusters of many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the very north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state. Borno is perhaps the most important state when studying Boko Haram. Boko Haram emerged out of Maiduguri, a city in Borno. They then recruited young men from the local university as well as almajirai. Almajirai is boys that have received a formal Islamic education. Due to this education and the lack of professional education, many almajirai fail to find employment (Comolli 2015, 70-72). Yusuf promised financial stability and a purpose in life. Yobe state then became the second base of operations when military and the JTF ORO flooded Borno with officials starting in 2009. Why events in Adamawa are high is not particularly clear but may be due to its proximity to Borno state as well as the border to Chad and Cameroon. This border later became significant as more and more fighters were recruited from neighboring countries and splinter groups formed of Boko Haram, involved in conflicts such as the civil war in Mali (Comolli 2015, 115-130). Violent events are particularly high in states such as Borno, as Boko Haram originated out of this state and as it sees a significant number of grievances.
Additionally, **Error! Reference source not found.** shows that data from the GED dataset also coincides with information according to the ACLED database. However, the data seems to show more events than graph 1. This can be due to the methodology used in the ACLED dataset and GED dataset. This methodology can mean that the ACLED database classifies more events as political violence.

**Error! Reference source not found.** and **Error! Reference source not found.** show that violent events are also high in other states, other than Borno. Here, events are still high in Borno state and Bauchi, however also in states located in the Niger Delta such as Delta, Edo, and Bayelsa. These events in the Niger Delta can most likely be attributed to the large oil reserves in the area. These oil reserves have been subject to many conflicts including civil unrest. Starting 2003 militants started to form in the Niger Delta, attempting to fight the exploitation of multinational corporations such as Shell (Pigrau 2013). The data suggest that most events are caused by two groups, Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants.
Transactions

In this graph (Error! Reference source not found.), it is evident that transactions increased explicitly around 2009 when Boko Haram’s activity increased and became more violent. It is interesting to note that this was also the year the Nigerian government began heavily cracking down on Boko Haram, detaining many of its members as well as detaining and killing Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 109). However, after 2010 transactions plummeted, while Boko Haram gained even more traction throughout the years with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014 (Holpuch 2018). It is unclear why transactions plummeted, but maybe due to reasons such as aid dedicated to entirely different areas in the first place or a changing objective of donor countries. For instance, many aid organizations such as the Gates foundation provide aid for global health
problems such as AIDS. AIDS in Nigeria has decreased by 21%. Therefore, programs targeting AIDS prevention would likely decrease the amount of aid given (UNAIDS n.d.)

Figure 6 shows the breakdown of transactions per state in Nigeria. It becomes clear that aid is concentrated at the other side of the country, primarily in states such as Sokoto on the border to Niger, and the cluster of Katsina, Kano, and Kaduna. While Borno state receives considerable amounts of aid, surrounding states such as Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe and Adamawa receive little in comparison. This is shocking as Boko Haram activity concentrates in all of these states with bases in Yobe. However, many nations also give aid for different objectives other than fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, concentrating on different areas. For example, Briggs (2017) found that aid does not flow to the poorest regions in a country (Briggs 2017, 187). The concentrated aid in the North West of Nigeria could be due to poverty levels there (McAdams 2014). Sokoto state has been ranked as the poorest state in Nigeria with a poverty rate of 89.9% (Egbas 2018). Poverty levels in the North East are high as well. States such as Jigawa and Yobe have high poverty levels as well, however, receive less aid. States such as Kano, on the other hand, have also been a victim to considerable high-profile attacks by Boko Haram. This includes explosions killing over 200 people (Comolli 2015, 133). Aid is concentrated in states where
Boko Haram does not necessarily operate which may be due to other objectives of donor countries.

Figure 6: Transactions per state in Nigeria in total, source: AidData

Figure 7: Projects and year, Source: AidData

Figure 8: Projects per state in Nigeria in total with satellite view, Source: AidData
Figure 7 and Error! Reference source not found. show that many areas of Nigeria receive help through projects. Projects are categorized as development projects financed through foreign aid; these projects are aimed at improving certain area or institutions of the country. Notably, Borno has a high number of projects as do Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, and Niger. Projects in Borno are consistent with an argument that aid targets conflict-heavy areas. Cross River on the other hand is a popular tourist destination as it includes many waterfalls, national parks and festivals (Cross River State Government 2019). Kaduna and Kono on the other hand house many corporations such as textile manufacturers (Maiwada and Renne 2013).

Further, Niger is a state in the Niger Delta, the most important oil-producing region in Africa, where militant groups have formed in protest of the oil industry (Pigrau 2013). Projects have fluctuated throughout time with most projects beginning in 2010. From then on projects decreased which could be due to safety concerns. Several aid workers have been targeted and killed by Boko Haram and countries such as the United States de-branding the name USAID from their programs in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 148).

Summary

The quantitative analysis on Nigeria shows that events have increased particularly starting in 2009 corresponding with the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. Transactions and projects also increased around 2009, consistent with this emergence and spur of violence in 2009. However, aid projects and transactions decreased throughout the years, while violent events and the presence of Boko Haram in Nigeria has increased. This is somewhat inconsistent with the hypotheses that aid decreased violence. However, this observation also highlights two problems in this study. For one, this research does not encompass reasons why countries give aid and for what specific area.
The aid given may have been given to target a completely different area of the country, having no effect on violence. Secondly, it is also difficult to conclude whether or not aid reduces violence or if violence simply sparks more countries to give aid. This shows that aid may not be able to decrease violence by itself or that aid is motivated by something other than violence.

**Sierra Leone**

This section explores the data showing the distribution of violent events and aid in Sierra Leone.

### Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum Statistic</th>
<th>Maximum Statistic</th>
<th>Mean Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Deviation Statistic</th>
<th>Variance Statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>30.94</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>21.90</td>
<td>479.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>2 billion</td>
<td>463 million</td>
<td>61 million</td>
<td>467 million</td>
<td>218 quadrillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events (GED)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>186.00</td>
<td>41.45</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>39.32</td>
<td>1546.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events (ACLED)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>370.00</td>
<td>37.84</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>79.78</td>
<td>6365.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sierra Leone, Source: ACLED, GED, AidData*

Table 4 shows 35 observations of violent events (state-year) in the GED dataset and 57 observations in the ACLED database. The minimum amount of events recorded in the GED is 1 with a maximum of 186. Meanwhile, the ACLED has a minimum amount of 0 with a maximum of 370 events. The mean tells us that on average around 40 events were recorded per year. With 41 in the GED dataset and 37 in the ACLED dataset.
Violent Events

Figure 9 and Figure 11 show the increase of violent events starting in 1990 with a spike in 1998, ending around 2000. There is a specific spike of events in 1998 and decrease of events in 1996, 1999 2000 and 2001. The spike of events in 1998 coincides with the intervention of ECOMOG and President Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing him from power (Gberie 2005, 111). The intervention of the ECOMOG forces sparked much violence at. First, however ECOMOG was able to take over major cities and areas. In 1999 events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé peace deal was able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR programs to take into effect. This disarmed many rebels and allowed them to receive food, shelter, and training in return (Gberie 2005, 163). From then on violent events decreased through 2002, when the civil war officially ended.

Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that violent events have increased throughout 1998 and then decreased after the Lomé peace deal was signed in 1999.
Transactions/Aid

Transactions and year, Source: AidData

Figure 13: Transactions and year, Source: AidData

Transactions and province in Sierra Leone, Source: AidData

Figure 14: Transactions and province in Sierra Leone, Source: AidData

Figure 13, Figure 14, Reference source not found. and Figure 16 show that aid was given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to rebuild the country. Figure 11 shows that aid increased after the civil war was over. Around 2003 just right after the civil war ended aid
increased in Sierra Leone with a spike in 2003 and 2010, suggesting aid given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation. Similarly, Figure 11 shows that projects increased as well especially after the end of the civil war and an additional spike from 2007 to 2012.

Summary

This quantitative analysis on Sierra Leone shows that violence in Sierra Leone increased during the civil war, especially coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG forces and fluctuating presidencies and coups. Violence decreased dramatically after the signing of the Lomé peace deal and then further after the end of the war in 2002. After 2002 and with the end of the war came an increase in aid projects and transactions, presumably to reintegrate former soldiers and rebuild the nation. This is consistent with the hypotheses, stating that aid has an impact on post-conflict reconciliation. This is further instrumental in rebuilding the country and reintegrating former soldiers.

