



4-29-2019

Politics, Protest and Patience: Gendered Rights and Human Security in India and South Korea

Anika Backelin-Harrison

Ursinus College, anbackelinharrison@ursinus.edu

Adviser: Rebecca Evans

Second Adviser: Abigail Kluchin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/gender_hon

Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Backelin-Harrison, Anika, "Politics, Protest and Patience: Gendered Rights and Human Security in India and South Korea" (2019).
Gender and Women's Studies Honors Papers. 2.

https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/gender_hon/2

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Gender and Women's Studies Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. For more information, please contact aprock@ursinus.edu.

Politics, Protest and Patience:
Gendered Rights and Human Security in India and South Korea

Anika Backelin-Harrison

April 29, 2019

Submitted to the faculty of Ursinus College in fulfillment of the requirements for
Honors in International Relations and Gender, Women's, and Sexuality Studies

Abstract

National security measures are often framed from a masculinist, hegemonic viewpoint, determining that the wellbeing of a state and its citizens is dependent on protection by a patriarchal government. This paper argues that the health and strength of a country and its citizens are better promoted through a focus on human security, defined by the United Nations as the right of all people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. Moreover, a gendered approach to human security is necessary to advance economic development, personal security and freedom from violence. Nonetheless, women all over the world are valued less than men, especially in political and economic spheres. This project explores the cultural, economic and political roles of women in India and South Korea, observing how and why these roles have changed, with an emphasis on both progress and continued obstacles to gender equity. As countries with contrasting levels of economic development and different political histories, India and South Korea offer excellent insight into the ways in which a traditionally masculinist approach to national security and economic development affects women's rights and women's representation.

Acknowledgments

To my advisor Dr. Becky Evans, who has been my source of compassion and curiosity for four years, proving nothing is out of reach if you have the right tools

To my mentors, Dr. Julin Everett and Dr. Abby Kluchin, who have taught me the importance of visibility

To my parents, friends, and family for their belief in, support of, and love for me and my work

For Kina: world is big, world is good

Thank You

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Acknowledgements	3
Introduction: Feminism, Gendered Rights and Human Security	5
<i><u>Chapter 1: In Conversation: Feminist Scholarship on National Security, Intersectionality and Global Gender Inequality</u></i>	16
<i>Women's Rights as Human Rights</i>	17
<i>Defining National Security from a Gendered Perspective</i>	18
<i>Postcolonial and Transnational Feminism: Acknowledging Value and Diversity in the Global South</i>	20
<i><u>Chapter 2: Feminist Analysis of Politics, Security and Nationalism</u></i>	24
<i>Indian Independence and the Rise of Nationalism</i>	26
<i>Nationalism in India and Women's Rights</i>	30
<i>South Korean Women and Political Independence</i>	33
<i>South Korean Nationalism and Women's Rights</i>	37
<i>Undercutting Rising Feminism in Two New Nations</i>	40
<i><u>Chapter 3: A Masculinist Approach to Politics by Women in Power</u></i>	42
<i>Indira Gandhi: Symbolic Representation without Substantive Representation</i>	44
<i>Park Geun-Hye: The Road to Impeachment</i>	49
<i><u>Chapter 4: Protest Through Education and Entrepreneurship</u></i>	55
<i>Economic Background</i>	56
<i>South Korea's Capitalist Development State</i>	59
<i>Women and Economic Growth in South Korea</i>	59
<i>India's Economic Model</i>	62
<i>Women and Economic Growth in India</i>	63
<i>GEM: A Report on Economic Empowerment</i>	68
<i><u>Chapter 5: Patience in the Here and Now: Current Feminist Movements in India and South Korea</u></i>	71
<i><u>Chapter 6: Conclusion</u></i>	80
Bibliography	81

Introduction: Feminism, Gendered Rights and Human Security

Security measures across the globe are often framed from a masculinist, hegemonic viewpoint, determining that the wellbeing of a state is dependent on government protections. This is best explained as sovereign and sole protector, highlighting external threats and positioning citizens as subservient to all governmental proceedings. As a result, national security is seen to require a strong militarized response. In our increasingly globalized world, proper security measures are no doubt essential. Nonetheless, advocates of human security argue that such a narrow view of national security does not encompass the actual breadth and depth of threats to human beings, which include natural disasters, violent conflicts, persistent poverty, epidemics and economic crises. The concept of human security therefore broadens the focus from traditional concerns to encompass the need for adequate food and shelter, access to health care and education, protection from violence and freedom from fear as well. All these human security issues are seen as vital for promoting peace, stability, and sustainable development.¹

As noted in General Assembly resolution 66/290, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.”² Resolution 66/290 states that the concept of human security includes:

- (a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;

¹ “What is Human Security?,” *United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/>.

² General Assembly resolution 66/290, *Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/66/290 (25 October 2012), available from undocs.org/A/RES/66/290.

- (b) Human security calls for people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;
- (c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights³.

The concept of human security thus provides a more promising framework for advancing peace, development and human rights by recognizing broader threats to human wellbeing than military security. At the same time, however, as noted by June Zeitlin and Doris Mpoumou of the Women's Environment & Development Organization (WEDO), "without an explicit commitment to gender equality and the application of a gender lens, women's aspirations, needs, concerns and solutions are neither visible nor adequately addressed."⁴ Zeitlin and Mpoumou criticize the fact that the United Nations' definition of human security takes a gender-neutral approach, assuming that men's experiences are the norm and failing to explicitly discuss gender inequalities. Just as human security demands social protection and good governance, as well as early warning mechanisms and basic protections for human rights, it also requires women's empowerment and gender equality. In contrast to the United Nations, Zeitlin and Mpoumou argue that unless women's rights and gender-based discrimination, danger and violence are explicitly addressed, human security will be "one more lofty idea that does not translate into action."⁵ To avoid this, a gender-sensitive approach is required, including a focus on violence against women, inequalities in power and decision-making, inequality in access and control over resources, women's human rights, and women's agency.⁶

³ General Assembly resolution 66/290, *Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/66/290 (25 October 2012), available from undocs.org/A/RES/66/290.

⁴ June Zeitlin and Doris Mpoumou, "No Human Security Without Gender Equality," *Women's Environmental & Development Organization (WEDO)*, accessed February 5, 2019, 30. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN018180.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Despite calls for a focus on gender equality, women still face significant barriers when it comes to access to resources, wage employment, and decision-making positions. For many years Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, UN Under Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women, has remarked on the low percentage of women officials in government. Globally, women comprise 23.5% of national parliamentarians, 6% heads of state, and 6% heads of government.⁷ Women are vastly underpaid in comparison to men, and a report by McKinsey Global Institute indicates that US\$28 trillion will be added to global GDP by 2025 if full income parity is achieved, and women work identical roles in the labor market along with men.⁸ Women are underrepresented in high profile jobs that are usually better paid, yet overrepresented in low-paying jobs. Only 19% of firms worldwide have a woman as their manager.⁹ These statistics reflect a devalued position for women in the workplace and in government. This imbalance has nothing to do with objective differences between men and women; it reflects the perception rather than the reality that women are weak or less capable. Such continued misperceptions fly in the face of well-documented findings that women's empowerment is central to poverty eradication and national development. In an empirical study of the connection between the security of women and the security of states, women's physical security was found to be the best predictor of state security, measured in terms of state peacefulness and peaceful relations with neighbors.¹⁰ Women's rights have also been linked to national prosperity: According to a 2012

⁷ Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, "Closing the Gender Gap in Politics," *UNWomen.org*, accessed April 16, 2018, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/4/op-ed-ed-phumzile-closing-the-gender-gap-in-politics>.

⁸ Jonathan Woetzel, et. Al, "How Advancing Women's Equality Can Add \$12 Trillion to Global Growth," *McKinsey Global Institute* (September 2015), <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-growth>

⁹ Eteban Oritz-Ospina, and Max Roser, "Economic Inequality by Gender," *Our World In Data*, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://ourworldindata.org/economic-inequality-by-gender>.

¹⁰ Valerie Hudson, Mary Capriole, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott and Chad Emmett, "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/2009), 7-45.

report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an increase of women, in the labor force results in faster economic growth.¹¹ A study conducted by the International Monetary Fund demonstrated that greater gender equality enhances economic productivity, improves developmental outcomes, and can change policy choices to make institutions more representative, while improvements in women's health and education were not only found to improve women's well-being but have also been linked to better outcomes for their children.¹²

Methodology: Feminist Analysis of Comparative Case Studies

This paper argues that the traditional approach to national security does not advance true human security; furthermore, it associates traditional approaches to national security with a realist, masculinist world view that actually exacerbates gender-based insecurity. The paper discusses feminist approaches to human security and argues for an intersectional feminist analysis that acknowledges differences among women in terms of race, class, sexual orientation and other categories, as well as differences in the lived experiences of women within the Global South.

I apply such a perspective of gendered human security to the comparative study of two countries: India and South Korea. This comparative study follows a method of case selection, which looks for cases that are disparate in most ways but nonetheless have similar outcomes in a particular area of interest.¹³ Since India and South Korea differ in many ways but nonetheless share high levels of gender inequality, this allows the analysis to focus in on specific factors that they have in common. This paper argues that the strength of national security discourses in both

¹¹ UN Women, 2017. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 306.

countries' politics, a reflection of the two countries' post-World War II history and their particular integration into global security and economic frameworks, helps explain their high levels of gender inequality. The paper also analyzes growing protest against national security approaches as well as against neo-liberal economic policies that have both incensed and mobilized women. Here, the intersectional feminist approach has a particular advantage in highlighting different responses among women depending on factors such as class, caste and religion. Finally, the paper points to the need for patience as a current assessment of gender equality and human security in both countries reveals progress as well as continued obstacles to progress.

After World War II, both India and South Korea faced a critical turning point in their histories as they transitioned away from colonial rule. Independence was fraught with violence, as both countries experienced partition and massive human migration crises across the new borders. Moreover, both faced enormous economic challenges and severe security threats. Decolonization and political division on the Korean peninsula disrupted previous trade ties with Japan and within Korea, causing serious economic turmoil. The Korean War (1950-1953) resulted in nearly five million lives lost, about half of which were civilians. The loss of 10% of Korea's pre-war population was a human and economic tragedy, depriving the country of labor and capital, and leaving the country with ongoing insecurity since the war ended with an armistice, rather than an actual peace agreement.¹⁴ In response to economic struggles and security threats, South Korea focused its resources on economic growth and a security alliance with the United States, prioritizing national security above individual rights, including women's rights. Although the South Korean constitution formally guarantees legal equality, stating that

¹⁴ "Korean War," *History*, accessed April 26, 2019, <https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war>.

“all citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status,” women remain woefully underrepresented in politics and social and employment discrimination is rampant.¹⁵

While women in India also face political, economic and social inequality, India’s post-World War II political and economic history differs slightly from South Korea. Upon independence in 1947, India faced enormous challenges of widespread poverty and political violence. Until the 1990s, Indian governments followed a mixed economic growth model that sought to balance the role of the market with that of the state but failed to solve the country’s persistent problem of poverty. While liberal economic reforms introduced after 1991 led to higher rates of growth and rising living standards for part of the population, a large number of Indians continue to live in abject poverty, with women suffering disproportionately. While gender inequality in India may be attributed to high rates of poverty, similar problems with gender inequality in South Korea suggest that other factors are responsible.

Although India’s political history and international relations are different from those of South Korea, both countries have faced security challenges that were used to justify militarized approaches to national security and more generally hierarchical approaches to politics. India and Pakistan faced tensions along their new border, particularly in the region of Kashmir, going to war over land rights several times between from 1948-1965, with tensions continuing to the present. After the United States entered into a security alliance with Pakistan in the mid-1950s, India cultivated strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union. It became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 but maintained close relations with the Soviet

¹⁵ South Korea, *The Constitution of the Republic of Korea* (17 July 1948), article 11. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ks00000_.html

Union, especially after the United States supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, although relations with the United States improved after the end of the Cold War.

As a result of national security concerns, Indian political leaders have been able to divert attention away from other human security problems, including gender inequality. While the Indian Constitution proclaims that all citizens have equal rights, a large gap between legal rights and violations exists in India, just as in South Korea. Though India's government bans dowry demands and dowry-related harassment, enforcement of these bans remains poor.¹⁶

South Korea and India therefore offer particularly interesting cases insofar as they differ in many respects, but both suffer from high levels of gender insecurity. South Korea has become an advanced industrial nation, with a GDP per capita that places it among the top economies in the world (see Table 1). Although South Korea is a successful democracy today, it only began to emerge from authoritarian rule in 1987 when restrictions on political prisoners were lifted. In contrast, India managed to become a successful democracy despite its low GDP per capita. India held its first democratic elections in 1951 and has remained democratic except for a brief period of emergency rule in 1975. Unlike South Korea, where military leaders ruled until 1991, India's military has remained subordinated to civilian rule. India's economy, which languished for years, has enjoyed high rates of growth since 1991; however, the country still has a long way to go to lift hundreds of millions of its citizens out of abject poverty and share the benefits of economic growth with the many Indians who continue to live in the countryside (see Table 1).

¹⁶ Ibid.

Table 1: Basic Indicators and Global Gender Gap Rankings in India and South Korea

Gender Gap Rankings	India	South Korea
<i>Population size (millions, 2018 estimate)</i>	1,297	51.4
<i>Religion</i>	Hindu 80%, Muslim 14%, Christian 2%, Sikh 2% (2011 est.)	20% Protestant, 15.5% Buddhist, 10% Catholic, 57% none (2015 est.). Many South Koreans also carry on at least some Confucian traditions and practices
<i>Urban population</i>	34%	81.5%
<i>Sex ratio at birth (male/female)</i>	1.12	1.05
<i>Maternal mortality rate (deaths/100,000 live births)</i>	174	11
<i>GDP (PPP, 2017 estimate)</i>	\$9.474 trillion	\$2.035 trillion
<i>GDP/capita (2017 estimate)</i>	\$7,200	\$39,500
<i>GDP growth rate (2017 estimate)</i>	6.7%	3.1%
<i>Political regime</i>	Parliamentary republic	Presidential republic
<i>Global gender gap rank (2018, out of 149)</i>	108	115
<i>Economic participation</i>	142	124
<i>Educational attainment</i>	114	100
<i>Health and survival</i>	147	87
<i>Political empowerment rank</i>	19	92

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*; World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2018*: 123, 147. Accessed 14 April 2019.

Despite these differences, both countries have a long and turbulent history with gender inequality, and both continue to rank in the bottom half of all countries as indicated in Table 1. As argued above, human security without gendered rights is not nearly comprehensive enough to promote peace, development and human rights. This paper therefore analyzes

women's rights and gender inequality in South Korea and India, demonstrating the need for and advantages of applying an intersectional feminist approach to human security. Chapter 1 provides a review of feminist scholarship, discussing formative works on feminism and intersectional theory by acclaimed scholars such as Chandra Mohanty and Gayle Binion. Chapter 2 examines gender roles in South Korea and India in the period following independence. In line with Iris Marion Young's logic of masculinist protection, this chapter focuses on the rise of nationalism and shows how states may adopt a role of patriarchal protector, placing women and children in a subordinate position of expected dependence and obedience.¹⁷ The state in both authoritarian South Korea and democratic India developed such a stance, legitimizing a subordinate role for women as necessary for protecting the nation.