Summary of Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis’s primary focus was to test the relationship of foreign aid on political violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis studied the cases of Sierra...
Leone and Nigeria. The analysis focused on Sierra Leone, and Nigeria shows how violent events, transactions, and projects coincide. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is an increase in violent events at the same time as the intervention of ECOMOG forces in the civil war and President Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup (Gberie 2005, 111). Then 1999, around the time of the Lomé peace deal, events decreased drastically. The Lomé peace deal was able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR programs to take into effect. After the Lomé peace deal was signed into effect, violent events decreased through 2002, when the civil war officially ended. After the 2002 mark, transactions and projects increased showing that aid was given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to rebuild the country. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after military interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is worthwhile studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid after the conflict is over.

For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. This also matches with the emergence of Boko Haram in the North, specifically Borno. Transactions increased explicitly around 2009 when Boko Haram’s activity increased and became more violent. However, transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko Haram increased their violent events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014. This is interesting to see as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events increase. This also highlights the difficulty of the project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid, as this is not in the scope of this thesis and would require more research. For instance, the aid given to Nigeria could have been given for reasons other than reducing terrorism. It is also
important to note that both cases benefit from foreign aid as it funnels more resources into the nation, allowing the combatting of grievances.

**Qualitative Analysis**

**A humanitarian approach to Boko Haram by aid organizations**

While the Nigerian government primarily focused on deploying their Nigerian military within states to combat Boko Haram, foreign aid and development programs focused on a more humanitarian approach. As both poverty and education contribute heavily to the circumstances surrounding the recruitment of Boko Haram, this section focuses on aid projects focused on improving education and decreasing poverty. The section then evaluates how much these projects were able to address these grievances commonly associated with political violence.

**Education in Nigeria**

Education in Nigeria begins with basic education which parents expect to be free and starts at six years old. Basic education then consists of six years of primary education and three years of junior education teaching children literacy, math, the three main languages of Nigeria and English. The junior education level then increases the number of courses taken to ten to thirteen and regularly tests the students on their knowledge. Successful completion of their exams rewards them with a certificate to go on to the senior schooling levels. The senior education level is designed to prepare the students for university. After successful completion of three years of senior education and passing the senior level exams, a student may choose to go onto university (International Organization for Migration 2014).

While enrollment in schools in Nigeria rose through the 1970s, the 1990s and post-1990s saw a decline in enrollment. Today around 61% of Nigerian students receive primary education.
However, this number changes according to regional disparities with numbers much lower in the North of Nigeria. In 2010, Northern Nigeria experienced the lowest enrollment rate of 19% while Southern Nigeria’s highest education rate was 91% (International Organization for Migration 2014). The presence of militants and political violence also influences education, especially in the North, with many schools being forced to close (World Bank 2015). Female education enrollment is also much lower compared to male education enrollment in the North, while female education enrollment in the South is higher than male education enrollment in the South.

Education enrollment sees an even more drastic change when it comes to junior, senior and college enrollment. The gross enrollment ratio (GER) for secondary education is estimated to be around 31% with 7.2 million young people not enrolled in school. This ratio falls even more with the transition from junior to senior levels, with a transition rate of 16% (International Organization for Migration 2014). For those that do attend schools learning outcomes are poor. Many students enrolled and graduating from primary school are unable to read which is due to poor skillset of teachers and the lack of resources (World Bank 2015)

Once a student completes the senior education level with plans to attend university, they may face additional capacity challenges. Currently, Nigeria has 153 universities with only around half a million slots open for students each year. In 2013, 1.7 million candidates registered for the university entrance exams, even though slots were limited. While the number of universities keeps increasing, the capacity and quality does not (International Organization for Migration 2014)

A needs assessment of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded by the European Union shows gaps in the Nigerian education system. These gaps start with skill level gaps between Nigerian students and global standards, in science, math, foreign languages
and technology in the basic and post-basic education system. But it also shows that often teachers lack pedagogical, technology and counseling skills. Lack of infrastructure, teaching materials, and research equipment is a crucial factor and a factor in the mass exodus out of Nigeria in search of better education (International Organization for Migration 2014). This mass exodus of people in search of a better education also hurts the Nigerian economy as skilled labor and the educated leave the job market, leaving behind unskilled labor or those with limited education.

_Hypothetical Claim_

To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, we should see that aid projects such as the project on Global Partnership for Education have improved factors such as net school enrollment, literacy rates as well as gender gaps in education.

_Aid Project in Nigeria on Education_

A significant global program to improve education all around the world is the Global Partnership for Education. The Global Partnership for Education is a program that includes several countries aimed to improve education in developing countries working with grants through civil society organizations and coordinating agencies, often the World Bank. Nigeria is a part of the Global Partnership for Education and the last grant the Nigerian government has received is aimed at “promoting school effectiveness and improved learning outcomes”, “increasing access to basic education for out of school girls” and strengthening planning and management systems including learning assessments and capacity development” and has a budget of 100million US dollars (World Bank 2015). The project focuses particularly on Northern states, which also have the highest numbers of out of school children. This is due to many children attending religious schools or poverty. Others begin education much later than at
six years old or drop out of school after receiving their primary education, around age eleven (World Bank 2015).

The grant by the NIPEP supports the Nigerian government in improving human capital in a bid to strengthen its economy. The grant identified five Northern states with especially poor education; those states are Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (World Bank 2015). The goal of improving education is measured with the following indicators:

- Primary Net Enrollment Rate
- Gender Parity Index (primary enrollment)
- Hausa reading rate of students enrolled in the Primary 2 and three grades
- English reading rate of Primary 3 pupils
- Number of Direct Project beneficiaries (disaggregated by gender)
- Establishment of a System for Learning Assessment at the primary level
- The utility of the Learning Assessment System

The project stresses the importance of working together with the Nigerian government as well as the states and to set realistic goals for the project. The project has three components with the following goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Indicators/ Specific Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting School Effectiveness and Improved Learning Outcomes</td>
<td>Grants for students and material, established classrooms, support for the cost of training of teachers, improving enrollment and encouraging students to stay in school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Access to Basic Education for Out-Of-School Girls</td>
<td>Expand basic education to girls through scholarships for students and female teachers, supporting staff, teachers, and facilities crucial in helping girls learn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Planning and Management Systems including Learning Assessment and Capacity Development</td>
<td>Improving management, monitoring and capacity building through audits, reviews and progress reports as well as school visits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, the project also has an estimated risk factor of high due to a relatively short time horizon to implement the policies, the decentralized flow of funds and coordination difficulties across five states and security risks (World Bank 2015). The report also points to corruption as a possible challenge in the project, which the grant aims to curb through improving education management on the local level. The project and funds are also regularly audited to prevent corruption and to increase accountability.

**Project Success**

**Direct Success**

Several factors including percentage enrollment, gender parity index, Hausa and English reading rates for primary students every year measure the success of the project. While the percentage of students enrolled in school decreases during the time the project has been running, the gender parity index increases and the reading levels in English and Hausa stay the same, as seen in table 2 (World Bank 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school net enrollment</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46.40%</td>
<td>46.40%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender parity index</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa reading rates</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English reading rates</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Goal assessment of education project in Nigeria, source: World Bank 2018*

**Aid project impact on terrorism**

While this project is a good start in making education more attainable and increasing the number of students enrolled in school, it misses the important part of non-integrated Qur’anic schools. As Menashy finds in her study, GPE projects often fail to address the issue of private
schooling such as Qur’anic schools (Menashy 2017, 250). Many students that are not enrolled in regular education are enrolled in Qur’anic schools, and most members of Boko Haram are comprised of graduates of Qur’anic schools. Integrating Qur’anic schools is essential to improving the education level in Nigeria as many Qur’anic schools do not teach math, science or languages. Some programs to look for in this matter is a project by UNICEF in Nigeria.

UNICEF projects implemented in Nigeria focus on the integration of Qur’anic schools with the regular education system and improving the education system overall. UNICEF in Nigeria focuses particularly on girls’ education as well as capacity building and focusing on children not enrolled in school. The program aims to work with the Nigerian government as well as unilateral aid-organizations such as USAID. UNICEF particularly plans to increase teacher competencies and gender inclusive pedagogy, which will be done through capacity building for primary teachers and Qur’anic facilities (UN ECOSOC 2017). The program also supports strengthening the community and their understanding of education as well as increasing enrollment through enrollment drives. UNICEF in Nigeria has also been able to inspire local imams and Qur’anic leaders to integrate their schools with the Nigerian education system (Akingbulu 2018).