Chapter 3 provides a more detailed analysis of political participation by prominent female leaders in each country, focusing on the first and only women elected to the prime ministership or presidency in either country's history, Indira Gandhi and Park Geun-Hye. Their terms as political leaders were in radically different time frames; Gandhi served as Prime Minister on and off from 1975 to 1984, Park from 2013-2017. The chapter argues that these women's terms in office demonstrated and reinforced masculinist politics and promoted traditionally feminine gender roles. The chapter also analyzes institutional factors, including the design of electoral systems and gender quotas and discusses cautionary evidence that the increase in women's representation in Southeast Asian countries like South Korea has actually decreased women's engagement due to the persistence of patriarchal norms and expectations.¹⁸

¹⁷ Iris Marion Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003), p. 2.

¹⁸ Shan-Jan Sarah Liu, "Are Female Political Leaders Role Models? Lessons from Asia," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018), p. 765.

Chapter 5 looks at economic factors, considering the influence of economic development on gender equality. Of interest here is the finding that women in both countries lack equal economic opportunity. While this might be expected to be true in the case of a poorer country like India, South Korean women also have a low level of labor force participation. In addition, the female labor force participation rate in India has actually fallen at the same time that the economy has more than doubled in size and the number of working-age women has grown considerably. This furthers the argument that cultural attitudes are important causal factors, as are political institutions that effectively promote women's political representation.

Chapter 6 reviews contemporary developments in both countries, emphasizing both progress and continued obstacles - hence, the need for patience. India and South Korea today are increasingly globalized societies, where people are connected to the wider world through smartphones and transnational economic trade. This means increased information sharing, including international discussion of issues such as sexual harassment and assault; this chapter therefore looks at the spread of #MeToo movements in both countries. The chapter employs intersectional feminist analysis to dissect current movements that speak on such issues and provide local examples that show that gender inequality holds these countries back from their true potential, especially in regard to human security.

Finally, the paper offers concluding remarks, including political implications as well as a discussion of limitations in the current study and directions for future research. Western expectations placed upon non-western nations are often unattainable and unrealistic. Studies performed under the guise of Western expectations run the risk of employing theories that lump women together as one whole - a universal group with the same barriers to equality all

over the world. I do not aim to do so – my goal in comparing India and South Korea is not to prove women are a homogeneous group, but rather I wish to provide support for my argument that human security needs to include gendered rights in its definition.

Violence, inequalities in power and resources, agency, and human rights are all important considerations for a gendered approach to human security. This paper seeks to explain why it is important to look at gender equity and why gendered rights and human security are necessary components of a country's overall success. It does so by applying an intersectional feminist analysis to the cases of India and South Korea, analyzing their political histories and use of national security discourses, evaluating protest against established economic barriers, and observing the patience of advocates across the decades, from independence to present day. From 1945 to 2019, women's movements in both countries have put pressure on politicians to lead their countries towards a more equitable future, but they have faced strong cultural, social and economic obstacles that have been reinforced by patriarchal politics.

Chapter 1: In Conversation: Feminist Scholarship on National Security, Intersectionality and Global Gender Inequality

In order to understand the causes and effects of gender-based discrimination, this paper adopts a feminist perspective on human rights, focusing on women's experiences, engaging in contextual, experiential, and inductive analysis that seeks to incorporate the diversity of women's lives.¹⁹ The paper broadens the examination of gender inequality to recognize the diverse experiences of women across race, class, religious or national boundaries. In doing so, it builds on feminist scholarship that criticizes a tendency in dominant Western feminist thought to focus on white women's experiences and ignore internalized racism, homophobia, and classism.²⁰ As Elizabeth Spelman writes in *The Inessential Woman*, "the notion of a generic 'woman' functions in feminist thought much the way the notion of generic 'man' has functioned in Western philosophy: it obscures the heterogeneity of women and cuts off examination of the significance of such heterogeneity for feminist theory and political activity."²¹

An intersectional feminist approach also builds on postcolonial feminists, who pointed to problems with "...cultural imperialism and shortsightedness" among white Western feminists.²² With these criticisms in mind, I am focusing my paper on the importance of intersectional analysis, to recognize and address multiple layers of gendered issues.

¹⁹ Gayle Binion, "Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (August 1995), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/762391>, 511.

²⁰ bell hooks, *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston: South End Press, 2007); Audre Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House" (1984); Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, Vol. 1989, Issue 1, Article 8.

²¹ Elizabeth Spelman, *The Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought* (Boston: Beacon, 1998), ix.

²² Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991): 7.

Women's Rights as Human Rights

When first-wave feminism began in the late nineteenth century, it mobilized white, middle-class women to push for suffrage and legal gender equality. In the 1960s, second-wave feminism inspired women to look at the sexist power struggles that existed within their personal lives and broadened the conversation to include “issues related to marriage, procreation, labor, property ownership, sexual repression, and other manifestations of unequal citizenship that are routinely viewed as private, nongovernmental, and reflective of cultural difference.”²³ Feminist legal scholars like Gayle Binion criticize the gendered economic, social and political realities that reveal women’s disempowerment, arguing that the exclusion of women from legal protection and from proportionate political and economic power has important implications for the rights of disempowered peoples more generally.²⁴ Feminist jurisprudence focuses on biases against women created by hierarchical, adversarial and exclusionary legal institutions that fail to respect claims made by women; at the same time, feminist legal scholars like Binion insist that violations of women’s rights have implications for all human rights. For example, although reproductive policy and nonenforcement of rape laws may be seen as issues that predominantly concern women, these issues are closely tied to legal protections of bodily integrity, which have applications to policies such as capital punishment and military conscription.²⁵

Feminist legal scholars also criticize the denial of women’s rights based on a separation of “public” and “private” spheres, subordinating women “to the control of patriarchal family authorities with the understanding that familial matters are ‘private’ and therefore, beyond the

²³ Binion, 509.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 513.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 513-514. *The term “women” is used here to refer to biologically female individuals, following the practice of international organizations that provide much of the data used in this study. However, it is important to acknowledge that gender identity and birth sex are two different things.*

scope of governmental authority and intervention.”²⁶ Such a distinction leads to a general reluctance to see gender inequities, including sexual harassment, gender-based violence and employment discrimination, as human rights issues requiring effective legal protection. The dichotomization of public and private serves to reinforce patriarchal power structures not only in the family and private sector but also supports the hierarchical power that controls the political system.²⁷

Defining National Security from a Gendered Perspective

In conversation with feminist international relations theorists, this paper explores the connection between women’s rights, national security and gendered views of nationalism, then advances an alternative feminist perspective based on human security. J. Ann Tickner a feminist international relations theorist, notes that states place a very high priority on national security yet typically exclude women from serving in what has almost exclusively been seen as a male domain; citing Simone de Beauvoir, Tickner writes that “men have been associated with defending the state and advancing its international interests as soldiers and diplomats, [while] women have typically been engaged in the ‘ordering’ and ‘comforting’ roles both in the domestic sphere, as mothers and basic needs providers, and in the caring professions, as teachers, nurses, and social workers.”²⁸

Similarly, masculinist views of national security enjoy dominant influence: “the language used to describe [international relations] comes out of a Western-centered historical worldview that draws almost exclusively on the experiences of men.”²⁹ Tickner goes on to

²⁶ Ibid., 515.

²⁷ Ibid., 517.

²⁸ J. Ann Tickner, “Man, the State, and War: Gendered Perspectives on National Security,” in Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, eds. *Essential Readings in World Politics*, 4th ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 89.

²⁹ Tickner, 90.

argue that masculinist perspectives on international relations claim to be objective and universally applicable, but they actually favor a patriarchal view of national security, correlated with the values of hegemonic masculinity. This logic is often used to justify a antagonize femininity, another definition for masculinist politics.

Western masculinist politics and expectations are commonly used as the norm for international discourse on national security, according to Tickner. Glorification of war, gendering of masculine and feminine behavior, and a Hobbesian 'state of nature' are just a few examples of masculinist discourse on the topic.³⁰ Women are typically considered exterior to war and military operations, often pitted as victims or collateral damage from battle. On the other side of that generalization, women are closely associated with peace movements during wartime or turbulent political regimes.³¹ Tickner compares western colonialism with these gendered views on national security issues, in particular the relationship between colonial imperialism and masculinity; just as whiteness is equated with civilization and Victorian standards are taken as proper markers of manliness and femininity, colonized peoples are stereotyped as half-brutes (justifying an aggressive response), effeminate (justifying subordination and protection) or infants (justifying tutelage and discipline).³² National security, then, is defined in this masculinist vein as a direct byproduct of hierarchical power, with government acting as a patriarch, much like a father within traditional families.

In contrast, feminist perspectives on national security call for a more secure world order by working improve security for all, including freedom from war as well as the absence

³⁰ Ibid, 90-91.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, 92.

of economic and sexual violence. Such a stance was embraced at the Women's International Peace Conference in 1985, where women from all areas of the world came to a collective agreement that national security needed a broader, yet more refined definition including gendered rights. The refined concerns included safe working conditions, freedom from threats of war and violence, and measures to address economic poverty and foreign debt. Women from developing countries included a broader section on insecurity, associating structural violence with western imperialism, militarism, sexism and racism.³³ Security as defined through an intersectional feminist lens must include these refined characteristics and broader challenges, amounting to a proper definition of human security by acknowledging different areas of security concern via gendered concerns.

Postcolonial and Transnational Feminism: Acknowledging Value and Diversity in the Global South

Just as women from the Global South contributed to a fuller understanding of human security in 1985, this paper looks to the various experiences of women from non-western cultures in order to better understand gender-based violence and disempowerment. This does not mean using the oppression of "Third World women" as a proxy for the backwardness of previously colonized nations compared to Western nations, nor does it mean treating women in countries like India and South Korea as all alike, regardless of class, race, gender, cultural identity, or nationality. The paper draws on the work of postcolonial feminist Chandra Mohanty, who criticizes the tendency to over-generalize about women in the Global South. In her essay titled "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse," Mohanty breaks down white feminist research on India, characterized by broad generalizations which lump

³³ Ibid, 93.

women all in to one cohort. According to Mohanty, "...the term 'colonization' has been used to characterize everything from the most evident economic and political hierarchies to the production of a particular cultural discourse about what is called the 'Third World'." ⁵⁰ Along with this, "...limitations are evident in the construction of the (implicitly consensual) priority of issues around which apparently *all* women are expected to organize."⁵¹ Mohanty's criticisms offer important notes on the pejorative language sometimes used to describe women from non-Western countries.

Mohanty's analysis also brings up caste as a singular issue, in particular because of the difficulties feminists in India face reconciling a desire for equality with centuries-old social hierarchy. When powers like the United States or Great Britain are set as a "standard" for humane treatment, a country such as India can have a difficult time reconciling itself to expectations it cannot meet. Mohanty believes this kind of expectation puts women outside of the Western world at an even greater disadvantage, because they are constantly seen as "less" – less educated, less socially aware, less politically adept, etc. In contrast, their struggles may be seen as "more" – more sexual harassment, more traditional patriarchy, more oppression, etc. ⁵² The "other" we make in our heads has very little basis in reality; and in fact, if anyone is living in a way different from the rest of the world, it is those in wealthy economies like the United States.

Uma Narayan offers a complementary argument that it is wrong to interpret postcolonial feminism through the lens of Western feminism. She criticizes the tendency to "other" non-western cultures and experiences, describing the culture and experiences of certain non-western women in very demeaning terms. ³⁴ Narayan also criticizes culture-reductionist forms of

³⁴ Uma Narayan, "Undoing the 'Package Picture' of Cultures," *Signs* 25, no. 4 (2000): 1083.

postcolonial feminism which “in attempting to take seriously these cultural differences ... risk[s] replacing gender-essentialist analyses with culturally essentialist analyses that replicate problematic colonialist notions about the cultural differences between ‘Western culture’ and ‘non-Western cultures’ and the women who inhabit them.”³⁵ She dubs this view of culture which covers up divisions and differences within Western and non-Western cultures the “package picture” of cultures, claiming such a picture is often misleading and misinformed.³⁶ According to Narayan, this view depicts cultures as neatly-wrapped packages, completely separate from any influences outside of their borders, and with distinct differences from each other so that none may be confused or correlated.³⁷ This depiction is incorrect, and offers no room to explore similarities or recognize changes over time that a culture will undoubtedly go through. This false view can be avoided, however, through historical analysis of the culture to be evaluated.³⁸

Analyzing political life, economic livelihood, and national social movements from an intersectional feminist standpoint showcases the breadth of human security and gendered rights. Intersectional analysis brings to the foreground a relationship between these categories, especially in discussions on gender identity. Rather than essentializing women or providing overly broad definitions of patriarchy and homogeneous, monolithic accounts of gender oppression, intersectional feminism highlights the importance analyzing the effects of race, class, and other factors that create multi-layered systems.³⁹ Vrushali Patil notes that the concept of patriarchy has been criticized for its “reification of nation-state borders and failure to interrogate the significance of cross-border processes for shaping gender relations and identities.”⁴⁰ Offering

³⁵ Narayan, 1084.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Narayan, 1083-1086.

³⁹ Vrushali Patil, “From Patriarchy to Intersectionality: A Transnational Feminist Assessment of How Far We’ve Really Come,” *Signs* 38, no. 4 (The University of Chicago Press: 2013): 847.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

a concern regarding intersectionality and patriarchy, Patil goes on to examine the ways in which a homogeneous, often western definition of patriarchy has been unsuccessful in supporting intersectional analysis, similar to Mohanty. While patriarchy is understood to generally mean men's dominance and oppression over other genders, Patil argues that the concept of patriarchy does not adequately capture the layered, intersectional identities that influence political, social and economic realities, including cross-cultural influences on gender inequality: "many of the patriarchies that are today discussed as domestic patriarchies – often in quite complex ways, via the language of intersectionality – are actually embedded within deep transnational histories that must be recognized and interrogated."⁴¹ Moreover, Patil argues that intersectional feminist analyses have often focused on the experiences of women in the Global North, neglecting the effects of neo-colonialism and global power inequalities and thereby discounting the unique experiences of women that could inform global social justice efforts.⁴²

The scholars mentioned above are in current discussion on the very theories necessary to support my paper, mainly feminist analysis, intersectionality, 'othering', and patriarchy. By offering my view that gendered rights are a necessary component of human security, I do not intend to say all security threats are gendered. Rather, I theorize that approaching issues of state security through a gendered lens will help organize a country's reactions to domestic threats. I focus on domestic threats because gendered violence is a state issue, from the home to political office. Iris Marion Young has developed a theory to tie human security and approaches to gender-based discrimination/violence together: masculinist politics. As stated in my methodology, states often employ masculinist politics in order to justify governmental protections, sometimes going as far as to declare security states in a time of emergency (such as

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 847-867.

Indira Gandhi did in 1975). Masculinist politics are neither male nor gendered towards men, rather they are the kinds of actions that enforce a subordinate role on to citizens. According to Young, masculinist protection enables a dominative protection, expecting those under said protection to concede “decision-making autonomy.”⁴³

⁴³ Young, 4.

Chapter 2: Feminist Analysis of Politics, Security and Nationalism

As discussed in the previous chapter, women's rights have been closely tied to national security. Following what Iris Marion Young refers to as a patriarchal logic, masculinized states concerned with national security adopt the role of protector and "put those to be protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience."⁴⁴ Appeals to nationalism and national security are used to justify a more centralized and paternalistic exercise of power, whether by authoritarian or democratically elected governments. This chapter explores the rise of nationalism in India and South Korea after World War II, showing that nationalism in both countries has been used to support political control by elites and ideologically conservative movements that have defended traditional values, including restrictions on women's rights.