Possible Shortcomings

The project failed the expectations set to satisfy H1. H1 states that countries that receive more aid see less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a strengthened rule of law. However, this does not necessarily mean that the project has done no good. In table 2 it becomes evident that the project has increased the percentage of schools benefiting from grants and further training. This project is one of many, and it may take several projects over time to sufficiently improve the factors set as determining factors in the
hypothetical claim section. The project report also fails to incorporate a critical view of the project fully and does not address limitations. However, a large part of this may be because the project is still going on and is not scheduled to be finished until 2019.

A better idea of the success of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) may be gained through scholarly reports on the program. Menashy (2017) studies the overall success of the Global Partnership for Education project with special attention to private schooling. Overall, GPE projects fail to address private schooling in receiving countries (Menashy 2017, 240). Menashy argues that this is mostly due to the multistakeholder nature of the GPE, representing many political bodies that choose to “strategically avoid” the topic of private education. This is largely due to the possibility of institutional clashing, causing political entities in multistakeholder organizations to avoid the subject. This further applies to other policies that may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education highlighting the issue (Menashy 2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which may render the projects by the GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals.

Summary

The project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals such as improving access to education. This, however, does not mean that aid is necessarily unsuccessful in addressing grievances but highly conditional on understanding and addressing local conditions. Understanding and addressing these local conditions is important for the success of the project but also to cut down recruitment for a terror organization. For instance, the project did not focus enough on Qur’anic schools, a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits. Additionally, this project faces criticism of the general structure of GPE projects due to its multistakeholder nature.
Poverty in Nigeria

As evident in the section on education, poverty is growing in Nigeria and impacting other sectors such as education. During the 1990s economic growth stagnated, however, this improved through the 200s with an increase of 5% in GDP (World Bank 2014). The economy in Nigeria is, however, still not growing enough to support the large population. Poverty was especially bad after the Nigerian military rule ended, characterized as a rural phenomenon with rates of up to 70% in some rural areas. While the poverty rate decreased for a short period in 2004, the total population living in poverty did not decrease due to population growth. The poverty rate then increased again in 2010 to rates of 70% (World Bank 2014). This poverty rate has devastating consequences for another sector of life, decreasing the number of children being able to go to school, decreasing the amount of the population with safe access to water and increasing child mortality rates.

The poverty rates in Nigeria are high, although there are a general increase and improvement of the Nigerian economy. Today, the Nigerian economy is considered the largest economy in Africa is mostly benefiting from the petroleum industry (Ajayi 2019). The Nigerian economy benefited from an increase in oil prices in the 1970s, massively increasing the economy. This also improved infrastructure, government services, construction and manufacturing jobs which led to many people moving to more urban areas. The sudden migration from rural to more urban centers, reduced the agricultural sector massively causing the need to import primary commodities (Ajayi 2019). Beginning with the 21st century, Nigeria continued to face unsteady growth which led the government to lend from international sources and introducing austerity measures. To repay their massive debt, much of the national budget was designated to repay loans. A 2005 debt-relief plan by the Paris Club forgave Nigeria most of
its debt. However, the high fluctuation of oil prices led Nigeria to a recession in 2016, from which the country is still recovering from today (Adebayo 2018).

Poverty is still a devastating factor in the lives of many Nigerians today. As of 2018, Nigeria has the largest number of people living in poverty followed by India. Eighty-seven million Nigerians live in poverty today, on average living on less than $2 a day (Adebayo 2018). This number is further increasing with an average of six people falling into extreme poverty every minute. While Nigeria has launched programs such as the structural adjustment program pre-1999, this also failed in improving poverty (World Bank 2014). A recent report by Oxfam and Development Finance International ranked the commitment to reducing poverty from the Nigerian government at the bottom of 157 countries (Kazeem 2018).

**Hypothetical Claim**

To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, the World Bank project on alleviating poverty should see an increase in access to basic infrastructure in select states.

**Aid Project in Nigeria on Poverty**

The fail in the structural adjustment program in the 1990s led the government to rethink their approach to poverty in Nigeria, which fostered a partnership with the World Bank. The World Bank along with the Nigerian government and the African Development Bank then developed the CPRP project with the following project objectives:

- To improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure
- To increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level
The project focuses on the states with the highest poverty levels, as selected by the Nigerian government; Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi and Yobe (World Bank 2014). In another phase of the program the states Edo, Gombe, Osun, Zamfara, Ebonyi and Kwara were added. The project marked the first large poverty reduction project targeted at fostering community-based projects. The project was also the first poverty reduction project partly carried out by the government, focusing on the community aspect at all. The project cost around 103million U.S dollars with the following goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Indicators/Specific Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Support institutions in poverty monitoring, monitor impact of state-led programs, provide resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based initiatives in basic social and economic infrastructure</td>
<td>Independent state-level social fund to fund community initiatives, education and information on the local level, supervising and funding micro-projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7: Project Goals, Source: World Bank 2014*

The project has a complex framework with several parties involved, including ministries at the federal level, the respective state governments, and community level governments and committees. The framework of the project can is summarized in Figure 17.
The project was largely carried out by the Nigerian National Planning Commission (NPC), which is the Nigerian agency responsible for poverty reduction. However, this was switched to the Federal Ministry of Finance as the NPC lacked the capacity for the project.

**Project Success**

**Direct Success**

The success of the project is evaluated by measuring the outcomes of the two objectives, improving access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure and increasing the availability and management of development resources at the community level. Access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure has been improved, with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects were mostly focused on education, water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014). The projects were also sustainable, with 92% of projects still being operated after one year and...
around 90% of projects after four years. Figure 2 shows the number of projects per state and sector.

Figure 18: Amount of projects per state and sector, source: World Bank 2014

3085 communities benefited from the project, accounting for 10.3 million residents. In addition, school enrollment in primary states grew by around 60% in states where the project was being carried out. The second outcome measured, increasing the availability and management of development resources at the community level is rated modest with over 300 communities participated in micro-projects. Over 300 organizations also received skill-based training in managing funds. While agencies and arrangements were put in place, cooperation between the government and community does not appear strengthened.

Aid project impact on political violence and recruitment

The project did meet the goals set to satisfy H1. The project was able to improve basic infrastructure to reduce poverty. Reducing poverty and creating social stability is instrumental in
stabilizing the country and groups that are at risk of being recruited. Poverty is a factor that can constitute relative deprivation and therefore increase frustration among the population. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark levels of unemployment, as well as economic need, often play a significant role in the recruitment of members in terror cells. While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it certainly aids terrorist organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55).

Poverty is a big factor in recruiting within terror cells due to psychological and economic factors. A psychological factor is the decreasing positive outlook on life and opportunity. Lack of opportunity is also the main economic reason, having no job and little money to provide for public services. The lack of opportunity becomes an easy target for terror cells that can provide a sense of belonging, public services and status. For instance, Boko Haram was able to provide monetary incentives to their members and splinter groups of Boko Haram are currently providing public services. Especially the provision of public services by the splinter group ISWAP garners much support, as these services are provided to non-Members as well (Obaji 2019). The project is still important, however, as it increases institutional access to education and the provision of public services. Therefore, the program is a good start in reducing the recruitment of members. However the state needs to be strengthened as well to increase public resources.

Possible Shortcomings

The project has improved access to basic infrastructure immensely as seen in figure 2. However, the success of the project may be limited as the results framework had not been fully developed at the time of the project. Several components of the projects, especially funding community projects had no designated organization to provide these resources. Another limiting
factor in community projects was the lack of trust between the Nigerian government and individual communities (World Bank 2014).

Further, the monitoring and evaluation process of the project was not spelled out directly, causing shortcomings. Baseline results were also not included in the project as the M & E process was poorly spelled out, making the evaluation of goals attained much more difficult. Several important factors that needed to be recorded for successful evaluation were not recorded including but not limited to the involvement and attendance of community members in the project, poverty data at the beginning of the project and number of organizations involved (World Bank 2014).

While the World Bank addresses some of their shortcomings in their report, detailing improvements, other factors can have an impact as well. Nigeria has suffered from extreme poverty in the North, yet the states chosen to be a part of the project were not the ones with the highest poverty levels. This means states with especially low poverty did not benefit from the project. Of course, this is not much of a shortcoming as other states benefited from the program; however targeting the correct states is crucial in reducing circumstances that influence the recruitment of Boko Haram members.