Walker Connor notes that nationalism is commonly interpreted as identification with the state and its interests. Yet for states that are comprised of heterogeneous peoples who are culturally, ethnically and linguistically distinct, nationalism can connote loyalty by a *segment* of a state's population to their particular notion of nation.⁴⁵ After World War II, nationalist politicians in India and South Korea pushed public sentiment toward an idealized "motherland", and a kind of nationalism formed that would soon be used to justify the subordination of women's rights to other national goals, including security and economic growth.

⁴⁴ Young, 2.

⁴⁵ Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ..." in Readings in *Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas*, Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, eds.(NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp. 266-275.

Indian Independence and the Rise of Nationalism

In 1947, India was catapulted into the international spotlight, newly independent and partitioned from Pakistan. Independence brought an escalation in religious violence, with millions beaten, raped or killed in communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims and between 10 million and 20 million people displaced from their homes. It did not take long for national security to include sentiments of nationalism, with a uniform civil code enforced to bring about an independent Indian identity⁴⁶. Vasanthi Raman writes on the expectations of gender justice in post-partition and post-independence legacy, wherein secularism was expected to be ensured for every community. However, the legacy of communal violence and security concerns arising from continued tensions with Pakistan meant that minority rights and caste rights were shoved aside as separate or less important topics⁴⁷. From this came a nationalism born out of rebellion, political negotiation, and long-standing cultural change and history. A patriarchal right emerged from gendered specialization, with men predominantly making legal decisions for country-wide security issues⁴⁸. Women's rights were rapidly changing as well, with high tensions between upper (Brahmin) caste and lower (Dalit) caste women in political conversation.

A 'Hindu warrior' identity had long been a theme of Indian nationalism, but after independence the motherland took on new meaning. Public demands and outcries against British imperialism made a 'Hindu warrior' identity popular among many Indians, as Hinduism is India's largest religion. Sikata Banarjee describes this shift as an imposition of cultural predominance, with Hindu Indians claiming not only a religious, but a historic and cultural right

⁴⁶ Vasanthi Raman, "The Women's Question in Contemporary Politics," in *Urban Women in Contemporary India: A Reader*, ed. Rehana Ghadially, (Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007), 326.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Young, 6.

to national identity. All others (read Muslims) could live in India only if they accepted this ordinance, and all people were expected to be organized, powerful, and alert in their daily behavior⁴⁹. Unlike other established religions, Hinduism does not have a book or set doctrine for all adherents to follow. Hinduism is a collective of sects, brought together as one identity in the Shivaji empire of seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century India⁵⁰. Modern Hindutva came about as a reaction to European colonization, as a way to express national and cultural identity singular to India⁵¹. Once India was free from British rule, this identity was used as a descriptor for all Indian citizens, whether they were Hindu or not.

In 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Congress Party that led India's independence movement, was elected as the country's first Prime Minister. At this time, Indian politicians adopted a constitution and declared that India "sought a democratic state, with strong institutions, embodying India's unique culture"⁵². The British Raj had implemented a parliamentary governmental system during the height of its colonial power, and India retained this colonially imposed parliamentary system after independence. Partition was a turbulent time for many Indians, since politics now leaned towards a Hindu nationalist state, rather than a universalist, inclusive identity such as Mahatma Gandhi had advocated for prior to independence. Gandhi, known to many as an advocate for peace, was assassinated in 1948 just as India was grappling with its newly won independence, and in the midst of forming its new national identity. Following his death, "... the political opportunity structure consisted of the British colonial judicial system in which western-educated Indian lawyers decided [legal] cases

⁴⁹ Sikata Banarjee, "Gender and Nationalism: The Masculinisation of Hinduism and Female Political Participation," in *Urban Women in Contemporary India: A Reader*, 300-301.

⁵⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, *Religion, Caste, and Politics in India*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 40.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 40.

⁵² Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, "India in a Changing World," in *India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016): 293 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cr3c.16>.

on the basis of available *religious* texts, interpretations of customs and the development of code law within separate systems of Muslim and Hindu personal law”⁵³. A hierarchy of power and authority was created, whereby those who came to run the new government had a certain level of predominantly British education, were predominantly Hindu, and certainly, yet implicitly, were almost exclusively men.

The partition of India from Pakistan formed a tense relationship between the two countries, which were previously one legal state. During and after World War I, Indian citizens began to push for national rule on a grand scale in exchange for supporting the Allies. At this time Gandhi rose to national, and then international acclaim for his non-violent, powerful protests against imperialism. Gandhi’s influence on India cannot be stated enough – even today both his image and influence are felt throughout the subcontinent, yet despite his peaceful message, he was a controversial political figure. Gandhi was a social leader, vested in mobilizing the masses to gain independence from the British. He did not, however, make himself accessible to everyone, particularly Muslims, and in doing so, gained enemies. Gandhi also used Hindu religious idioms in his political discussions, such as *ram rajya*⁵⁴ (governance by a Hindu deity), a phrase meant to inspire hope that India would prevail through trial, yet the use of this Hindi phrase alienated Muslims, because *ram rajya* is an allusion to a Hindu “Golden Age,” a time before Islam was prevalent in India. This xenophobic and clearly biased belief was not well-received by the Muslim population, and as a result undercut Gandhi’s message of a multi-cultural, independent India. Partition between India and Pakistan further alienated Hindus and

⁵³ Jana Everett, "All the Women Were Hindu and All the Muslims Were Men': State, Identity Politics and Gender, 1917-1951," *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 23 (2001): 2071-080. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410720>, 2075.

⁵⁴ “Governance by the Hindu deity Ram” – quoted in Mohammed Ayoob, “Gandhi’s Role in the Partition of India: Why He Was Partially Responsible for the Division,” *Foreign Affairs*, accessed March 25, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2017-10-19/gandhis-role-partition-india>.

Muslims from each other, and granted far more cultural, religious, legal, and political weight to Hindus in the newly independent India. Mohammed Ayooob states that “The division of the subcontinent reduced Muslims’ share of the population from over a quarter in British India to just ten percent in Independent India, allowing Hindu chauvinists to openly equate Indian nationalism with Hindu nationalism”⁵⁵.

To understand some of the controversy that surrounded Gandhi, it is important to remember his stance on India’s partition from Pakistan. Before India gained independence from the British, civil disobedience campaigns pitted Hindu and Muslim leaders against one another, which led the British to pass the Government of India Act in 1935. This was the first acknowledgement of an independent India by the British, but was still not a full relinquishing of colonial power. The demonstrations did not cease, violence continued to grow (sometimes resulting in massacres), and in 1945 Britain guaranteed full self-governance for India. In 1947 Viceroy Mountbatten announced his plan for a partition, forming Pakistan for Muslims and India for all other religious affiliations as an attempt to appease tensions. While a new country was successfully created, difficulties increased. The partition of India created a mass displacement of families and individuals. Muslims who stayed in India faced terrible discrimination, and those who left were tasked with forming an entirely new country and government. Many people separated from their immediate families by new and arbitrary national borders. To this day, India and Pakistan remain on poor terms, and continue to fight over territory (Kashmir) with military incursions on both sides of the border.

⁵⁵ “Gandhi’s Role in the Partition of India: Why He Was Partially Responsible for the Division.”

Nationalism in India and Women's Rights

The nationalism that arose during the struggle against colonial rule and in the immediate period following independence and partition had important effects on women in India. Women were an important part of anti-colonialist campaigns, including civil disobedience movements, and women formed independent organizations such as the All India Women's Conference to push for the franchise and civil rights. Nonetheless, feminist concerns and movements soon took a back seat to nationalism. The nationalist movement homogenized women as a collective group of like-minded people (regardless of caste, region, class, etc.). Upper-caste officials gained a monopoly on women's rights, and after independence, decades passed with little to no movement on feminist issues. Although the constitution prohibited sex-based discrimination, this was not enforced with any vigor.⁵⁶

Sarojini Naidu offers an excellent example of the limitations of feminism in India, in the period preceding and immediately following independence. She was “the first Indian woman to be elected President of the Indian National Congress and was the first governor of the state of Uttar Pradesh in independent India.”⁵⁷ As such, she was heavily involved in Indian politics and served as president to the All-India Women's Association, Women's Indian Association, and the National Council of Women in India.⁵⁸ Despite her prominent political role, Naidu's feminism was notable for its acceptance of religious and patriarchal hierarchy. This can be seen in her glorification of a “golden age” (the time before an invasion brought Islam as a major religion to

⁵⁶ Sarbani Guha Ghosal, “MAJOR TRENDS OF FEMINISM IN INDIA,” *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 66, no. 4 (Oct – Nov 2005): 798-799.

⁵⁷ Asha Nadkarni, “Regenerating Feminism: Sarojini Naidu's Eugenic Feminist Resistance”, in *Eugenic Feminism, Reproductive Nationalism in the United States and India*, (University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 67.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 69.

India). While she advocated for women's education, equal access to jobs and representation, her argument centered around women bearing sons to lead the country.⁵⁹ Thus, Naidu defended women's rights based on the patriarchal justification that these would lead to better mothers and stronger sons. Intentionally or not, Naidu's views reveal a piece of Indian thought at the time that insisted women's highest role was that of a mother.⁶⁰

Such a conservative approach to women's rights played into the hands of nationalists, who worked to suppress feminist efforts to increase women's rights. From 1949 to 1951, the the All India Women's Conference drafted and submitted the Hindu Code Bill to the constituent assembly and provisional parliament in India.⁶¹ This bill was introduced as an attempt to increase Hindu women's rights, from divorce to inheritance. Once this bill reached the People's Assembly (Lok Sabha), it was made clear that many members of government did not support complete reform of Hindu law, especially property rights and marriage customs.⁶² Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tabled the bill until he could find a proper enforcer, naming B. R. Ambedkar, law minister and champion of Dalit (lower caste) rights, to the task. The bill was pushed back and forth through the Lok Sabha, with some going as far to claim a constitutional crisis over it. Several women who were involved in these discussions were shamed by men in their constituency for drafting such a controversial bill.⁶³ One such opponent, Thakur Das Bhargava (Lok Sabha member from Punjab), argued: "Those who want to deal with Hindu Law and the place of women in Hindu society should look at the question, not through western glasses, but through the glasses of our own civilization."⁶⁴ Bhargava believed in the traditional

⁵⁹ Nadkarni, 86.

⁶⁰ Nadkarni, 88.

⁶¹ 'All the Women Were Hindu and All the Muslims Were Men,' 2072 – 2077.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 2078.

gender roles assigned by Hindu law, and pushed the idea that feminism was nothing more than another form of Western imperialism.

As nationalism effectively reinforced traditional gender roles, women experienced few gains. Undurti Vindhya attributes this to a fear from the top-down, that women who are in elected positions could challenge a traditionally powerful (read masculine) state by defying prescribed gender roles.⁶⁵ According to Neera Desai and Maithreyi Krishnaraj, there were some exceptions for middle class women in education and employment, but overall the status of women, especially lower caste women, was declining.⁶⁶ As described in the next chapter, Indian feminists began to challenge economic inequalities, recognizing not only inequalities between men and women but also along lines of caste, tribe, religion and region. In the process, they began to adopt a dual approach to gender issues – combining them with socio-economic, caste and ecological concerns.⁶⁷ Over time, this would prove fruitful in gaining international recognition of caste and women’s rights, but before the 1970s, little would be done to promote either. The intricacies of modern development often overshadowed anything else, with women used as markers for improvement, subjected to control by others: “...women have been looked upon either as victims of social practices or targets for development as in the post-independence period, but never as participants in development.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ibid, 297.

⁶⁶ Ghosal, 799.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 801.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 799.

South Korean Women and Political Independence

At the end of World War II, South Koreans found themselves in an entirely new situation, facing not only decolonization and division but military occupation as well as the U.S. Military Government (USMG) occupied the southern half of the peninsula from 1945 – 1948. Emerging from Japanese imperialism, South Koreans were fighting for a new national identity, separate both from their new hostile neighbor, North Korea, and from the west. People's committees rapidly formed and spread across the country, focusing on the rights of students, women, labor, and more.⁶⁹ These committees were the basis for the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), which formed the short-lived People's Republic of Korea and proclaimed a program of radical social change.⁷⁰ All sectors of society that were adversely affected by the split between North and South Korea now saw themselves as *minjung*, meaning, “a dynamic, liberating subjectivity that arises from a history of oppression”, literally an identifier for the “toiling masses”⁷¹ (and would later be used during protests in the 1980's against military occupation).⁷² In the late 1940s, however, popular demands were trumped by Cold War calculations as the USMG outlawed the People's Republic and worked to ensure that a governments-sympathetic to U.S. national interests would take its place. Fearing South Korea would side with its Communist neighbors, “the geo-political interests of the United States could

⁶⁹ Hagen Koo, ed., *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13-14.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 15.

⁷¹ Mi Park, “South Korea: Passion, Patriotism, and Student Radicalism,” in *Student Activism in Asia: Between Protest and Powerless*, edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Edward Aspinall, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv18p.10>, 133.

⁷²See Nicola Anne Jones, *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2019. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ursinus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=302780>, 45-67.

not be overshadowed by the vaguely defined interests of a former Japanese colony.”⁷³ This meant the preferences and demands of South Korean citizens were not nearly as important to the USMG as an alliance with pro-American politicians.

By stopping Koreans from forming their own civil society, elite politicians pushed the prospect for a true democracy farther away. Before Korea’s partition, democracy seemed compatible with the desires of the people –unions, students, women and the *minjung*. However, hopes of immediate democracy were cut short by Syngman Rhee, who was elected as South Korea’s first president in 1948 and remained in power until 1960. Rhee relied on Confucianist hierarchy and national security to consolidate authoritarian control.⁷⁴ Presenting himself as a protector and mobilizing fear, Rhee withheld civil liberties, denied due process, banned free assembly, justifying the suppression of political opposition by using the threat of communism as a scapegoat.⁷⁵

National security was not only used as a justification for denying civil liberties and democratic rule, it was also used to support an economic model that demanded a high level of sacrifice from South Korea’s already strained populace. Rhee’s government set out to stimulate economic growth by promoting Korean industries, offering loans and incentives to select firms in targeted industries and protecting them from foreign competition through tariff barriers and bans on rival products. This policy of import-substitution industrialization offered special privileges to select entrepreneurs, favoring elite industrialists over workers and sacrificing human security for

⁷³ Geir Helgesen, *Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics*, Democracy in Asia, [no. 3], (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 67-69.

⁷⁴ Mi, 128.

⁷⁵ Youngtae Shin, *Protest Politics and the Democratization of South Korea: Strategies and Roles of Women*, (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014), accessed December 8, 2018, <https://ursinuscollege.on.worldcat.org/oclc/897116992>, 47.

national growth.⁷⁶ By conducting such intensive internal surveillance while also demanding high rates of modernization, Rhee introduced South Korea to the world under a dictatorship.

The South Korean economy had undergone a substantial transformation by the 1960's, but corruption linked to import-substitution industrialization policies led to economic problems, increasing dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, Rhee, heading for a fourth term in 1960, was elected by a "lopsided victory."⁷⁷ The election had been rigged country-wide, with police given specific instructions on how to ensure that the Rhee autocracy would serve another term.⁷⁸ Civil society was brutally repressed, with manipulated elections and executions of political opposition leaders. Fervently anti-communist, Rhee promoted a set of patriarchal societal rules that constrained the population's ability to protest against the regime.⁷⁹ Despite these authoritarian controls, Rhee's authoritarian regime collapsed in 1960. After a short period of democracy, a military coup led by General Park Chung Hee restored authoritarian rule.

Under General Park, government policymakers switched to an economic strategy of growth through export promotion. Certain firms continued to be offered special treatment such as low-interest loans, but these were now export firms and their special treatment was largely tied to their export performance. As Korean firms became more efficient and successfully competed in global markets, South Korea was transformed into an industrialized country, enjoying unusually high rates of growth. South Korea's workers, however, did not share in the benefits. Inequality rose and working conditions were poor, leading to labor and student activism that helped set the stage for Park's assassination in 1979.

⁷⁶ Myung Soo Cha, "The Economic History of Korea," *Economic History Association*, accessed April 28, 2019, <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-korea/>

⁷⁷ John Kie-chiang Oh, *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999, 40.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 40.

⁷⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Syngman Rhee: President of South Korea," accessed January 29, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Syngman-Rhee>.

Authoritarian actors continued to use brutal means to maintain their power. One event in particular remains a shameful reaction by the South Korean government against protesters. On May 18, 1980, students from 55 universities in South Korea protested the new military regime led by General Chun Doo-hwan, calling for political reform and trial of those who had kept the country under military rule for so long. Kwangju, capital of South Chōlla Province, was a hotbed of civil protest dating back to ancient dynasties, fostered mostly by students. Police and the military responded to the protest with a massacre. Protesters were chased out of public spaces and into their homes, beaten with rifles and control-clubs, and some were taken away in military vehicles. On May 19th the city rose to aid the students, with hundreds of taxis and buses forming blockades so the military could not access the roads. On May 21st the military opened fire on the protesters, then on May 27th General Chun ordered a complete annihilation of anti-establishment forces. By the government's count, over 200 people were killed, and thousands wounded, and many believe those numbers are far too low an estimate. Even a city as historically steeped in anti-establishment sentiment as Kwangju had never seen such violence. 27,000 military troops were deployed in this time, for a massacre that lasted a week against Korean civilians.⁸⁰

In the following years, mass efforts by students, union workers, women's rights activists and others demanded governmental change. Military occupation lasted until 1992, with the election of Kim Young Sam. He was an outspoken critic and the first civilian president in the three decades since independence.⁸¹ Kim famously arrested former president Chun Doo-Hwan and Chun's hand-picked successor, Roh Tae-Woo, although the two were later released from prison. While Kim was initially credited with bringing democracy to South Korea, his presidency

⁸⁰ Oh, 80-84.

⁸¹ Choe Sang-Hun, "Kim Young-sam, South Korean President Who Opposed Military, Dies at 87," *The New York Times*, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/kim-young-sam-former-president-of-south-korea-dies-at-87.html>.

was tarnished with failure to meet with North Korean leaders, and an International Monetary Fund bailout of \$58 billion during the Asian financial crisis.⁸²

South Korean Nationalism and Women's Rights

Authoritarian leaders' success in controlling popular demands for broader political, economic and social rights stemmed in part from South Korea's history of Confucianism, brought in from China centuries before. The relationship between men and women in South Korea is informed by this history, for example through religious texts in which men are associated with the sky while women are associated with the earth, seeming to justify men as 'above' and women as 'beneath.'⁸³ Put simply, "Confucianism begins with family relationships and ascribes different roles and responsibilities to various family members. Even today South Korea's social structures are heavily influenced by Confucian family structures, with some scholars like Eunkang Koh remarking on desire for a distinct, Korean feminism that abolishes gender discrimination and patriarchy promoted by hegemonic tendencies of Confucian practices, rather than preserving the system under a "shield of Korean tradition."⁸⁴

Taking family as a microcosm of society, Confucianist philosophy informed (and continues to inform) political and economic life along a model of harmonious family relationships."⁸⁵ By maintaining hierarchy based on age, gender, and class, ideal citizens in South Korea were expected to observe this hierarchy, so they could better serve their country.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Sirin Sung, "Women Reconciling Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea," *Social Policy and Administration* 37, no. 4 (August 2003): 346.

⁸⁴ Eunkang Koh, "Gender Issues and Confucian Scriptures: Is Confucianism Incompatible with Gender Equality in South Korea?" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 71, no. 2 (2008): 347-348, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40378774>.

⁸⁵ Seung-Kyung Kim, and John Finch, "Confucian Patriarchy Reexamined: Korean Families and the IMF Economic Crisis," *The Good Society* 11, no. 3 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.1353/gso.2003.0007>, 43.

For example, until 2008, South Korea's family household registration system (*hoju jedo*) was in effect. This system "stripped women from inheritance right along with their right to have custody of the children."⁸⁶ The system continuously favored men as heads of the household; if a woman had been widowed or divorced, her closest male-bodied relative was legally in charge of her household, including the authority of her children. Not only this, but if a single mother had a baby boy, he was technically the head of the household. If a woman wanted to study or emigrate abroad but was divorced, she had to leave her children behind because of legal precedence for the father.

Youngtae-Shin, a South Korean feminist historian, discusses how women in post-WWII South Korea designed models of political activism around established gender expectations, forming influential social movements, some of which still last today. Central to Shin's analysis are the protest strategies used to resource and mobilize mothers in particular, as agents of feminine identity in the country after WWII⁸⁷. Shin makes it clear that although the division of North and South Korea was in and of itself a catalyst in women's political involvement, it was not the details of partition which made it so. Rather the tensions surrounding South Korean identity and governance were changing at breakneck speed, and once the Cold War between occupying powers of the North and South began, human security took a back seat to military dictatorship⁸⁸. This immediate and swift denial of a democratic state employs a very certain view of nationalism, centered around a masculinist approach to political negotiation.

South Korea's constitution grants equality for all citizens under the law, including the right to hold office. However, these rights have been widely disregarded since the constitution

⁸⁶ Shin, 33.

⁸⁷ Ibid 128.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 47-48.

was implemented in 1948. In South Korea's first election in 1948, 22 women ran for office, but none were successful. Women's participation in legislative politics remained extremely limited for many decades, so Korean women found alternative ways to influence government.⁸⁹

According to Shin, "Korean women's political influence did not come from the formal and legal process. It arose from their primary role as mothers, simply taking care of their family members, later transforming into political activities in the public arena, all the while emphasizing their primary role as mothers."⁹⁰ In the first few decades following independence, the South Korean women's movement was associated with leisurely and social activities for mostly middle- to upper-class women, including some government-sponsored activities that supported the political regime.⁹¹

As discussed more fully in chapter 4, women in South Korea went on to design models of political activism that were built around established gender expectations but went on to challenge these, forming influential social movements that helped challenge authoritarian rule. Central to Shin's analysis are the strategies used to mobilize women, and mothers in particular, as agents of feminine identity in a country that rapidly transformed itself into an urbanized, industrialized, dynamic economy after World War II.⁹² While South Korea's economy and society were changing at breakneck speed, the Cold War tension between communism and capitalism that played out in the division between North and South Korea stifled political development and women's rights, as human security took a back seat to military dictatorship.⁹³ Authoritarian rule rested on a particular view of nationalism, centered around a masculinist approach to politics.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 48.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 48.

⁹¹ Cho H., 1994: 335, quoted in Nicola Anne Jones, *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2019. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ursinus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=302780>, 46.

⁹² Ibid., 128.

⁹³ Ibid, 47-48.

Undercutting Rising Feminism in Two New Nations

As nationalistic fervor of the far right began to take hold of governments both in India and South Korea, post-independence politicians made attempts to separate their respective countries away from any feminist ideology that conflicted with established cultural traditions. Advocating for nationalism, regeneration of old customs, and unity with pride for the homeland, these political mantras also paved the way for Indian and South Korean feminists to be silenced. Feminists were made into a scapegoat, and feminist ideals were constructed as something to be avoided, threatening to the newly emerging national identities. The emphasis on a family unit as the center of life in India and South Korea made for a compelling argument against expansion of gender equality. If women were not home, or if women were getting paid equally to their men, there would be no guarantee they would stay home and perform familial duties. As the role of mother, wife, daughter or other relation was enforced as a cultural heritage, there began to be a pull began between modernizing views on increasing women's agency in their own lives, versus their following traditional community expectations.

Under these new governments, women were at a significant legal disadvantage to men. While this was not so different from life under previous colonial rule, hopes for a more equal society that arose in India's pro-independence movement and South Korea's people's committees dimmed. In both India and South Korea, women faced a similar conundrum, with elite politicians obscuring the demands for women's rights by classifying them as unimportant, or futile. Women's experiences in both countries were frustratingly similar to what many had been experiencing already – enforced patriarchy by members of an elite class or caste in politics. Those same politicians claimed feminist ideology left no room for cultural tradition.

Aside from obvious differences between South Korea and India, such as population size and economic wealth, the two countries share remarkable similarities in terms of the role of national security discourses in rationalizing the continued subordination of women's political and economic rights, along with those of other disempowered groups. Neither India's Hinduism nor South Korea's Confucianism are wholly at fault for the damage done to women's rights and opportunities, as each religious and cultural traditions was used after independence to support a narrow approach to nationalism and national security, shaping the conversation for decades to come. Indian nationalism was not equated with Hindu nationalism until well after WWII, and South Korean nationalism was not entirely Confucian by nature. In addition to military restoration, ruling politicians used Hindu nationalism and Confucian hierarchy to conflate certain ideological and political cultural practices with aspirations for modernization. This made human security a low-tier hope for decades, since domestic safety needed to be prioritized after such a destructive war period.


Chapter 3: A Masculinist Approach to Politics by Women in Power

Although women in political office are still rare by global standards, women across the globe have made great strides in their political representation over the past few decades. This applies to South Korea and India as well, where the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments has increased considerably, as shown in Figure 1. In South Korea, women hold 17% of parliamentary seats, and in India, women hold 12% of such seats and both men and women in South Korea overwhelmingly express their willingness to vote for a woman if she were more qualified than a man.⁹⁴ While political office is generally dominated by men at the national level in India, local and state elections have seen an upsurge of women's candidacies in the past few decades. At the local level, Indian governmental systems or Panchayats (local village councils) and their Pradhans (head of council) are widely recognized authorities. In 1992, the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution designated one-third of all Panchayat seats *and* Pradhan positions be reserved for women. Only two states did not implement this immediately: Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Not only did this reservation system reserve seats for women, it also reserved positions for castes and scheduled tribe members. These reservations were implemented differently across the country, in proportion with those members' representation in the community at large.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Han'guk Yosong Yugwonja Yonmaeng 1993, 5 5-56, quoted in Kyung-Ae Park, "Political Representation and South Korean Women," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 432-48. doi:10.2307/2659403, 440.

⁹⁵ Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," *Econometrica* 72, no. 5 (2004), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>, 1413

Figure 1: Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments, India and South Korea



Source: “Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) | Data.” *The World Bank*. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=IN-KR-CR>.

This chapter explores both gains in women’s political representation as well continued obstacles to effective political action on behalf of gender equality. Public opinion on women as political leaders varies from region to region, as it does everywhere on the globe, but very few women have ever been elected to their country’s top political office. Only fifty-six (38%) of the

146 nations (38%) studied by the World Economic Forum in 2014 and 2016 had a female head of government or state for at least one year in the past half-century. South Korea and India therefore offer two ground-breaking cases in which women became heads of government with the potential to change the political discourse surrounding women in politics: Indira Gandhi, who became India's first and only female prime minister in 1966, and Park Geun-Hye, who was elected as President of South Korea in 2013. These two women served as political markers for their countries, both in the way they handled their political power for or against women's rights, and the difficulties they faced from their own ministers and cabinets. As such, they raise interesting questions about shifting perceptions about the role of women in politics. Their stories are turbulent and end in tragedy; Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her own bodyguards in 1984, while Park Geun-Hye was indicted for corruption and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Indira Gandhi: Symbolic Representation without Substantive Representation

Certainly there is an expectation that when women are elected to political office, they will, in some way, focus on eliminating gendered expectations or roles in society. In fact, past experience shows that this is not necessarily the case. Like anyone elected to a position of power in a representative democracy, women are just as likely to promote policies that will benefit their constituencies and in societies where patriarchal norms remain powerful, women leaders have an incentive to adopt a masculinist approach to national security. This can clearly be seen in the case of Indira Gandhi, whose symbolic election failed to translate into the incorporation of feminist and women's rights agendas, or even significantly improved conditions for the majority of women.

Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister of India from 1966-1977, and again from 1980 to her assassination in 1984. The daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi was her father's colleague, close confidant and the only political heir to her father and grandfather.⁹⁶ Gandhi was a political phenomenon in her own right, growing up in a prominent political household. Elected to the New Congress Party of India, Gandhi had the backing of several elite politicians who believed her father's legacy would continue through her. Her most infamous political move was her declaration of a state of emergency in 1975, which lasted for 19 months,⁹⁷ and resulted in the immediate arrests of politicians, people considered to be "opponents" of the regime, and any alleged instigators of civil disorder, hoarders, smugglers, or black market traders.

This display exemplified Gandhi's leaning toward a masculinist political strategy, specifically in regard to mobilization of fear. As Iris Young points out, state actors will justify expectations of complete loyalty and obedience in times of emergency, as well as establishing surveillance and restricting freedoms. This is all done under the guise of a protector, considered a masculinist prerogative.⁹⁸ The press had very little leeway in this time, with severe restrictions placed on freedom of speech which limited the public's awareness of the effects of this move.⁹⁹ The emergency declaration was a last-ditch attempt to gain favor from small farmers and increase agricultural productivity through heightened control over internal affairs. However, the opposite happened – conditions of poorer areas of India were not changed, and "...forced sterilisation, slum destruction and random arrests created strong counter-reactions" to Gandhi herself.¹⁰⁰ Gandhi was a secularist, promoted the green revolution in agriculture, and

⁹⁶ Henry C. Hart, *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised*, Westview Special Studies on South and Southeast Asia, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), 244.

⁹⁷ Torild Skard, *Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers World Wide*, (Bristol UK: Policy Press, 2015), <https://ursinuscollege.on.worldcat.org/oclc/916311275>, 24.

⁹⁸ "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State," 7.

⁹⁹ Hart, 68.

¹⁰⁰ Skard, 24.

nationalized banks; on the other hand, she was “no feminist”¹⁰¹ by self-declaration. She faced discrimination from her colleagues and opposition from her political rivals due in part to her authoritarian tendencies, but also due to bias against a woman in power.

Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 was carried out by her two bodyguards, both Sikh by religion. Gandhi had just ordered the Indian army to invade the Golden Temple in Punjab, a political move fostered by years of discontent with her regime by several Sikh factions. Increased protests led by these factions were turning violent, and on June 6, 1984, Gandhi ordered the Indian army to invade the Golden Temple, held hostage by one of the Sikh factions. This display of power brought international condemnation and Indian citizens were divided on whether the act was impressive (read masculinist) or cowardly. Her subsequent assassination was carried out on October 31 in retaliation for this affront to Sikh heritage and religion.¹⁰²

Gandhi was faced with impossible odds that no one can deny – the first woman in India to become Prime Minister, a lengthy family legacy of powerful political influence, and many hardline critics who scrutinized her every move.¹⁰³ Gandhi’s legacy is tangled and powerful, with lasting impact on social views of women in power in India. Since her assassination, The New Congress Party has nominated a member of her family every election term.

While Gandhi’s leadership was questioned on many fronts, her tenure was followed by renewed activism by women’s movements. Many women were elected to local governments and their success encouraged other women to get involved. Indian women in politics are generally regarded as changemakers, encouraging a higher likelihood that women’s rights will be taken in


¹⁰¹ Ibid, 26.

¹⁰² Ashutosh Varshney, “Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety,” *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027190>, 248.

¹⁰³ Skard, 25.

to account on local levels.¹⁰⁴ Research suggests that officials who are women highlight poor behavior by the police to elite officials and the press, thereby encouraging change in the public sphere.¹⁰⁵

Figure 2. Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Empowerment in India



Source: Iyer, et. al. “The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India,” 178.