Summary

The project was generally successful in implementing social programs and curbing recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects were mostly focused on education, water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014). However, the project ran into some problems as it was not fully developed and frameworks to assess the success of the project was
not fully developed before the project began to take off. In addition, while the project is a good start to curb the recruitment of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the government of Nigeria.

**Reconstructing Sierra Leone through aid projects**

Some improvements have been made in Sierra Leone through the past years, and aid projects still play a pivotal role. Some improvements were achieved through local councils. In addition, a new National Election Commission Local and provisional security has been established throughout the country, and the United Nations, as well as British troops, were integral in helping the country post-conflict. The situation of the youth has also seen an emergence of self-organized organizations. One example is the Bike Riders Association, a group of former child soldiers that mostly stole motorcycles during the war. Today they earn their money by providing transportation to people. The group has a membership base with an identity card and maintenance support, much like a tax organization. However, none of these organizations include girls, who have been hurt the most and have the least amount of power (Kaldor and Vincent 2006).

As institutions and the rule of law are often damaged by political violence, post-conflict efforts have to focus on reconstructing institutions and reintegrating the community. Sound institutions such as the rule of law can often aid in reintegrating the community and fostering a new trust between the community. Aid organizations and projects can help foster this new trust and help rebuild institutions, as long as projects are tailored to the country’s needs (Mlambo 2009). In the case of Sierra Leone aid projects focused on topics such as education, the rule of law to further overall disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The aid projects I
focus on in this section focuses on one DDR project focused on ex-combatants and the other on education in Sierra Leone.

**DDR in Sierra Leone**

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects are vital to stopping a country from slipping back into a civil war. Broken institutions, as well as the shadow state and economy of Sierra Leone, can further foster this situation. The idea of DDR programs is to part fighters from their weapons and militias and then help them into civilian life through education, money and training. Since the 1908’s there have been over sixty DDR programs, many focusing on Sierra Leone and its civil war (The Economist 2018). DDR projects started with the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé peace deal negotiations were the first negotiations that gave civil society a voice in peace deal negotiations, unlike in the previous three peace deal negotiations. However, the civil society’s demand for justice was met with little enthusiasm from the government and the RUF. Eventually, the peace deal included a ceasefire, the emergence of a DDR project and the inclusion of the RUF in the Sierra Leonean government as well as amnesty for all fighters (except crimes against humanity) and their reintegration into the community. The DDR process in Sierra Leone consisted of three stages. The first stage started under the Kabbah regime in 1998 with the support of the UNDP, ECOMOG and the World Bank. This stage was designed to provide an out for fighters, especially in already defeated regions (Sesay and Suma 2009). This also saw the emergence of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDRR) to further coordinate the reintegration of fighters.

Phase two then included RUF representatives, but otherwise still had the same mandate. This time the NCDDR and UNAMSIL chaired more important parts of the committee. Phase three then began after fighting continued throughout 2000, after the signing of the Lomé peace
deal. The Abuja accords, a ceasefire agreement between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, called for further disarmament of all fighters involved in the war. This stage was the final stage as it saw no further outbursts of violence, allowing more collection centers to be set up.

The DDR process also allowed ex-fighters to be reintegrated into their community by offering training, education and monetary incentive (Sesay and Suma 2009). However, the DDR process left little space for women and children. The biggest challenge was that the DDR process was only designed for ex-combatants, meaning women and children that were used as cooks, maids or medics were left out. Women that were combatants, however, often did not receive any incentive either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. The official DDR program of Sierra Leone ended in 2003.

**Hypothetical claim**

If H2 holds to be true, we should see an increase in ex-combatants receiving training and being reintegrated in the community and an increase in women participating in these programs through the project on DDR.

**Aid Project in Sierra Leone on DDR**

DDR has been the focus of many multilateral and unilateral aid projects. One of these projects is carried out by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GIZ). The projects overall goal was to foster DDR in Sierra Leone, specifically reintroducing ex-combatants into civilian life and establishing a peaceful community. Other goals included poverty reduction, securing the internal peace process and creating a more inclusive space for women. The program was employed in partnership with the NCDDR and Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODOP), starting in 2000 until 2005 with a total contribution of around six million Euros (Trentmann 2010). The project focused on
vocational training as a means to reintegrate ex-combatants as well as peace building and skills training. The project also emphasizes capacity building through the community, local and national level. The project aimed to re-integrate ex-combatants and through this improve the following four markers:

- Poverty reduction through vocational training allowing ex-combatants to reduce their chances of slipping into poverty
- Gender equality by giving men and women the same opportunities in attaining training
- Crisis prevention integrated into the training
- Environmental factors such as agricultural training

The project also identified markers to evaluate the project success after initial training and the start of the project. The markers are designed to identify the impact the project will have in the long-term (Trentmann 2010). These markers are:

- 75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled villages
- 50% of people trained in income generating activities are still active
- The population in targeted communities qualifies as non-violent

**Project Success**

*Direct Success*

The project had considerable success in their four individual markers and the overall goal to reintegrate ex-combatants in the community. In particular, different social groups were able to be reintegrated into society; this was especially successful in the local regions of Kailahun, Port Loko, and Pujehun. However, the project covered more than just these three districts. In total, the project focused on thirteen different states (Trentmann 2010). The project was able to
successfully integrate several social groups into their programs and took community needs and preferences into account. The project was also able to address goals set in poverty reduction, gender equality, and crisis prevention. However, sustainability in terms of environmental factors could see improvement. The project success can, therefore, be summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Goal</th>
<th>Success of Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>The training was able to provide a better socioeconomic status to all groups (men, women, and children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>Women and men had equal access to training facilities; caring centers provided an opportunity for mothers to care for their children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis prevention</td>
<td>Civil and human rights, as well as crisis management, were taught as part of the training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental factors/ sustainability</td>
<td>Agricultural training taught the importance of sustainability, but no measurements were taken to improve this</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8: Project goals, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ)*

Overall the project was able to train 2354 persons [1258 noncombatants (521 women); 874 ex-combatants (99 women) and 222 ex-child soldiers]. Additionally, some of the long-term goals were met by the project, as detailed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-term Goal</th>
<th>Success of Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled villages</td>
<td>80-88% of trained ex-combatants remained in the settled villages and are considered integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% of people trained in income generating activities are still active</td>
<td>60% of trained ex-combatants report their source of income as business activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The population in targeted communities qualifies as non-violent</td>
<td>No quantitative markers have been set or reported for this goal, but self-reports of ex-combatants point towards reduced violence due to training and general acceptance in the community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 9: Outcomes of Project, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ)*
Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation

The project meets all the goals set as markers for the hypothesis to hold true, however, could have done more to incorporate former female soldiers and women trapped in the war. The project was able to reintegrate many former soldiers into communities, training them and providing them with work. This is crucial in post-conflict reconciliation as grievances, and possible relative deprivation should be addressed to curb future political violence. This project is a good start in terms of DDR, giving ex-combatants an opportunity to receive training and reintegration into society.

While the project does include women in their DDR process, they do not receive special attention or consideration in this project. Women in Sierra Leone often do not receive training such as the one in the DDR project. Women in Sierra Leone participated in the civil war in the forms of wives, maids, cooks or medics. However, many DDR programs require weapons to be turned in, in return for training (Sesay and Suma 2009). As a result of that, women are often left out of the DDR effort. Even women that did participate in the war as combatants did not receive any training either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. Women in Sierra Leone are at the periphery of society, struggling with domestic violence and suffering from FGM. Violence against women was a horrible side effect during the civil war and did not stop after the war was over. While some laws are designed to give women an out in abusive relationships, most of these laws are never enforced. Other laws allow men to have immense control over women, especially in a marriage. For instance, a widow can be forced to marry her deceased husbands’ brother or risk losing her home, land, and children (Larson 2013). A woman that wishes to report a case of domestic abuse has to undergo immense cost for medical
procedures and filing a police report, while her case may result in no charges filed and her return to the relationship.

**Possible Shortcomings**

While the project was generally successful, the post-project evaluation also finds some possible shortcomings in the implementation of the project. The overall effectiveness of the project was rated as good; however, some issues arose working multilaterally. Through the project, one of the key partners in the project the NCDDR in Sierra Leone ceased to exist. This made reconciling data especially difficult, as no institutions were present anymore (Trentmann 2010). This also further complicated the evaluation process.

The project also failed to include any monitoring process to assess issues at the beginning of the project. Further, the project had a high financial need for personnel, training and technical staff which is justified by the post-war situation and the need for DDR projects. The project also did not put much emphasis on agriculture and farming and provided only little training in this. The evaluation report recognizes that and suggests further building on training in farming so ex-combatants can support their livelihood. Lastly, the project recognizes the importance of women in the DDR process; however, fails to address their role in the civil war (Trentmann 2010).

**Summary**

This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms of reintegrating and training former soldiers to rebuild communities and the country. Specifically, the DDR project was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing their own business. This project is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing future political violence by decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training former soldiers decreases the
opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience grievances. While the project did a good job overall, it could have done more to include women and former female soldiers. The program retrained 2354 persons, of which only around 500 were women. Women continue to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights and lack of enforcement mechanisms for attained rights.

**Education in Sierra Leone**

Education in Sierra Leone faces many challenges partly due to the destruction of institutions from the civil war. The Ebola virus outbreak in the country made providing education even more difficult by decreasing the economy and national spending on education. In 2015 the economy had decreased by 21% as a result of the Ebola outbreak. Domestic revenue declined by 10% of the GDP and inflation increased to 9.8% by the end of 2014 and further 17.4% by 2016. This has caused a decrease in overall national spending, impacting the education sector. In 2013, the percentage of public expenditure spent on education was 2.4% of the GDP and the amount per student around $106-150, the lowest in the West African region (World Bank 2017).

On the individual level, participation rates have decreased after the Ebola outbreak. Socioeconomic and regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra Leone. The quality of education is further impacted by limited access to primary and secondary education. While this has improved, the number of schools in Sierra Leone is still considerably low, and many schools are private, keeping enrollment rates low (World Bank 2017). For students that are in school, learning outcomes and retention rates are poor. 87% of first graders in Sierra Leone are unable to read a single word and poor writing and speaking skills. Many students also drop out of school, for instance around 52% of students dropped out of the first
grade in 2012. Students are also plagued by gender disparities, with women being more likely to drop out of school than men. Teacher qualifications also decrease the quality of education in Sierra Leone. Teachers are often not trained or trained but lack the knowledge and pedagogical skillset to mentor students (World Bank 2017). Lack of infrastructure is another issue in education in Sierra Leone. The lack of the number of schools in Sierra Leone leads to overcrowding and excessive student-teacher ratios. Around 50% of schools have a student-teacher ratio of 40:1 and classrooms are poorly equipped, lack textbooks and need repairs.

Nevertheless, the Sierra Leonean government has improved in terms of education, moving from a recovery to a development phase. In 2007, Sierra Leone joined the Global Partnership for Education starting several aid projects. The government mostly works with other aid organizations to implement an education project. These projects mostly focus on girl’s education, the quality of education as well as capacity building (World Bank 2017).

Hypothetical claim

To make an impact on post-conflict reconciliation and for H2 to hold to be true, the project should rebuild the institution of education through an increase in education quality, a number of teachers receiving training and girls receiving an education.

Aid Project in Sierra Leone on Education

The aid project of interest is a project by the World Bank to increase access to education, enrollment rates, and learning outcomes. The project is built on recent issues with the Ebola outbreak and the cut of national spending. The project, Revitalizing Education Development in Sierra Leone (REDiSL), was developed by the Sierra Leonean government with the help of several other developmental agencies such as the World Bank as part of the Global Partnership of Education. REDiSL was founded in 2014 to support already existing framework, with a
budget of 22 million U.S dollars. The already existing framework, the Education Sector Plan (ESP) was built on three pillars:

- Access, equity, and completion
- Quality and learning outcomes
- Systems strengthening

REDiSL was created to support these pillars with the following global objectives further:

- Fragile and post-conflict countries implement sound ESP’s
- All girls complete primary school and enroll in secondary school
- The number of students mastering grade 3 literacy and numeracy skills increases
- Improved teacher effectiveness
- Increased volume in financing

At the time of implementation, the project was assessed to benefit over 6,000 primary schools and 900,000 students with 50% of those being female (World Bank 2014). This is done through three different learning goals as outlined below.

*Improving the learning environment and opportunities in targeted areas*

This goal was targeted through performance-based school grants, programs to increase school readiness and strengthening reading outcomes. Performance-based school grants are projected to increase access to additional resources, increase the learning environment and increase training for school officials. Schools must meet agreed-upon requirements and markers to continue receiving funding, to implement a reward-based system for schools that foster quality education. Schools are ‘judged’ by the number of days open, the amount of students in classes and amount of classes as well as quality indicator monitoring (World Bank 2014). School
readiness is improved through an individual project providing 50 pre-primary classrooms, teacher training as well as available teacher resources. Reading outcomes are strengthened through providing books for students as well as teachers, a national reading campaign and training for teachers.

*Strengthening education service delivery*

This goal is designed to improve the measurement of education outcomes, establishing a new data collection system and a sounds system of providing education. The project provides technical coordination to analyze education assessments. This will then aid in establishing a new data collection system. This data collection system is built on the student census that has been carried out by the ministry with the help of the World Bank. The goal of this data collection system is to increase the autonomy of the Sierra Leonean government in assessing education in their country. The project also supports improving the successful delivery of education, mostly by aiding the Nigerian government in providing and establishing assessments, improve staff capacity and the development of budgets.

*Project Success*

*The direct success of the project*

The project was originally met with difficulties due to the Ebola outbreak, which prompted many schools to close. The project has met several criteria and has overall increased school performance, teachers’ skills and implemented. Overall the project had 2.3 million beneficiaries, reopened 8,100 schools, and 44 percent of schools have met 60 percent of performance targets (World Bank 2017). In addition, 50 pre-primary classrooms have been built, 1,350 schools are still receiving performance-based school grants, 5,970 schools have been disinfected and have received handwashing stations post-Ebola outbreak, 36,000 handwashing
stations have been distributed to schools. Perhaps most importantly, however, all 14 districts of Sierra Leone benefitted from the project. The success of the project can be summarized by the following markers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of schools that meet at least 60% of performance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60 %</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of trained teachers using new methods</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools reopened</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>8,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of project beneficiaries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,262,515</td>
<td>1,230,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female beneficiaries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 10: Project Baselines and Results, Source: World Bank 2017*

Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation

While not reaching all of the target goals, this project was able to increase the quality and accessibility of education. The project is important to consider for post-conflict reconciliation as it increases and rebuilds the institution of education. After a civil war, the main challenge for a state is the damage done to institutions. Therefore, strengthening these institutions can have a positive impact on the country. Education is especially important as it prepares the future of the country and therefore directly impacts the path the country can take. While socioeconomic and regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra Leone, this project is a good step in the right direction to rebuilding this institution. The improvement of education is mostly able to address a weakened civil society with high unemployment and former child
soldiers needing a new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). An important factor and the end goal of post-conflict reconciliation is curbing the emergence of political violence. Addressing high unemployment and former child soldiers is therefore crucial to curb grievances and relative deprivation that may arise in the future. This project is instrumental in rebuilding institutions especially for former child soldiers and the unemployment, recognizing that most unemployed in Sierra Leone are former child soldiers.

**Possible Shortcomings**

The project faced difficulties with the Ebola outbreak, causing the delay of the project by one year. The project made up for this by increasing the disbursement amounts. In addition, some data such as the number of teachers trained, and policy guidelines developed have not been assessed yet as the project received additional funding in 2017, moving the closing date of the project to 2018.

Another factor is the wide criticism of the Global Partnership on Education project. Just like in the Global Partnership on Education project in Nigeria, possible shortcomings are addressed by Menashy (2017). The author finds that GPE projects often fail to address private schooling in receiving countries, which is mostly due to the number of political entities in a multistakeholder project (Menashy 2017, 240). These political bodies then choose to “strategically avoid” the topic of private education, to avoid institutional clashing. This further applies to other policies that may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education highlighting the issue (Menashy 2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which may render the projects by the GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals.
Summary

The project can be considered successful in curbing political violence and aiding in post-conflict reconciliation. While the project had some difficulties with starting due to the Ebola outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and benefited all districts in Sierra Leone (World Bank 2017). While the general structure of GPE projects has received criticism due to its multistakeholder nature, this project was able to address problems in education in Sierra Leone. This aid is also important in cases of public sectors such as education, as the government is still working to rebuild this with limited funds. Lastly, the rebuilding and commitment to education in Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources available for former child soldiers and to combat unemployment. While we cannot say for certain that this will curb violence in the end, it is more likely to as grievances are often motivators for violence. Foreign aid is crucial in these case studies as it enables these projects to have an impact in areas in the country that may not be the priority for the nation or that the nation is unable to fund.