Figure 2 poses an interesting look in to the effects of women’s representation. According to the graph, the longer it has been since a woman has been visible in office, the higher the rate of documented crimes against women.¹⁰⁶ The authors of the study, Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani,

¹⁰⁴ Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra, and Petia Topalova, "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4, no. 4 (2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23269746>, 172.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Prachi Mishra, and Petia Topalova, insist that the increase is actually good news, driven primarily by greater reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. While there was no quantifiable difference in the number of crimes committed when a woman was made head of local government, more women did report assaults and harassments, showing the importance of visibility and representation in government at all levels, because more reported crimes encourage change, as shown in Iyer's study.¹⁰⁷ Women working as leaders in their communities are in position to make a strong impact on social change, should they choose to. As it is important for all community leaders to recognize the plights of gendered violence, it is especially important to make space and time for women to voice concerns.

Interestingly, women have also run as candidates for the Hindu right, circumventing criticism of their political activism by campaigning as mothers and arguing that they should be celebrated for fulfilling their "cultural duty."¹⁰⁸ Currently, the governing party of India is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Founded in 1980, it is the most far right-wing Hindu Nationalist party of India's independent political history. The BJP promotes a kind of communalist Hinduism primarily associated with Hindutva that benefits upper-caste/middle class Indians the most. The ideology is established by using religion as a common "denominator of the political community."¹⁰⁹ In addition, the BJP is involved in anti-Muslim rhetoric¹¹⁰ and poor treatment of lower-caste citizens.¹¹¹ While India's constitution is secular by law, the governing party is not.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ *Urban Women in Contemporary India: A Reader*: 306.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Rana Ayyub, "Modi's India is a Living Nightmare for Muslims," *The Washington Post*, Dec 6, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/06/modis-india-is-living-nightmare-muslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d9f776e2431f.

¹¹¹ "World Report 2018 – India," *Human Rights Watch*, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/india>.

This creates social, economic and political issues for those who are not members of the ruling religion, especially Muslims, for the stigma against Islam by the BJP.¹¹²

Park Geun-Hye: The Road to Impeachment

As a more recent example of a woman in power, Park Geun-Hye's presidency offers similar insight into South Korea's political system. She was President from 2013-2017, and indicted for corruption in 2018.¹¹³ As the daughter of Park Chung-Hee, the assassinated military leader who set the South Korean economy on a path to export-led growth, she was raised in South Korea's presidential housing.¹¹⁴ She represented regional districts in the national assembly and was nicknamed the "Queen of Elections" until she suffered a loss in 2007. In 2011 she was elected to the Grand National Party, and spearheaded the party's reform into the Saenuri Party, one of the four popular national parties. In 2012 the Saenuri Party nominated her as its presidential candidate, where her biggest rival was the man who is South Korea's current president, Moon Jae-In of the Democratic United Party.¹¹⁵

Park was elected in a close race with Jae-In on February 25th, 2013. Criticisms and doubts followed her policy measures, much due to the legacy of her father. While some praised Chung for his economic policies, many condemned him as brutal and undemocratic and questions about undemocratic if not illegal actions dogged Park's tenure.¹¹⁶ In 2013, the Park administration successfully moved to have a minor opposition party (the Unified Progressive Party) disbanded

¹¹² "Modi's India is a Living Nightmare for Muslims."

¹¹³ Choe Sang-Hun, "Park Geun-hye, Ex-South Korean Leader, Gets 25 Years in Prison," *The New York Times*, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/world/asia/park-geun-hye-sentenced-south-korea.html>.

¹¹⁴ André Munro, "Park Geun-Hye: President of South Korea," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Park-Geun-Hye>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

and its members stripped of their National Assembly seats. While the court ruled to ban the party because it advocated “North Korean-style socialism,” critics charged that “Park was using a national security argument to muzzle domestic opposition” since party members were fierce critics of the president (Pak and Park 2019: 2). Reports that Park used the country’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) to conduct an illicit online campaign to sway public opinion in favor of her 2012 presidential campaign also fueled suspicion (Pak and Park 2019: 2). Public distrust increased after a tragic accident with the ship Sewol, which caused the deaths of over 300 people in 2014. Park’s administration was blamed for allowing the ferry company to flout regulations as well as for its disorganized and poorly handled, with Park herself criticized for getting Botox injections during the immediate aftermath (Pak and Park 2019: 3).

Further questions about her legitimacy came after a major scandal erupted in 2016, where a national newspaper released a story concerning influence over Park’s administration by one of her close friends. Blackmail and money laundering were alleged, and Choi Soon-Sil (Park’s friend) was arrested in November for unfair sway over governmental money handling. In December, the National Assembly voted to impeach Park, and March of 2017 saw her facing 18 charges related to abuse of power pressed to her case. While she pleaded not guilty, her successor was elected – former opponent Moon Jae-In, who remains President today. On April 6, 2018, Park was sentenced to a lengthy prison term and a \$17 million USD fine for corruption.¹¹⁷

Park’s story is shorter than Gandhi’s because of how recent the events are in history. Gandhi’s legacy has had time to settle and be observed out of Indian context, whereas Park’s scandals are recent. Both women held seats of incredible power, and both were criticized not only for their policies. Both women grew up in households where they were expected to become

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

leaders, and had family legacies of national power. Women's political participation was not heavily altered by these women, suggesting it is not always the case that women politicians pave the way for more women to take seats.

South Korea's experience with women's political representation and progressive legislation is much more recent and coincides with the country's transition to democratic rule after 1987. With a nationwide movement towards democracy, South Korea seemed to be heading towards better rights for all, symbolized in part by ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1984.¹¹⁸ When Kim Young-Sam was elected president in 1992, South Korea saw an era of democratization and curbed military power for the first time since independence. Kim instituted open nominations for presidential candidates, and reduced corruption through installing "... 'real name' financial transactions with mandatory annual publication of bureaucrats' and politicians' assets."¹¹⁹ His administration oversaw the trials and imprisonments of ex-presidents Roh and Chun in 1995 for human rights abuses.¹²⁰

In combination with political parties' efforts to gain women's votes, women's organizations began to engage with the state. Rather than accepting the status-quo of political hierarchy, women's organizations began demanding legislation for equal rights and opportunities in South Korea.¹²¹ South Korean women's movements in the 1980's and 1990's demanded legislation to combat discrimination in wages, sexual harassment, and gendered violence.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Kim Sun Uk, "An Analysis of Legislative Policy for Performance of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) in Korea," in *Women's Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea*, edited by Pil-wha Chang, Ŭn-sil Kim, and Ihwa Yōja Taehakkyo, (Seoul, Korea: Asian Center for Women's Studies, 2005), 260.

¹¹⁹ Kil and Moon, 2001, quoted in *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, 48.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Kim S. K., 1997, quoted in *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, 47.

Women were actively involved in *minjung* social activism, a reaction to rapid economic development,¹²³ which also encompassed labor, student, and even agrarian movements. The common denominator for these movements was their dedication to anti-authoritarianism and opposition to neoliberal economic policies.¹²⁴

1999 saw more victories, with the Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act, supportive regulations for women's entrepreneurship, and the National Public Service Law revised to include maternity and paternity leave.¹²⁵ These changes were put into effect nationwide, and encouraged more political participation by women who otherwise had been encouraged to remain apolitical. Kyung-Ae Park, a scholar from South Korea, analyzed the transformation in women's roles since 1948 to 1999, from their traditional roles as homemakers with low socioeconomic status, little time allocated to political livelihoods, and a social belief that homemakers do not engage in politics.¹²⁶ Yet despite changes in these roles thanks to gains in education and employment, South Korean women continued to have low rights of political participation due to political opportunity structures that acted as inhibitors to women's political participation: "...the success rate of women is more directly related to the structure of political opportunity and the electoral situation than to gender, lack of educational and occupational credentials, and paucity of experience."¹²⁷ Interestingly enough, these factors do not seem to have inhibited voter's attitudes towards women's candidacies. In 1992, voters indicated a strong preference for an equal ballot formed on basis of qualification, rather than gender stereotype. It

¹²³ Nicola Anne Jones, quoted in *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, 47.

¹²⁴ Lee and Jong, 1999, quoted in *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*, 46.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 261.

¹²⁶ Kyung-Ae Park, "Political Representation and South Korean Women," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no 2 (May 1999), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2659403>, 437.

¹²⁷ Susan Carrol (1994): Ibid, 438-439.

seems party elites, who are most often men, are the biggest culprits in disavowing officials and candidates who are women.

In 2000, the South Korean government established the Department of Gender Equality, enabling women to contribute more to the creation of government policy. Before this, only women with financial difficulties were mentioned in public policy – now, the demand was to focus on women in every policy department.¹²⁸ An obstacle to human security in South Korea was abolished in 2008 – the *Hoju* system, or family registration system introduced in 1953 by Civil Law. Under the *Hoju* system, every South Korean family had to register under a “family head”; a man in the family, given South Korea’s entrenched patriarchal culture. The *Hoju* system set up legal preference for men to inherit family names, and for women in the family to be taken in to another family by marriage, and take that family head’s name. In 2005, the Constitutional Court announced that the *Hoju* system was unconstitutional, and the system was abolished on January 1, 2008. This was accomplished through cooperation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and non-governmental organizations like Korea Women’s Associations United.¹²⁹ Many South Koreans across religious and class lines advocated to abolish the *Hoju* system; the only group in support of maintaining the system was Sungkyunkwan, the Association of Korean Confucians. In an official statement, Sungkyunkwan stated “...the *hoju* system was a valued part of Korean tradition and should, therefore, be preserved.”¹³⁰

Leaders from more than four religions in South Korea came together to draft a statement advocating the abolishment of the *Hoju* system on June 11th, 2003. Their argument centered on

¹²⁸ Sirin Sung, “Women Reconciling Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea,” *Social Policy and Administration* 37, no. 4 (August 2003): 346.

¹²⁹ Koh, 346.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 346-347.

gender equality and the rights of the individual.¹³¹ Sungkyunkwan opposed these grievances and argued the Hoju system was a formative part of South Korean culture. Lee Seungkwon, head of rituals for Sungkyunkwan, claimed family values would be at risk if the system were to be abolished. This argument equated South Korean traditions to family values, reinforcing the notion of unequal gender roles through systematic patriarchal practice.¹³²

In 2016 Claire Lee, writer for *The Korea Herald*, delved in to the topic of women as political candidates and preference for party in South Korea. Lee reported that not one of the 33 women up for election as independent candidates in 2016 won a seat; only candidates from the four major parties (Saenuri, Minjoo, People’s Party and Justice Party) won seats. She also found that 69.5% of voters did not think women were involved enough in politics, despite South Korea’s steady rise in development.¹³³

¹³¹ Ibid

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Claire Lee, “Women’s Presence in Politics Still Limited in South Korea,” *The Korea Herald*, accessed April 13, 2019. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160621000907>.

Chapter 4: Protesting Patriarchy Through Education and Entrepreneurship

Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, noted that “globally, women earn only three-quarters as much as men, even with the same job and same education. They are underrepresented in the formal sector and overrepresented in the informal sector. They spend twice as much time on household chores as men – and four times as much on childcare. They make up 70 percent of the billion people living on less than a dollar a day, and are the first to be submerged by economic crisis.”¹³⁴ As Lagarde points out in her speech, economic concerns are closely related to concerns about fairness and justice and therefore to human security; expanded economic opportunities for women are vital to the sustainability of women’s empowerment.

This chapter begins by comparing India and South Korea in terms of their population size and economic achievements as well as the economic policies that they have adopted. It also analyzes the effect of policies on women’s economic situation in both countries, including their participation in the paid labor force. Here, the paper discusses a surprising decline in Indian women’s labor force participation rates that has coincided with strong economic growth. The chapter ends with a discussion of the role that entrepreneurship can play in improving women’s situation, emphasizing through data provided in the Global Entrepreneurship Model’s (GEM) 2016/2017 “Report on Women’s Entrepreneurship” that education rates are *not* barriers to successfully creating a business.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Christine Lagarde, “Empowerment - The Amartya Sen Lecture 2014,” London School of Economics and Political Science, Department for International Development (6 June 2014). http://www.lse.ac.uk/assets/richmedia/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/transcripts/20140606_1830_theAmartyaSenLecture2014_tr.pdf

¹³⁵ Donna J. Kelley, Benjamin S. Baumer, Candida Brush, Patrica G. Greene, Mahnaz Mahdavi, Mahdi Majbourni Marcia Cole, Monica Dean, and René Heavlow, “2016/2017 Report on Women’s Entrepreneurship,” *Global*

Economic Background

As two of the most prominent global economies today, India and South Korea represent two very different types of economies. According to Focus Economics, a blog summarizing economic forecasts by leading economists, India is projected to become the fifth largest economy in the world by 2023. Currently, India ranks sixth in world economy, and South Korea is twelfth.¹³⁶ India is the world's fastest growing economy as well, currently ahead of China.¹³⁷ Of course, India and South Korea have vastly different population sizes. As indicated in Table 2, India is home to 1.3 billion people – approximately one in every six people on earth lives in India today. South Korea has a population of only 51.4 million in comparison, 4% of India's population.¹³⁸ Although India's economy is now larger than South Korea's, South Korea's per capita wealth, at US\$39,500 in 2017, is much larger than India's GDP per capita of US\$7,200 in 2017. At only 18% of South Korea's average earning power per person, India's GDP per capita is significantly below South Korea's, yet it is worth noting that in two decades India's population rose from 992 million to 1.3 billion people (a 24% increase), while South Korea's population rose from 46.28 million to 54.4 million, a 15% increase.¹³⁹ In addition, South Korea is a much more urbanized country with a very small agricultural sector and an economy that is transitioning from industry into services. India, in contrast, still has a substantial agricultural sector, although its industrial and service sectors are growing. Moreover, while India has shifted toward low-end

Entrepreneurship Monitor, Boston: The Fenway Group, accessed March 15, 2019, <https://www.gemconsortium.org/report/49860>.

¹³⁶ "The World's Top Ten Largest Economies," *Focus Economics*, accessed April 6, 2019, <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world>.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ "Country Comparison, India and South Korea," *CountryEconomy*, accessed April 6, 2019, <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/south-korea/india>.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

manufacturing and services, South Korea has moved into high-end engineering and technology sectors; high-tech exports accounted for 27% of South Korea's manufacturing exports in 2013, as opposed to 8% of India's manufacturing exports.¹⁴⁰

Today, according to journalist Ujval Nanavati, the South Korean government encourages citizens to take up jobs such as electricians, masons, and plumbers because of the shortage in skilled laborers those careers.¹⁴¹ South Korea's high tertiary education rate has the paradoxical effect of disillusioning people from choosing a career in these essential jobs. In India in 2010, the percent of graduates with tertiary degrees (masters level or higher) (age 15+) in India was 4.85% - although given India's much larger population, this translated into roughly 60 million people, more than the entire population of South Korea.¹⁴² This is a good example of the difficulty in comparing these two countries by numbers – India's size is one of its biggest challenges. Distributing services and opportunity to keep up with the growing population is a challenge. South Korea faces an inverse problem – a shrinking birth rate. According to *The Korea Herald*, the fertility rate in South Korea dropped below 1 at the start of 2018.¹⁴³ Population size and access to facilities are already in question for both India and South Korea, for truly opposite reasons.

¹⁴⁰ Ujval Nanavati, "Why India Is No Match for South Korea," *Forbes India* (11 July 2015), accessed April 6, 2019, <http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/why-india-is-no-match-for-south-korea/40661/1>

¹⁴¹ See Figure 2, Forbes India.