Conclusion

This research aimed to understand the relationship between foreign aid and political violence. Throughout the paper, I explored the theory of aid and aid projects being able to alleviate some grievances that in turn cause political violence. In addition, I focused on post-conflict reconciliation projects and how they can curb future cases of political violence. For the research, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis further explored my theory utilizing two different datasets. One dataset included data on the number of attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Nigeria. The other dataset also looked at a number of attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Sierra
Leone. The qualitative analysis studied four different aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, focusing on poverty reduction, education, and DDR.

**Summary and Discussion of the Qualitative Analysis**

The qualitative analysis looked at individual projects being able to improve grievances in the individual country and turn either improving recruitment of terror cells or post-conflict reconciliation. For the case of Nigeria, two projects were studied. One was a project on education focused on connecting the Nigerian government and the Global Partnership for Education. This project aimed to increase school enrollment, reading levels and equal education for both genders. However, the project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals, but should not be completely disregarded. While the project was not able to reach its goals, it still focused resources into Nigerian schools and established a partnership between the Nigerian government and other world organizations to improve education. The project most likely had little influence on recruitment for a terror organization as the project did not focus enough on Qur’anic schools, a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits.

The other project in Nigeria focused on poverty reduction and was implemented by the World Bank. The project was able to implement social programs, possibly helping to curb terror cell recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. While the project is a good start to curb the recruitment of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the government of Nigeria. Terror organizations involved in providing public services continues being a problem and garners them support and recruits.
In the case of Sierra Leone, this research studied two different projects with the goal of post-conflict reconciliation. The first project focused on DDR and retraining former soldiers of the Sierra Leonean civil war. This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms of reintegrating and training former soldiers in an effort to rebuild communities and the country. Specifically, the DDR project was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing their own business. This project is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing future political violence by decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training former soldiers decreases the opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience grievances. However, the project could have done more to include women and former female soldiers. Women continue to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights and lack of enforcement mechanisms for attained rights.

The second project focused on education in Sierra Leone. This project was also implemented by the Global Partnership for Education. While the project had some difficulties with starting due to the Ebola outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and benefited all districts in Sierra Leone. The project was able to rebuild education in some communities which are an important factor for post-conflict reconciliation. The commitment to education in Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources available for former child soldiers and to combat unemployment.

**Summary and Discussion of the Quantitative Analysis**

The quantitative analysis aimed to research the relationship of foreign aid on political violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis focused on Sierra Leone shows the increases of violent events coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG and President Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing him from power (Gberie 2005,
111). In 1999 events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé peace deal was able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR programs to take into effect. From then on violent events decreased through 2002, when the civil war officially ended.

Further, aid in Sierra Leone increased after the civil war was over, suggesting aid given to assist in post-conflict reconciliation. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after military interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is worthwhile studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid.

For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the very north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state. Borno is perhaps the most important state as Boko Haram first emerged from there. In terms of aid, transactions increased specifically around 2009, when Boko Haram’s activity increased and became more violent. However, transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko Haram increased their violent events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014. This is interesting to see as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events increase.

**Comparison to Expectations and Limitations in this Study**

Expectations for this study reflect the two hypotheses, one being that foreign aid has a positive impact on political violence and the other being that foreign aid has a negative impact on violence. The analysis of Sierra Leone confirmed that countries give aid after a conflict or civil
war to further post-conflict reconciliation, confirming one of the expectations, that foreign aid has a positive impact on violence. The case of Sierra Leone showed that the amount of aid and projects increased after the war ended making a case for post-conflict reconciliation. The quantitative analysis of Nigeria, however, showed that aid transactions and projects decreased after the number of violent events increased, which did not match either narrative. Rather, this scenario confirmed the null hypothesis of the first hypothesis stating that foreign aid does have an impact on political violence. These further highlight two issues, one being the difficulty of the project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid, as this is not in the scope of this thesis and would require more research.

In the qualitative analysis, the expectations were similar. I expected to see aid projects targeting grievances such as poverty and education or reintegrating former soldiers. The projects in Sierra Leone were able to retrain and reintegrate former soldiers into the country, while the projects in Nigeria had some success with providing education and poverty alleviation. These aid projects did target grievances; however, it is difficult to assess their true impact on violence. For one, this project does not assess the long-term effects of DDR efforts and post-conflict reconciliation on grievances and curbing violence. Similarly, the impact of lowering poverty and improving education cannot be assessed in the long-term either.

**Implications of this Project**

This project summarizes the effects of foreign aid on political violence. While this project only studied two cases, the implications can be applied widely. This project shows that aid an important foreign policy tool and proves its effectiveness to policymakers. Firstly, this project displays that aid can have an impact on political violence, especially in terms of post-conflict reconciliation. This means policymakers in another country or of a non-governmental
organization can continue giving aid and implementing aid projects in stats that have just suffered a conflict.

This study also proves that aid projects can be used to reduce grievances that can lead to violence, potentially curbing violence and recruitment in the end. This is applicable globally and not just to the two case studies as political violence has the same common motivators, as laid out at the beginning of this paper and explained by Gurr. For policymakers this means that giving aid with the goal of reducing or curbing violence can be succesful. However, the case study of Nigeria shows that these aid giving countries need proper research of the country that is supposed to receive aid and instiutionts in place. This is important to make sure grievances are really addressed in order to have an impact on violence.

While this project only studied two cases the findings can be applied more broadly. This project can be applied to any nation that suffers from political violence and receives foreign aid. This raises the question why nations that experience political violence and foreign aid do not become more peaceful. This thesis would suggest that this would be due to aid funneled into the country without targeting the correct areas, leaving grievances to increase. This again goes to show how important proper research is on behalf of the giving country or organization. However, donors may also experience limitations of where aid can go or may be unwilling to send aid to already fragile areas.

Further implications of this research are that aid projects can have a significant impact on post-conflict reconciliation and help in rebuilding the country. This in turn then reduces grievances, again curbing potential future violence. This can also be applied globally, as most countries experience the same common problems after a conflict or war, mostly due to broken
institutions. Therefore, this project can be applied broadly in the study of foreign aid on political violence.

**Further research**

As laid out in the sections on limitations to this project, this project is not able to study the short-term and long-term effects of aid and aid projects on violence. This project merely spells out the impact aid can have on grievances, studying specific aid project and traces the impact aid has had on violence. Current limitations include the lack of research on aid allocation. Therefore, a long-term study of violence and aid could show us how past projects have influenced violence. This is something that could be explored with more time and could give some clarity to the causal effects of the study.
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Appendix

Nigeria’s History and Violent Extremism

To understand political violence in Nigeria today, one must look at Nigeria’s history and violent extremism in the past. When studying violent extremism in Nigeria, it is important to consider ethnic tensions and political context as well as religion (Comolli 2015, 11). Up until the nineteenth century, northern Nigeria used to be dominated by city-states and kingdoms largely composed of Hausa elite. Hausa is an ethnic group in Nigeria. However, wars were the norm as kings constantly tried to increase their empire. The rulers of the Hausaland converted to Islam predating Christianity in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 12). Usman Dan Fodio is considered to be the founder of Islam in Nigeria and helped spread Islam across the northern region of Nigeria by declaring jihad against infidels in 1804. Today, he still an important figure in Nigeria and serves as inspiration for many groups. For instance, Boko Haram declared in a letter in 2011 that they strive to bring back the memory and legacy of Dan Fodio (Comolli 2015, 13-14). Dan Fodio belonged to the Fulani that eventually moved to Hausaland; he then became a widely respected figure in his ethnic group alongside his group, the Qadiriyya Brotherhood. He gained trust and support in the states Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara. The government of Nigeria and extremist groups then first came in contact when the King Yunfa took the Gobir throne in 1801 and decided to persecute and exile the Fulani. Gobir is the former name of Nigeria, as it was still evolving and found to be a city-state (Comolli 2015, 13). Dan Fodio and his followers moved to Gudu and began an opposition. Later on, Dan Fodio was elected Amir al-Mumiriin which led to political power (Comolli 2015, 14). Eventually, this led to King Yunfa and Dan Fodio beginning a feud with Fodio starting a guerrilla warfare.
Dan Fodio and the Fulani people then began attacking the Hausa, fed up with oppression, high taxes and violations of Sharia law such as the permission of alcohol. In 1809 Hausa kings were ousted, and Fodio became the first Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate in Gobir (Comolli 2015, 15). Today the caliph of Sokoto remains a popular and leading figure, one whose support is sought by the Nigerian government. Dan Fodio then extended his jihad covering areas under control as far as Bauchi, Nupe, and Yoruba. Today the Hausa and Fulani are known as the Hausa-Fulani as they joined forces when they both shared a common religion. They make up 30% of Nigeria’s population, and Hausa is the most common spoken language (Comolli 2015, 16). When the British colonized Nigeria, decided to leave the Fulani alone, as they were scared of resistance. This allowed them to expand their empire (Comolli 2015, 16-17). After the colonial rule was over in 1960 most positions in the government were given to the Igbos. Then, in 1966 an attempted coup d’état resulted in the killing of two prominent northern leaders, which resulted in an Igbo, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi becoming president. Northern soldiers then launched a counter-coup, and Igbo’s living in the North became isolated. In 1967, Ojukwu, the governor of the southeast declared the Republic of Biafra, a newly independent country. A war erupted, between the Nigerian government with the help of British forces against weakened Biafran people. The war also impoverished many and led to a famine that led to 2 million Biafrans dying (Comolli 2015, 16-18).

Religious and ethnic tensions have continued since Nigeria’s independence in October 1960.-Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian Nobel Peace Laureate has said, "I consider myself a Yoruba before I'm a Nigerian. That is my immediate instant identity. And I think most intellectuals will say the same thing, and politicians. However, here we are together, brought together by the British. They are operating the same constitution. A new identity which supervenes the various
ethnic nationalities is born” (al-Jazeera 2010). Despite Soyinka’s optimism, rival ethnic, regional and religious identities have contributed to violence and instability, as Nigeria alternated between democracy and military rule since independence (al-Jazeera 2010). Regional, religious and ethnic leaders competed for control of the state and the power and resources that came with it, as when efforts by Igbo leaders in the oil-rich southeastern region of Nigeria to secede sparked a bloody civil war in 1967 (al-Jazeera 2010). The mixture of poor job prospects as well as poverty with ethnic disparities and exclusions have shown to heavily correlate with successful recruitment and individual motivation in Africa (UNDP 2017, 55). Today, scholars argue that the people living in the North in Nigeria may fall back onto sharia law and education as they view the state as a failure as well as its education system (Comolli 2015, 18-19).

**Background on Boko Haram or Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad**

*Beginnings in Borno state under Lawan and Yusuf*

Boko Haram’s origin can be traced back to 1995 at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, where a Muslim leader, Lawan, set up a Muslim youth organization. This organization was built around a conservative non-violent movement. However, in 2002, Lawan left, and Mohammed Yusuf was appointed the leader of the sect (Comolli 2015, 45-47). The first out of violence then emerged in 2003 when public buildings and police stations were attacked in Yobe. It is unclear what lead to this, but the existing political sphere could have contributed including the re-election of Christian President Obasanjo in 2003 (Comolli 2015, 50). The widely accepted origin of Boko Haram is said to be that the youth was fed up with corruption around them which prompted them to move to Yobe and set up a base there, named “Afghanistan.” New members arrived from other countries, such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. After increased military
strikes against Boko Haram in Yobe, they returned to Borno. Boko Haram then began to expand their reach into Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger after returning to Borno (Comolli 2015, 50-51).

Eventually Boko Haram gained power through Boko Haram members being sitting members of city councils, setting up a “state within a state” with police and cabinet. Yusuf also set up a mosque for the youth, named after known Salafist Taymiyyah. Salafism is a form of Sunni Islam, characterized by the notion that Islam should be rid of non-Muslim influences. The name Boko Haram can be translated to “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa. However, this name was popularized by the media, members of Boko Haram call the sect Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad (Comolli 2015, 51). In 2009, Boko Haram declared that they do not reject Western education per se but Western civilization. This means that Western culture is rejected and Islamic ways of life reinforced. From 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly dormant with the exception of a major initiative in 2007. This period shaped Boko Haram, with reports of training under al-Qaeda officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as receiving funds from al-Qaeda to target Americans in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 51). Yusuf continued his teachings, amassing an impressive following. This following grew, as he created a system of informal social welfare, setting up microfinancing systems (Comolli 2015, 52).

A shift in leadership

Then in 2009, Boko Haram re-emerged, and their tactics changed soon after. In 2009, tensions were heightened due to a confrontation between Boko Haram members and officers belonging to Operation Flush. This operation was tasked with robberies and enforcing the wearing of helmets. On June 11, 2009, Boko Haram members were traveling to a funeral when the officer stopped the procession asking them to put on helmets. After refusing, violence broke out between the officers and sect member (Comolli 2015, 53). Boko Haram then declared the
state as their enemy, and the state began to crack down on Boko Haram. Many members were arrested, firearms and explosives were seized. Boko Haram then retaliated and attacked a police station in Bauchi in which 50 people died. The police then attacked the base near the Bauchi airstrip. Violence then spread to Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe with more than 100 causalities in one day (Comolli 2015, 53-55).

The government then deployed the army to crack down on Boko Haram. Many locals were displaced, and Yusuf, as well as his then deputy Shekau, were arrested. Yusuf then died in custody of the government; however the circumstances are debated. The police claim that he tried to escape and was killed during this, while others say that he died during police questioning (Comolli 2015, 58-60). Witnesses report that Yusuf and other Boko Haram members were shot as the police lacked confidence in the judicial system of Nigeria. The, between August 2009 and April 2010, the group was believed extinct. In 2010 Abubakar Shekau took over, starting a new, more violent period of Boko Haram (Comolli 2015, 63). Boko Haram then widened their targets and began attacking institutions associated with democracy such as polling places but also schools, bars, hospitals, mosques, and prisons. After 2012, the group Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan criticized Boko Haram for the killing of Muslims, stating that the Qur’an forbids the killing of innocent people. The group then declared that they would be ready to fight any group that targeted Muslims. Eventually, many groups splintered off from Boko Haram, continuing to operate in Nigeria and neighboring countries such as Cameroon and Chad (Comolli 2015, 63-70).

Sierra Leone’s History and the Diamond Trade

Sierra Leone is a small West African state that began as a settlement for freed slaves sent by the British government. The small area was called Freetown, however quickly experienced
conflict, disease and food shortage forcing the freed Blacks to work for slave traders. This fueled abolitionists and caused Freetown to become Britain’s first colony. Britain then infused the country with freed Blacks from Jamaica and North America. Eventually the mix of early settlers and freed Blacks came to be known as Creole. The rest of Sierra Leone as we know it today became a British protectorate along with Freetown. The constitution of 1924 brought all of Sierra Leone together as a political unit with unicameral legislature with the colony and protectorate represented in the same chamber. The protectorate was allocated more seats which heightened tensions; this struggle saw the emergence of two political parties, the National Council of Sierra Leone for the colony and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) for the protectorate. The SLPP eventually gained majority control with the backing of protectorate educated people, forcing the colonial authorities to introduce the constitution of 1951. This constitution gave the protectorate majority control, making SLPP leader Milton Margai prime minister.

The country then became independent under Margai in 1961. The years directly before and after independence were marked by violence. Before independence the oppressiveness of chiefs in the Northern province led to riots and protests, other protests were directed at the corrupt government, directly targeting future prime ministers Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens. In both instances, the army responded resulting in deaths. The development of diamonds as a natural resource in Sierra Leone also changed the political landscape. Commercial exploitation first started in 1931 by British companies. Diamonds soon came to dominate Sierra Leone’s economy. Siaka Stevens became prime minister in 1967, however before he was a minister of mines in the Margai regime. Through this position, Stevens was able to grant government status to all mines. After Milton Margai’s death, his younger brother Albert Margai became prime
minister of Sierra Leone, much to the disliking of other ethnic groups and Stevens. In 1967 Stevens won the election.