¹⁴² Barro-Lee, "India - Percentage of population age 15+ with tertiary schooling. Completed Tertiary," *Trading Economics*, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/barro-lee-percentage-of-population-age-15-with-tertiary-schooling-completed-tertiary-wb-data.html>.

¹⁴³ Yonhap, "Fertility Rate Dips Below 1 in 2018: official," *The Korea Herald*, accessed April 8, 2019, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190118000235>.

Table 2. Economic Indicators, India and South Korea (2017)

<u>Economic Factor</u>	India	South Korea
Population (2017)	1,317 million	51.4 million
Labor force (total/by sector) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture • Industry • Services 	521.9 million <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 47% • 22% • 31% 	27.75 million <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4.8% • 24.6% • 70.6%
GDP (purchasing power parity)	\$9.447 trillion	\$2.035 trillion
GDP composition by sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture • Industry • Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16.8% • 28.9% • 46.6% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2.2% • 39.3% • 58.3%
GDP per capita (PPP)	\$7,200	\$39,500
GDP – real growth rate	6.7%	3.1%
Female labor force participation rate	27%	52.21%
Population below poverty	21.9% (2011 estimate)	14.4% (2016 estimate)
Unemployment rate	8.8% (2012 estimate)	3.7%
Gini index (dist. of family income)	35.2 (2011 estimate)	35.7 (2016 estimate)
Household income or consumption by percentage share <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowest 10% • Highest 10% 	(2011 estimate) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.6% • 29.8% 	(2015 estimate) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6.8% • 48.5%
Access to sanitation	36% (2013)	100% (2013)
Connectivity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internet Users (per 100) • Average Internet speed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 (2014) • 25.3 Mbps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85 (2014) • 2 Mbps

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook.” Accessed April 6, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/>. Ujval Nanavati, “Why India is no match for South Korea,” *Forbes: India*, July 11, 2015, accessed April 6, 2019, <http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/why-india-is-no-match-for-south-korea/40661/1>

South Korea’s Capitalist Development State

Like a number of other countries in East and Southeast Asia, South Korea achieved its economic success as a capitalist development state. Developmental states in East Asia have achieved high per capita income levels through strong state intervention, extensive regulation and planning often through authoritarian states that concentrated both economic and political power.¹⁴⁴ The developmental state in South Korea used a variety of means to promote the growth of new industries, first focusing on import-substitution industrialization and later shifting to export-promoting industrialization. The state channeled investment into promising industries that were able to become global leaders with the help of government subsidies, low-interest loans and generous credits; import tariffs and exchange rate controls were manipulated to stimulate exports and lower the cost of imported inputs, and state repression helped keep the cost of labor low. The firms that were supported by the government’s industrial policy were often linked through family ties and developed into powerful business groups known as *chaebols*.

Women and Economic Growth in South Korea

South Korea’s focus on export-led growth attracted global businesses drawn to the possibility of employing cheap labor, especially local women. As Cynthia Enloe explains in her analysis of the globalization of sneaker production, companies such as Nike and Reebok were attracted by the ability of the military government to suppress labor organizing and workers’

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, Menon.

acceptance of Confucian values and sense of patriotic duty, which “seemed to make South Korean women the ideal labor force for modern export-oriented factories.”¹⁴⁵ Enloe notes that the managers of these companies were men, who had plenty of incentive to keep their staff under control to meet quota demands. These men negotiated with trade unions and were responsible for health and safety, allowing for virtually no corporate oversight by Reebok or Nike in South Korea.¹⁴⁶ Appeals to nationalism and Confucianism encouraged women to enter factory jobs beginning in the 1960s, and the government relied on women accepting their feminized role in the domestic economy in order to boost production and serve the country.

Jongwoo Han and L.H. M. Ling describe South Korea’s capitalist developmental state as “a hybrid product of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance,” under the blanket of East Asia’s authoritarian capitalist economic structures. Confucian patriarchal privileges are assigned to the state, while characteristics of classic womanhood (deference, discipline, and diligence) are pushed on to women.¹⁴⁷ Unlike the capitalist model of development in western economies like the United States, South Korea’s developmental state draws on the country’s heritage of Confucianist collectivism and grants the state a much larger role; however, both types of capitalist economies incorporate masculinist practices that subordinate women’s rights to broader national imperatives.¹⁴⁸

However, as part of the broader protests of the 1980s, women also began organizing and protesting dangerous working conditions, regular harassment and low pay. This posed a profound challenge to the regime since “if women reimagined their lives as daughters, as wives,

¹⁴⁵ Cynthia Enloe, “The Globetrotting Sneaker,” in *The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire*, (University of California Press, 2004) 44.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 44-45.

¹⁴⁷ Jongwoo Han, and L. H. M Ling, "Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 42.

¹⁴⁸ Han and Ling, 58.

as workers, as citizens, it wouldn't just rattle their Korean employers and those men's foreign corporate clients; it would shake the very foundations of the whole political system."¹⁴⁹ In response to successful efforts by feminist activists to encourage women workers to protest their treatment and demand higher wages, the government sent in riot police to intimidate the workers; these efforts failed, however, and women not only won the right to organize but also won pay increases. Women's mobilization was also credited with helping topple the military regime and usher in democracy.¹⁵⁰

Despite important gains, South Korean women also faced job losses as Nike and other manufacturing companies began moving their factories in the late 1980s and 1990s to other countries that offered even cheaper labor and fewer labor protections. Thus, the creation and loss of factory jobs in South Korea offer are a perfect example of neoliberal economics in a globalized economy; though South Korea moved up the economic chain, women continued to remain vulnerable to the vagaries of capitalist growth in a masculinized state; as Enloe describes, "the poor women had moved from rural villages into the cities in the 1960s searching for jobs to support not only themselves, but parents and siblings. The late 1980s exodus of sneaker-manufacturing jobs forced more women into the growing 'entertainment' industry."¹⁵¹

In February 2019, CNN Associate Producer Sophie Jeong published an article on the effects and obstacles of South Korea's glass ceiling. While tertiary education rates are the highest in the world (nearly 70% of 25-34 year-olds are tertiary graduates) South Korea has rampant discriminatory practices when it comes to hiring women.¹⁵² Recently three of the

¹⁴⁹ Enloe., 47.

¹⁵⁰ Enloe., 47-48.

¹⁵¹ Enloe., 48.

¹⁵² Sophie Jeong, "South Korea's Glass Ceiling: The Women Struggling to Get Hired by Companies that Only Want Men," CNN (February 1, 2019). Retrieved from: <https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/31/asia/south-korea-hiring-discrimination-intl/index.html>

country's largest banks were found guilty of eliminating qualified women applicants, and editing the test scores of men who applied and did not have the requisite qualifications.¹⁵³ When KB Kookmin Bank was charged with eliminating 112 women applicants, it was fined a mere US\$4,500.¹⁵⁴ According to South Korean laws, it is illegal to dismiss a woman for having a child or getting married, and employers that do face five years in prison or a fee of \$26,500 USD, yet women interviewed in Jeong's article said they did not feel comfortable bringing cases of gender discrimination to court for fear of isolation, or possibly job termination.¹⁵⁵ Discriminatory hiring has proven slow to change, and employers continue to ask questions pertaining to personal relations, such as if a woman plans to have a baby or get married, and one told a 23-year old applicant that "women aren't fit to work in sales".¹⁵⁶ In November 2018, South Korea's Supreme Court upheld the four-year prison sentence of Park Gi Dong, former CEO of Korea Gas Safety Corporation. He was found guilty of favoring men over women in the hiring process, on the grounds that he believed women would take maternity leave and impede business.¹⁵⁷ These obstacles create a ripple effect of disillusionment with job security, in an already competitive job market. When the effects of neoliberal economics bleed in to the workplace, human security is put at severe risk.

India's Economic Model

For years, India languished under an economic system that produced low rates of growth and failed to meet the basic human needs of hundreds of millions of poor Indians. The mixed

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

economy introduced by Nehru in the 1950s blended socialist planning with the least productive forms of private-sector competition, as the Indian bureaucracy implemented a “license raj” that stifled innovation and fostered corruption. The system began to change under Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi, who was elected in 1984 on a wave of sympathy after his mother’s assassination. Economic liberalization followed, and foreign companies – traditionally suspect – began to get a cautious welcome. Local industries boomed and consumer society expanded but India’s poor continued to be left behind. Liberalizing reforms continued under Gandhi’s successor, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who freed prices, reduced import tariffs, privatized some government-owned businesses and eased licensing restrictions on what businesses could make.¹⁵⁸

Reforms continued under the coalition government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee and the BJP and these have been associated with high rates of growth; between 1990 and 2013, GDP growth averaged 6.4% and the share of agriculture in GDP roughly halved (from 33 to 18%), while that of services increased from 24 to 31%. Urbanization has also increased, from 26% to 32%.¹⁵⁹

Women and Economic Growth in India

Neoliberal economics “shifts the balance of power to big domestic capital and international finance capital.”¹⁶⁰ Although this produces wealth for some, it does not translate into an equitable distribution of income. Sustained high economic growth since the early 1990s

¹⁵⁸ Simon Long, “India’s Shining Hopes: A Survey of India,” *The Economist* (21 February 2004), accessed April 28, 2019.

¹⁵⁹ Erin K. Fletcher, Rohini Pande, and Charity Troyer Moore, “Women and Work in India: Descriptive Evidence and a Review of Potential Policies,” *CID Faculty Working Paper*, No. 339 (Center for International Development, Harvard University, December 2017), 2.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

has brought significant change to the lives of Indian women. Total fertility fell from 4.0 to 2.5 children per woman between 1990-2013, while girls' primary school enrollment reached parity at boys, and universal enrollment was achieved in 2015. Between 1994 and 2010, the fraction of women aged 15-24 attending any educational institution more than doubled (from 16.1% to 36%).¹⁶¹ However, despite this rapid economic growth, educational gains, and fertility decline, female labor force participation, as discussed more fully below, has actually declined.

Who controls household income has immense power over those living under that roof. Rehana Ghadially warns that discussions on women's household economics tend towards older, gendered trends of "economic internationalization."¹⁶² In order to secure a beneficial economic future, security must extend to land and property rights as well. Indian feminists were essential in founding pan-Indian nationalism and social reform in the nineteenth century. However, after the constitution was written to include gender rights and property rights in 1948, implementation of reform for women in India proved difficult.¹⁶³ Since independence, India has introduced three more bills in an ongoing attempt to grant more women property and land rights. They are almost entirely geared towards aiding Hindu women; very little legislation exists that specifically aids women of other religions.¹⁶⁴ Legal measures certainly are a step in the right direction, but the bills are all designed to aid specifically Hindu women, as indicated in the following representative passage: "This act applies...to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian,

¹⁶¹ Fletcher, Pande and Moore, 2.

¹⁶² *Urban Women in Contemporary India*, 210.

¹⁶³ Sita Anantha Raman, *Women in India: A Social and Cultural History*, Volume 1, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-CILO, 2009, 101.

¹⁶⁴ K.C. Roy, "Institutions and Gender Empowerment in India," in *Institutions and Gender Empowerment in the Global Economy*, by Cal Clark, H.C. Blomqvist, and K.C. Roy, eds, (Singapore: World Scientific. <http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=57ce53ca-08c4-42a3-9c93-371bcd3f3fc%40sdc-v-sessmgr02&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=514857&db=nlebk>, 71.

Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage...if this Act had not been passed.”¹⁶⁵

India also faces a conundrum that compounds these challenges of granting women greater property rights – the cultural practice of the caste system. Although officially outlawed, the caste system transcends religious, economic, political and social lines, and is a largely socialized way of enforcing barriers, particularly to women. It is “...a system of ascribed status, originating from association to job type. Portuguese colonizers developed the word ‘caste’ with association to ‘chaste,’ implying that the social boundaries associated with everything from public space to marriage would keep groups ‘pure’...”¹⁶⁶ Given the profound disadvantages from long-standing traditions of economic, political, and social discrimination against women and lower caste people, the economic struggles of lower-caste women are particularly difficult to resolve. One way to overcome a system of unequal opportunity is to create your own based on necessity for income, such as many women do by becoming entrepreneurs.

Economic growth is important for women’s economic opportunities, since this permits a higher amount of female workforce participation, increasing household incomes across the country. However, economic growth does not always increase women’s economic participation, as India’s experience shows. As indicated in Figure 3, the labor force participation rate of South Korean women rose only marginally from 47% in 1990 to 52% in 2017, whereas India’s rate went down from 35% in 1990 to 27% in 2017. While it is easy to assume these figures indicate an increase in gender inequality, another statistic may challenge that assumption. From 1993 to

¹⁶⁵ “The Hindu Succession Act, 1956,” *iKanoon*, accessed March 10, 2019, <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/685111/>

¹⁶⁶ Anika Backelin-Harrison, "Intersectional India: Caste, Feminism and Development in the 21st Century," *International Relations Summer Fellows*, (Collegeville: Ursinus College Digital Commons, 2018), https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/int_sum/4, 3.

2018, secondary education enrollment in India rose by 41.2%.¹⁶⁷ According to Chitvan Singh Dhillon with the Indian Economic Service, at very low levels of education and income, women must work to support their households; however, with increased family income, women “tend to withdraw from work in the formal economy to give more attention to household activities.”¹⁶⁸ Singh Dhillon notes that, with some but limited education, women face pressure to stay at home and are less likely to find jobs that match their intermediate levels of education: “It is only at higher levels of education and income that women re-enter the workforce through well-paying jobs that match their education and skills.”¹⁶⁹ Despite the short-term effect on women dropping out of the workforce, the proven increasing number of girls staying in school is a boost in human security, because it offers more opportunity for a better economic livelihood in the future.

¹⁶⁷ “School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross).” *The World Bank*. Accessed March 15, 2019.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR.FE?locations=IN>

¹⁶⁸ Chitvan Singh Dhillan, “India’s Female Labour Force Is Declining,” *The Tribune* (India). May 1, 2018.


<https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-s-female-labour-force-is-declining/582031.html>


¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Figure 3. South Korean and Indian Female Labor Force Participation Rate, 1990-2018

Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15-64) (modeled ILO estimate)

International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in September 2018.

License : CC BY-4.0 



Source: *The World Bank*. Accessed December 8, 2018.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN>.

GEM: A Report on Economic Empowerment

According to the GEM report, “In 2016, an estimated 163 million women were starting or running new businesses in 74 economies around the world.”¹⁷⁰ The motives for women joining or remaining out of business entrepreneurship include religion, familial duties, cultural traditions,

¹⁷⁰ GEM Women’s Entrepreneurial Report, 12.

and more.¹⁷¹ It is important to look at women who are creating their own businesses and *why*, comparing this with feminization of labor in the workforce, particularly in factories.¹⁷² As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, neoliberal economics have a direct correlation to dependency issues countries in the Global South face. Women's entrepreneurship is therefore a difficult descriptor, because it is at once an independent venture and a reaction to poor working conditions supported by a system of neocolonialism, meaning imperialist influence is still administered in previously colonized countries.

Women tend to create companies that have high growth potential specifically in East Asia.¹⁷³ Despite this, women continue to earn less than men and therefore bring less income to the household. In the last three decades this trend has shifted, with more women demanding equal pay and equal household status. Women's entrepreneurship trends are good indicators of human security in an economy. A recent study of women's entrepreneurship across the globe was released in 2017, entitled the GEM Women's Entrepreneurial Report. According to GEM, women entrepreneurs fall in to two categories: new and nascent.