However, a coup led by David Lansana took over the government. A day after the coup, he was unseated by the National Reformation Council (NRC) which was in turn unseated by junior soldiers who returned the government to Stevens. In 1968, Lansana was later charged with treason and executed. Stevens was then able to reduce the opposition in parliament through declaring a state of emergencies, arresting the opposition and fraudulent election petitions. In 1977, Stevens became prime minister again, after heavily fraudulent elections. In 1978, Stevens had a bill declaring Sierra Leone a one-party state passed. In fear of the army, Stevens starved the army of its resources and created his army the Internal Security Division, which later came to be a tool to intimidate political opponents. Heads of all-important institutions in Sierra Leone were political appointees backing Stevens. Stevens soon became greedy and involved in illegal diamond mining with the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone. He later nationalized the diamond trade, with a 12% share just for himself. The government neglected much of rural Sierra Leone, causing a high infant mortality rate, malaria, and undernourished children. In 1985, Stevens handed Sierra Leone over to his successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh’s regime was comprised of the same people as Stevens’ regime. However, in 1987 Momoh arrest most of them under coup suspicions. In the 1990s resistance against the Momoh state and one-party state gained momentum.

**Background on the Revolutionary United Front**

*Beginnings of Foday Sankoh*

The beginnings of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) start with Foday Sankoh, a soldier in the Sierra Leonean army. During the 20th century, the army was widely unpopular,
mainly due to its ties with colonial oppression. The army was used to ensure compliance in Sierra Leone. Sankoh was in the army when Lansana staged the coup against Stevens but did not play any role in it. Sankoh has however claimed to have been part of the junior soldier group who unseated the NRC and returned the regime to Stevens. In 1971, another coup of the Stevens regime was attempted, this time supported by Sankoh. Sankoh was later arrested for failing to report the planning of the coup (Gberie 2005, 42).

Exactly twenty years after the failed second coup, on March 23, 1991, Sankoh announced the launch of a people’s armed struggle to overthrow the oppressive Momoh regime. This came after Sankoh had moved to Bo, the most important center of dissidents in Sierra Leone. There Sankoh became involved with the Pan African Union, which had been started by university lecturers of the Fourah Bay College. These lecturers had partaken in protests against the Stevens regime in 1977, which led to violence and eventually another rigged re-election of Stevens. While this group did not constitute the emergence of the RUF, some of its members later joined the RUF. An important turn in the story of the RUF happened with the Sierra Leonean government boycotting Gaddafi’s hosting of the annual Organization of African Union meeting. In response, Gaddafi channeled funds to regime critical university students. A Green Book Study Group was started propagandising Gaddafi’s political ideas, and soon after demonstrations were started at the Fourah Bay College. The group then recruited more people including Sankoh and received training in Libya. However, the group soon died down. The only members that would not give up were Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Rashid Mansaray. While the trio’s attempts died down as well. Sankoh was invited by Gaddafi to train in his Benghazi camp. In this camp, Gaddafi trained government dissidents from all the countries he did not politically agree with. In this camp, Sankoh met Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor needed a base to forge his war in
Liberia. After being turned down and arrested by the Momoh regime, Taylor came to Sankoh. Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Mansaray then joined Taylor in Burkina Faso and in the attempt to overthrow the Liberian government.

*The RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)*

With the war in Liberia taking on ethnic dimensions, ethnic groups either rallied behind the NPFL or the original Doe regime (Gberie 2005, 56). Many died through the war mostly targeted due to their ethnicity. The Doe regime was on the verge of collapse with NPFL forces capturing the capital, Monrovia. By the same time, tough, the NPFL had split with a new group emerging. This new group was led by Prince Johnson and called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). This war caused a massive exodus of people into countries such as Sierra Leone. At the same time ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States put together an intervention group, ECOMOG. President Doe and some of his military had barricaded themselves in the presidential palace, fighting Taylor’s forces on the one hand and Johnson’s on the other. Johnson then captured Doe in front of ECOMOG troops, torturing and killing him. As a result, Charles Taylor felt cheated of capturing Doe and vowed to attack Freetown’s international airport in response (Gberie 2005, 58). In 1991, Sankoh announced that President Momoh should resign or face an armed rebellion. The RUF war began on 23 March 1991, when rebels attacked two border towns in Sierra Leone. The government of Sierra Leone quickly blamed the attacks on Charles Taylor, ignoring Sankoh. However, Sankoh made sure he would not be ignored, capturing towns in the Kailahun district (Gberie 2005, 60).

*The Sierra Leonean Civil War*

At first, the Sierra Leonean army only arrived later, after the RUF had already attacked towns. However, after Guinea and Nigeria supported Sierra Leone with troops, the army went on
the offensive towards the end of 1991. While the forces were still widely effective, they quickly gained more support with the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (Ulimo). Ulimo was created in Sierra Leone by former soldiers of the Doe army. They launched an offensive against the RUF, successfully taking back Pujehun district and pushing the RUF back into Liberia (Gberie 2005, 64). While Ulimo fought in Liberia “at the doorstep of Taylor,” Guinean and Sierra Leonean forces were fighting a stalemate in Sierra Leone. This stalemate caused Momoh to changes his political stance, signing a multiparty constitution. Corruption of funds eventually caused front-line soldiers to go without pay, prompting a coup led by Solomon Musa. They formed a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) with Valentine Strasser as the new leader (Gberie 2005, 68).

The NPRC promised to end the war quickly and stopped all programs artificially creating product scarcity, which made them popular fast. The newly formed government then comprised new volunteer forces, largely made up of youths that had lost their families at the hands of the RUF. By 1993, over 1,000 young boys mostly under age fifteen were enlisted in the army. After human rights organizations denounced this, the NPRC announced that these groups were to be demobilized (Gberie 2005, 77). In 1992, the RUF captured the biggest mining town in the country, Gandorhun. After the army recaptured the town, they began punishing anyone helping the RUF. This led to imprisonment, torture, and killings at the hands of the Sierra Leonean army. The regime further murdered twenty citizens, including a pregnant woman in 1992 due to allegations of plotting a coup. By the end of 1993, the Sierra Leonean government had recaptured major land, causing Strasser to announce a ceasefire and calling for remaining rebels to surrender.
However, only a month later the war escalated. Many soldiers had either left their posts watching a major soccer game or had felt betrayed by the NPRC, joining the RUF. This coined the term of sobels, soldiers by day and rebels by night. Disloyalty to the military further deteriorated the war and caused major problems. The corrupt NPRC army dismantled and killed many volunteer soldiers that fought the RUF, including the Kamajoisia (Gberie 2005, 84). However, Deputy Minister of Defence, Hinga Norman was able to keep the Kamajoisia alive and give them a more important role in the military. In 1996, the Kamajoisia were able to capture Zogoda, the RUF’s last remaining stronghold at the time. Military members, as well as RUF members, also engaged in terrorist attacks throughout the country. In 1996 Strasser was also overthrown. Eventually, Ahmad Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party comes to power in 1996 after his victory in the presidential election. While Kabbah was quickly removed from power by his military, ECOMOG led by Nigeria reinstated order and Kabbah resumed power in 1998 (Gberie 2005, 111).

ECOMOG quickly became the governments only defense, with the Sierra Leonean army largely dismantling and partly joining the RUF. While ECOMOG was able to overtake Freetown on behalf of the government, more rural areas were harder to overtake. In 1999 Nigeria was bound to recall their ECOMOG forces which caused diplomatic missions to intervene, coming to the Lomé peace accord (Abdullah 2004). The Lomé peace accord was signed in July of 1999 and pardoned Sankoh for treason, gave him a transitional position in the government as a form of Vice President as well as a position overseeing the mining fields. The peace accord was also conditional on the RUF dismantling arms (Abdullah 2004, 138). After the signing of the peace accord, many rebels refused to give up arms. As a result, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) camps were set up allowing rebels to exchange weapons for food,
shelter, and training in new skills (Gberie 2005, 163). The camps proved much more successful and effective post-2000.

Alongside the Lomé peace accord and DDR camps, the United Nations sent peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was there to assist the peace accord and brought a serious amount of troops (Woods and Reese 2008). However, the troops brought controversy with them as well, with the head of the UNAMISL troop accusing Nigerian army forces of illegal mining. While UNAMSIL troops were deployed in Sierra Leone, Russian forces also helped out with troops and helicopters, and the British army intervened as well. In 2000, the British forces helped UNAMSIL from the brink of collapse and re-established order. This was an important break at the end of the civil war, as they stabilized the situation, took back the main parts of Sierra Leone and triggered an additional ceasefire (Gberie 2005, 176). Further, Guinean troops helped push back RUF troops, and a UN resolution demanded the Liberian government to stop working with the RUF (Gberie 2005, 177). On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over.