Nascent entrepreneurs are in the process of starting a business, but have not paid wages or salaries for three or more months. New entrepreneurs have a business three to forty-two months old. Total Entrepreneurial Activity, or TEA, indicates the percent of working-age adults (in this case specifically women) 18-64 years old, who are either new or nascent entrepreneurs.¹⁷⁴ According to GEM, women's entrepreneurial ventures rose by 10% in 73

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² See Teri L. Caraway, "The Political Economy of Feminization: From 'Cheap Labor' to Gendered Discourses of Work," *Politics & Gender* 1, no. 3 (2005): 399–429. doi:10.1017/S1743923X05050105.s

¹⁷³ Philippe Debroux, "Female Entrepreneurship in Asia: The Case of Japan, South-Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam," *創価経営論集 / 創価大学経営学会 編* 37, no. 1-3 (2013), 2.

¹⁷⁴ GEM Women's Entrepreneurial Report, 16.

countries over the last two years alone.¹⁷⁵ Part of this may stem from necessity, when women need income and are unable to find another work option.¹⁷⁶

Indian and South Korean total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) measures are increasing in different manners – Indian women are primarily using factor-driven development methods, which are “...recognized as early stages of economic development, usually marked by a largely rural population working primarily in sectors of agriculture and the extraction of natural resources.”¹⁷⁷ These methods are most favorable to women with little to no education. To be clear, location is not correlated to education level, so it is inaccurate to assume “rural” indicates “uneducated,” or “urban” indicates “educated.” According to GEM, “TEA participation *decreases* at every level of educational attainment compared to women with no education.”¹⁷⁸ Inverse proportioning suggests South Korean women are primarily using innovation-driven methods, which describe “mature economies, with a distinct shift to more service-based business as well as industrial sectors based on knowledge intensity and innovation.”¹⁷⁹ These methods lend themselves to women who have a secondary degree or higher, and are not as favorable to women with no education.¹⁸⁰ The difference in development methods offers insight in to the levels of education most common in each country. South Korea’s tertiary education rate is the highest in the world, while India has a high secondary education rate.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 8.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 30.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 27.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 13.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 27.

Chapter 5: Patience in the Here and Now: Current Feminist Movements in India and South Korea

Before the voices of the current #MeToo movement were made international, feminists in the Global South worked and protested against patriarchy, class-and caste-based discrimination and neocolonialism using politics and patience. The struggles differed from country to country, region to region, even town to town. No two countries were or are the same in their treatment of gendered rights. However, women's labor and contributions are treated as lesser than men's throughout the world.¹⁸¹ No country has yet achieved gender parity across education, health, economic and political systems. India and South Korea, disparate as they may seem, are perfect proofs of this claim. Two countries, diametrically opposed in their economic structure, population size, cultural history and regional location, are both struggling to change the political and legislative narrative by adopting feminist ideology.

¹⁸¹ See Teri L. Caraway, "The Political Economy of Feminization: From 'Cheap Labor' to Gendered Discourses of Work."

Table 3: Global Gender Gap Report 2018

Gender Gap Indicators, 2018	INDIA	SOUTH KOREA
<u>Educational Attainment</u>		
Global ranking (out of 149)	#114	#100
Literacy (female/male)	0.75	1.00
Primary Enrollment (female/male)	1.01	1.00
Secondary Enrollment (female/male)	1.01	1.00
Tertiary Enrollment (female/male)	1.00	0.780
<u>Health and Survival</u>		
Global ranking (out of 149)	#147	#87
Sex ratio at birth (female/male)	0.90	0.93
Healthy life expectancy (female/male)	1.02	1.06
<u>Economic Participation and Opportunity</u>		
Global ranking (out of 149)	#142	#124
Labor force participation (female/male)	0.35	0.75
Wage equality for similar work (female/male)	0.65	0.53
Estimated earned income, PPP, \$US (female/male)	0.23	0.46
Legislators, senior official and managers (female/male)	0.15	0.14
Professional and technical workers (female/male)	0.34	0.93

Source: World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2018* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018). Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf 123, 147.

As shown in Table 3, South Korea has completely closed the gap between men and women in terms of literacy and rates of enrollment in primary and secondary schools, although women are still underrepresented in higher education. Educational opportunities for Indian girls and women have become much better in recent years, but Indian women continue to suffer from higher rates of illiteracy than men. Women in both South Korea and India can expect to live longer and healthier lives than men, but the unnaturally low ratio of females to males at birth in

both countries suggests continued discrimination against girls, resulting in a disproportionate rate of death for infant girls. India stands out for the low rate of women's labor force participation and the low percentage of women in professional and technical jobs; however, though South Korea does better on these indicators, it falls far short of parity and both countries do poorly in terms of wage and income equality. Perhaps surprisingly, South Korean women earn proportionally even less than Indian women for the same work when performed by men.

While gender quotas for political seats and economic ventures for working women are good beginnings, the work still is not done. These countries must move towards equitable gendered rights, improve their human security, and ensure better futures for generations to come. One way in which the Indian government has attempted to move on gender rights is through employment schemes. In 2012, in response to published data showing that most women living in rural areas were unemployed, a for-profit agency, Gram Tarang, set out to rectify this situation.¹⁸² Two young women, Shashi and Prabhati Das, were featured in an article in *The New York Times* on the aspirations of women from rural areas who were enticed to move to cities through Gram Tarang's new program to increase factory jobs for women. The piece described these women in incredible detail. "It is late May, the first day of their factory summer — of love letters folded into squares and dropped onto work stations; of fevers sweated out on the floor of a bare hostel room; of supervisors shouting in a language they do not understand, a couple of words — 'work' and 'faster' — gradually becoming clear; of capitalism, of men and of a bit of freedom."¹⁸³ This initiative, while certainly aimed at increasing employment, failed to ensure that the jobs would be safe and rewarding by their own standards.

¹⁸² Ellen Barry, "Young Rural Women in India Chase Big-City Dreams," *The New York Times*, accessed May 18, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/world/asia/bangalore-india-women-factories.html>.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 2.

In the abstract, the scheme sounds appealing. Young women are employed en masse, they are less likely to be married off at a young age, and they begin to understand fiscal independence. But the rights of factory workers in India are abysmal at best. "...[G]arments worn in the West are still made by humans — nearly all of them women, working exhausting hours, with few legal protections and little chance of advancement, for some of the lowest wages in the global supply chain."¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, without taking marital customs or age into consideration, young women in the workforce are particularly unprepared for city life in India since many of them are coming from rural areas. There are families who will not accept any money from their daughters, or who demand they come home after a certain period, so they may marry at a later time.

While the employment initiative may have been undertaken in good faith, the actual reality of this scheme is that most of these girls go home, going back due to illness or too much pressure.¹⁸⁵ Shashi and Prabhati were two of over 30 women to arrive at the factory; Prabhati went home, Shashi bought a new smartphone and contacted her boyfriend for the first time on her own. In the beginning it was not supposed to be like this; when they arrived, Prabhati made bold moves and statements to show her unwavering dedication to city life. But it is Shashi, the girl who arrived at the factory saying, "All the flirts and ruffians in the whole world must have been born on this lane" who makes it through the physical and emotional abuse suffered by millions of women in textile factories.¹⁸⁶

A more promising initiative to promote human security by incorporating gendered rights comes from Piplantri, a state in Rajasthan, India. As head of his village, Shyam Sundar Paliwal

¹⁸⁴ Barry, 16.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 22.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 2-23.

began a trust program to celebrate the births of girls. Each villager, including the child’s parents, collects 31,000 rupees (US\$500) and places it in a trust for the girl to use when she turns 18, either as money for school, dowry, or both – the decision is hers. Along with the money, 111 saplings are planted and cared for as the girl grows up.¹⁸⁷ “The parents would then sign an agreement to take care of the saplings, enroll their daughter in school, and agree she may only marry after age eighteen.”¹⁸⁸ In India, respect for ecology and celebration of female births is called ecofeminism. Paliwal is credited with creating a system that not only encourages families to value the births of girls, not only honors each girl and the environment with living reminders of their worth, not only sets up each girl for agency in a life-altering choice when she turns 18, this system also led to a drop in crime rates¹⁸⁹. This trust system was groundbreaking in its intention – to help raise children on equal footing, regardless of gender. Celebrations for the birth of a male child in India are not had for a female child, as female children can be considered a financial burden. Paliwal’s determination to change this narrative has brought global recognition to his local solution.

In India, human security can vary considerably from one location to another. One generalization made by many Indian scholars is this: cultural heritage and modern thinking clash heads quite often. Until recently, the Sabarimala shrine in Kerala excluded women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering, on the grounds that their presence dishonored the deity. On New Year’s Day, 2019, the law was struck down and two women entered the temple amidst violent protest.¹⁹⁰ For a westerner, this may seem like a relatively common headline for Indian

¹⁸⁷ Kate Good, “This Amazing Village in India Plants 111 Trees Every Time a Little Girl is Born,” *One Green Planet*, accessed July 16, 2018, <https://www.onegreenplanet.org/environment/village-in-india-plants-plants-trees-every-time-a-little-girl-is-born/>.

¹⁸⁸ Backelin-Harrison, 17.

¹⁸⁹ *One Green Planet*.

¹⁹⁰ Supriya Nair, “Two Women Enter a Temple. A Country Erupts,” *The New York Times*, January 8, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/opinion/india-women-sabarimala-temple.html>

news – women who have been silenced for many years only just now getting the governmental recognition they deserve. In fact, this generalization is quite false. While India’s reputation as a patriarchal society is not incorrect, it is often misinformed, and ignores the regional and individual differences between women. India’s southern state of Kerala has a history of successful social justice movements, and women have better access to health care and education than many other parts of the country. In some cases, women in Kerala have a heightened amount of inheritance, with property and finance.¹⁹¹ The disparity between Kerala and other states in India makes it difficult to agree on what exactly human security should be based on, and how broad the categories should be.

Meanwhile, South Korean women are battling against beauty standards and invasive hidden cameras, with societal norms strongly opposed to any resulting feminist outrage. Beauty and self-worth are marketed as one and the same in South Korea. The country’s beauty industry is one of the most robust examples of perfectionist standards in the world, according to journalist Mariana Zapata. Recently, young women in their late teens and twenties have begun protesting this industry by “removing the corset” (in Korean: Tal Corset), or destroying their makeup and cutting their hair short.¹⁹² Reacting to stringent beauty standards may be an apt foil for frustrations with pervasive societal expectations as well. As this paper has shown, Confucianist ideals are still heavily present in South Korean life; for women, this includes passivity, soft-spoken voices, and traditional feminine beauty.¹⁹³ Many slogans associated with the #MeToo movement are becoming popular with women attempting to break out of these set standards.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Mariana, Zapata. “South Korean Women are Fighting to Take Off Their Corsets,” *The Establishment*, 2018, accessed December 8, 2018, <https://theestablishment.co/south-korean-women-are-fighting-to-take-off-their-corsets/>.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 4-5.

¹⁹⁴ Isabella Steger, “An epic battle between feminism and deep-seated misogyny is under way in South Korea,” *Quartz* (2016), accessed December 8, 2018, <https://qz.com/801067/an-epic-battle-between-feminism-and-deep-seated-misogyny-is-under-way-in-south-korea/>.

South Korean society is so against feminism that even K-pop idols receive heavy backlash for reading feminist novels, or using a phone case that says “girls can do anything.”¹⁹⁵ In Zapata’s article, one woman, alias Fennie J, said she realized her beauty regimen was never self-satisfaction but rather an attempt to fit the norm of social standards.¹⁹⁶ As the Tal Corset movement gains traction, critics speak up. Some remark that a “movement” of destroying beauty products, cutting hair and denouncing the system is just going from one “corset” to another, so long as the standards do not change.¹⁹⁷ According to student Minjung Kim, “Living as a feminist in Korea is really not easy, [it] means you can get fired, your personal information might be posted up on the internet without your consent, and it’s likely to affect your chances of being hired.”¹⁹⁸

Acts of rebellion against South Korea’s beauty industry may be growing in popularity, but another movement has the government taking notice. Reports of the use of spy-cam pornography, filmed with small cameras hidden in public facilities or put up skirts, indicate that such security breaches are increasing country-wide. According to Min Joo Kim and Adam Taylor, “The number of suspected perpetrators identified by the police rose from 1,354 in 2011 to 5,363 in 2017, and more than 95 per cent were men.”¹⁹⁹ Although spy cams are removed quickly when they are found, perpetrators are rarely caught. President Moon Jae-In has called for tougher punishments, and warned that spy cam usage is increasing with advanced technology, particularly smartphones.²⁰⁰ One police official, Chae Kyoung-deok, was instructed to head a

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 6.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 9.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 10.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 11-12.

¹⁹⁹ Min Joo Kim and Adam Taylor, “‘My life is not your porn’: South Korea’s war against spy cameras and sexual harassment: Community cam-hunter squads now conduct electronic sweeps of public spaces,” *The Independent*, July 31, 2018, accessed April 4, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-spy-cams-metoo-sexual-harassment-ahn-hee-jung-a8470771.html>.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 5.

taskforce especially for finding spy cams and arresting perpetrators. One woman, accompanying officers inspecting a local pool, said, “I think that young women should dress more modestly and take more care about their own body... That would lead to less sexual assault.”²⁰¹ Hearing her comment, Mr. Chae remarked that if a man said that, it would be major controversy. The comment made by the woman suggests a very strict view of how women should behave in society. However, Mr. Chae’s job is in itself a victory for social change, in that his department is designed to respond to current sexual harassment issues.

As change is often slow to come, it helps to know who is advocating for the rights of citizens throughout the decades. Indira Jaising, one of India’s Senior Advocates, is to India what Ruth Bader Ginsburg is to the United States – a feminist who has encouraged change in legislation for over fifty years. In 2005 she became the country’s first woman hired to be solicitor general and has secured landmark cases advocating for human rights across caste, religion, and class borders. She is an excellent example of India’s demand for change; born six years before partition, she has lived through the entire history presented in this paper.²⁰² Jaising was personally involved in one of India’s most critical moments: the emergency declared by Indira Gandhi. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Gandhi’s decision to call for an emergency led to many issues for India country-wide. Not mentioned were some of the causes for these incidents; in 1975 Jaising had set up an NGO to advocate for railway union workers, some of whom were striking against their employers and being retaliated against by authorities.²⁰³ These strikes turned into riots, and Gandhi soon called a state of emergency in reaction to general upheaval,

²⁰¹ Ibid, 8.

²⁰² Vidhi Doshi, “Indira Jaising: ‘In India, You Can’t Even Dream of Equal Justice. Not At All,’” *The Guardian*, March 9 2017, accessed March 15, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2.../mar/09/indira-jaising-india-is-in-crisis-this-fight-is-going-to-go-on>.

²⁰³ Ibid.

some of which was caused by the union workers Jaising was representing. This did not discourage her from representing Indian citizens in the courts. Jaising is a unique example of Indian women breaking barriers. She attended a fellowship at the Institute of International Legal Studies in London, practicing law rather than getting married. Her constant support of and demand for equal rights has brought change country-wide, responding to the difficulties women have faced and still face today.

These studies are important reminders that gendered rights are important to include in human security. While recognition and public outcry of mistreatment certainly seem to be on the rise, actual social and political support of that is often slow to keep up. A poignant example of this is ‘the Delhi gang rape’ from 2012 triggering mass demonstrations for legal reforms around the country (and the world). Even after this horrific murder, the violence continued with little improvement. Political leaders fell under public scrutiny for accusations of assault; one such case resulted in resignation by the minister of state in India.²⁰⁴

In 2017 India’s Supreme Court ruled in favor of strengthening fundamental rights, including equal rights for women. This included the right to This was motivated by public demand for accountability, much inspired by the need for heightened individual privacy, now legally defined as “intrinsic,” free speech (already in the constitution), and rule of law guarding against authoritarianism.²⁰⁵ Jayna Kothari says, “In the year of the #MeToo movement that has reshaped popular discourse on gender relations across the world, including in India, the Indian Supreme Court has contributed in good measure.”²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ “India.” In *Freedom in the World*. (Freedom House: 2019). Accessed April 16, 2019. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/india>.

²⁰⁵ “World Report 2018 – India,” 2-3.

²⁰⁶ Jayna Kothari, “India’s Supreme Court is Making Landmark Decisions in Social Change,” *OpenGlobalRights*, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.openglobalrights.org/Indias-Supreme-Court-is-making-landmark-judgements-in-social-change/>.

In April 2019, South Korea's Constitutional Court overturned a ban that denied abortion except in cases of rape, incest or danger to the mother's life. Lawmakers have been instructed to overturn the ban by 2020. This decision reflects the reality that large numbers of South Korean women have had illegal abortions, which are often unsafe and unregulated. Abortions in South Korea (before this overturn) placed women at risk of fines or jail time. These victories are proof of movement towards better rights and security for citizenry.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Tamara Evdokimova, "How a Long Abortion Rights Crusade Got South Korea's 65-Year Ban Overturned," *Slate.com* (April 12, 2019). <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/abortion-south-korea-legalized.html>

Chapter 6: Conclusion

To measure human security is to measure the merit of a nation's governance. It is, in effect, the task of valuing the safety and health of people over the amassment of armaments. Employing human security with a gender-neutral approach demands social protection and good governance, as well as early warning mechanisms and basic protections for human rights. While closing the gender gap is slow to come, it cannot be denied that recent years show immense progress in demands for equity. Rather than viewing women as one homogeneous group, I have forwarded an intersectional feminist analysis which argues for the inclusion of gendered rights in the application of human security measures.

India and South Korea are not the first nations to struggle with this, and they are far from the last. Their comparison is a reminder that, no matter how dissimilar two things may be, there will always be commonalities. The wealth, or dare I say the value, of citizens' safety, must be the foremost concern of a nation's government. Governments must therefore shift their focus to human security, which in turn must include gendered rights. By recognizing the importance of gender equity and inclusion, policies may be adopted and implemented that not only reduce gender disparities but improve outcomes for disempowered groups more generally.

Bibliography

All:

- Binion, Gayle. "Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective." *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (August 1995): 509-526. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/762391>.
- Caraway, Teri L. "The Political Economy of Feminization: From 'Cheap Labor' to Gendered Discourses of Work." *Politics & Gender* 1, no. 3 (2005): 399–429. doi:10.1017/S1743923X05050105.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, Vol. 1989, Issue 1, Article 8.
- "Country Comparison, India and South Korea." *CountryEconomy*. Accessed April 6, 2019. <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/south-korea/india>.
- General Assembly resolution 66/290, *Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/66/290 (25 October 2012). <https://undocs.org/A/RES/66/290>.
- "GDP Per Capita (current US\$)." *The World Bank*. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=IN-KR>
- Hudson, Valerie, Mary Capriole, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott and Chad Emmett. "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States." *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/2009), 7-45.
- Kelley, Donna J., Benjamin S. Baumer, Candida Brush, Patrica G. Greene, Mahnaz Mahdavi, Mahdi Majbouri Marcia Cole, Monica Dean, and René Heavlow. "2016/2017 Report on Women's Entrepreneurship." *Global Entrepreneurship Monitor*. Boston: The Fenway Group. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://www.gemconsortium.org/report/49860>.
- Menon, Rahul. "Neoliberalism or Neocolonialism? Evaluating Neoliberalism as a Policy Prescription for Convergence." *Developing Economics*. Accessed April 26, 2019. <https://developingeconomics.org/2019/01/11/neoliberalism-or-neocolonialism-evaluating-neoliberalism-as-a-policy-prescription-for-convergence/>.
- Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile "Closing the Gender Gap in Politics," *UNWomen.org*. Accessed April 16, 2018. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/4/op-ed-ed-phumzile-closing-the-gender-gap-in-politics>.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds. *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 1991.

- Nanavati, Ujval. "Why India is no match for South Korea." *Forbes: India*. July 11, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2019. <http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/why-india-is-no-match-for-south-korea/40661/1>.
- Narayan, Uma. "Undoing the 'Package Picture' of Cultures." *Signs* 25, no. 4. (The University of Chicago Press, 2000): 1083 – 1086.
- Ortiz-Ospina, Eteban, and Max Roser. "Economic Inequality by Gender." *Our World In Data*. Accessed April 16, 2019. <https://ourworldindata.org/economic-inequality-by-gender>.
- Patil, Vrushali. "From Patriarchy to Intersectionality: A Transnational Feminist Assessment of How Far We've Really Come." *Signs* 38, no. 4. (The University of Chicago Press: 2013): 847 – 867.
- Seawright, Jason and John Gerring. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2008): 294-308.
- Spelman, Elizabeth. *The Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought*. (Boston: Beacon, 1998), ix.
- "The World Factbook," *Central Intelligence Agency*, accessed April 6, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/>.
- "The World's Top Ten Largest Economies." *Focus Economics*. Accessed April 6, 2019. <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world>.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "Man, the State, and War: Gendered Perspectives on National Security." In *Essential Readings in World Politics*, edited by Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, 44 ed., 89-97. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.
- "What is Human Security?" *United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*. Accessed April 24, 2019. <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/>.
- Woetzel, Jonathan, et. al. "How Advancing Women's Equality Can Add \$12 Trillion to Global Growth." *McKinsey Global Institute*, (September 2015). <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-growth>.
- Zeitlin, June, and Doris Mpoumou. "No human security without gender equality." *Women's Environmental & Development Organization (WEDO)*. Accessed February 5, 2019. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN018180.pdf>.

South Korea:

- Cha, Myung Soo. "The Economic History of Korea." *Economic History Association*. Accessed April 28, 2019. <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-korea/>
- Chang, Pil-wha, Ŭn-sil Kim, and Ihwa Yōja Taehakkyo, eds. *Women's Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea*. Asian Center for Women's Studies. Seoul, Korea: Asian Center for Women's Studies, 2005.
- Connor, Walker. "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ..." in *Readings in Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas*. Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, eds.(NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 266-275.
- Debroux, Philippe. "Female Entrepreneurship in Asia: The Case of Japan, South-Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam." *創価経営論集 / 創価大学経営学会 編37*, no. 1-3 (2013): 1–23.
- Encyclopedia Britannica. "Syngman Rhee: President of South Korea." Accessed January 29, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Syngman-Rhee>.
- Enloe, Cynthia. "The Globetrotting Sneaker." In *The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire*. University of California Press, 2004: 43 – 56.
- Evdokimova, Tamara. "How a Long Abortion Rights Crusade Got South Korea's 65-Year Ban Overturned." *Slate.com* (April 12, 2019). <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/abortion-south-korea-legalized.html>
- Han, Jongwoo, and L. H. M Ling. "Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea." *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 53-78.
- Helgesen, Geir. *Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics*. Democracy in Asia, no. 3. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Jones, Nicola Anne. *Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2019. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ursinus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=302780>.
- Kim, Min Joo and Adam Taylor. "'My Life is Not Your Porn': South Korea's War Against Spy Cameras and Sexual Harassment." *The Independent*. Accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-spy-cams-metoo-sexual-harassment-ahn-hee-jung-a8470771.html>.
- Kim, Seung-Kyung and John Finch. "Confucian Patriarchy Reexamined: Korean Families and the IMF Economic Crisis." *The Good Society* 11, no. 3 (2002): 43-49, <https://doi.org/10.1353/gso.2003.0007>.

- Koh, Eunkang. "Gender Issues and Confucian Scriptures: Is Confucianism Incompatible with Gender Equality in South Korea?" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 71, no. 2 (2008): 345-62. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40378774>.
- Koo, Hagen, ed. *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- "Korean War," *History*. Accessed April 26, 2019. <https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war>.
- Lee, Claire. "Women's Presence in Politics Still Limited in South Korea," *The Korea Herald*. Accessed April 13, 2019. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160621000907>.
- Mi, Park. "South Korea: Passion, Patriotism, and Student Radicalism." In *Student Activism in Asia: Between Protest and Powerless*, edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Edward Aspinall, 125 – 151. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv18p.10>.
- Munro, André. "Park Geun-Hye: President of South Korea." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed April 13, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Park-Geun-Hye>.
- Oh, John Kie-chiang. *Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Oh, Jung-Hwa. *Globalization and Feminism in Korea*. Seoul, Korea: Prunsasang Co, 2005.
- "Park-Geun-Hye: South Korea's ex-leader jailed for 24 years for corruption," *BBC News*, April 6, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43666134>.
- Park, Kyung-Ae. "Political Representation and South Korean Women." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 432-48. doi:10.2307/2659403.
- Park, Nathan. "South Korea is an Ally, Not a Puppet" *Foreign Policy*. January 2019. Accessed April 2, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/17/south-korea-is-an-ally-not-a-puppet/>.
- Sang-Hun, Choe. "Kim Young-sam, South Korean President Who Opposed Military, Dies at 87." *The New York Times*. Accessed March 28, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/kim-young-sam-former-president-of-south-korea-dies-at-87.html>.
- Sang-Hun, Choe, "Park Geun-hye, Ex-South Korean Leader, Gets 25 Years in Prison," *The New York Times*, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/world/asia/park-geun-hye-sentenced-south-korea.html>.

Sarah Liu, Shan-Jan. "Are Female Political Leaders Role Models? Lessons from Asia." *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018): 255 – 269.

Shin, Youngtae. *Protest Politics and the Democratization of South Korea: Strategies and Roles of Women*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014. 2014. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://ursinuscollege.on.worldcat.org/oclc/897116992>.

South Korea, *The Constitution of the Republic of Korea* (17 July 1948). Article 11. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ks00000_.html

Steger, Isabella. "An epic battle between feminism and deep-seated misogyny is under way in South Korea." *Quartz* (2016). Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://qz.com/801067/an-epic-battle-between-feminism-and-deep-seated-misogyny-is-under-way-in-south-korea/>.

Sung, Sirin. "Women Reconciling Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea" *Social Policy and Administration* 37, no. 4 (August 2003): pp. 342 – 360.

"The World Factbook: Korea, South." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 25, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>.

"World Report 2018 – South Korea," *Human Rights Watch*, 2018, accessed April 2, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/south-korea>.

Zapata, Mariana. "South Korean Women are Fighting to Take Off Their Corsets." *The Establishment*, (2018). Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://theestablishment.co/south-korean-women-are-fighting-to-take-off-their-corsets/>.

Yonhap. "Fertility Rate Dips Below 1 in 2018: official." *The Korea Herald*. Accessed April 8, 2019. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190118000235>.

India:

Ayoob, Mohammed. "Gandhi's Role in the Partition of India: Why He Was Partially Responsible for the Division." *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed March 25, 2019. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2017-10-19/gandhis-role-partition-india>.

Ayyub, Rana. "Modi's India is a Living Nightmare for Muslims." *The Washington Post*, Dec 6, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/06/modis-india-is-living-nightmare-muslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d9f776e2431f.

Backelin-Harrison, Anika. "Intersectional India: Caste, Feminism and Development in the 21st Century." *International Relations Summer Fellows*. Collegeville: Ursinus College Digital Commons, 2018. https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/int_sum/4.

- Barro-Lee. "India - Percentage of population age 15+ with tertiary schooling. Completed Tertiary." *Trading Economics*. Accessed April 8, 2019. <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/barro-lee-percentage-of-population-age-15-with-tertiary-schooling-completed-tertiary-wb-data.html>.
- Barry, Ellen. "Young Rural Women in India Chase Big-City Dreams." *The New York Times*. Accessed May 18, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/world/asia/bangalore-india-women-factories.html>.
- Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra, and Esther Duflo. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72, no. 5 (2004): 1409-443. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>.
- Dhillan, Chitvan Singh. "India's Female Labour Force Is Declining." *The Tribune (India)*. May 1, 2018. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-s-female-labour-force-is-declining/582031.html>
- Doshi, Vidhi. "Indira Jaising: 'In India, You Can't Even Dream of Equal Justice. Not At All.'" *The Guardian*, March 9, 2017, accessed March 15, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2.../mar/09/indira-jaising-india-is-in-crisis-this-fight-is-going-to-go-on>.
- Everett, Jana. "'All the Women Were Hindu and All the Muslims Were Men': State, Identity Politics and Gender, 1917-1951." *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 23 (2001): 2071-080. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410720>.
- Fletcher, Erin K., Rohini Pande, and Charity Troyer Moore. "Women and Work in India: Descriptive Evidence and a Review of Potential Policies." *CID Faculty Working Paper*, No. 339 (Center for International Development, Harvard University, December 2017).
- Ghadially, Rehana. *Urban Women in Contemporary India: A Reader*. Los Angeles, California: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2007. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=278178&site=ehost-live>.
- Ghosal, Sarbani Guha. "MAJOR TRENDS OF FEMINISM IN INDIA." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 66, no. 4 (2005): 793-812. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856169>.
- Good, Kate. "This Amazing Village in India Plants 111 Trees Every Time a Little Girl is Born." *One Green Planet*. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://www.onegreenplanet.org/environment/village-in-india-plants-plants-trees-every-time-a-little-girl-is-born/>.
- Hart, Henry C. *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised*. Westview Special Studies on South and Southeast Asia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976.

- “India.” In *Freedom in the World*. (Freedom House: 2019). Accessed April 16, 2019. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/india>.
- “India Population 2018.” *World Population Review*. Accessed December 8, 2018. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/india-population/>.
- Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra, and Petia Topalova. "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4, no. 4 (2012): 165-93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23269746>.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *Religion, Caste and Politics in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
- Kothari, Jayna. “India’s Supreme Court is Making Landmark Decisions in Social Change.” *OpenGlobalRights*. Accessed April 13, 2019. <https://www.openglobalrights.org/Indias-Supreme-Court-is-making-landmark-judgements-in-social-change/>.
- “Labor force participation rate, female (% of Female Population Ages 15+) (Modeled ILO Estimate) | Data.” *The World Bank*. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN>.
- Long, Simon. “India’s Shining Hopes: A Survey of India.” *The Economist* (21 February 2004). Accessed April 28, 2019.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse.” *Feminist Review* 30, (1998): 61-88.
- Nadkarni, Asha. "REGENERATING FEMINISM: Sarojini Naidu’s Eugenic Feminist Renaissance." In *Eugenic Feminism: Reproductive Nationalism in the United States and India*, 65-98. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt6wr7s6.5>.
- Nair, Supriya. “Two Women Enter a Temple. A Country Erupts.” *The New York Times*, January 8, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/opinion/india-women-sabarimala-temple.html>
- “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) | Data.” *The World Bank*. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=IN-KR-CR>.
- Raj, Suhasini and Kai Schultz. “Religion and Women’s Rights Clash, Violently, at a Shrine in India.” *The New York Times*. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/asia/india-sabarimala-temple.html>.
- Raman, Sita Anantha. *Women in India: A Social and Cultural History*. 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-CILO), 2009.

- Randall, Vicky. "Legislative Gender Quotas and Indian Exceptionalism: The Travails of the Women's Reservation Bill." *Comparative Politics* 39, no 1 (Oct 2006): 63-82. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20434021>.
- Roy, K.C. "Institutions and Gender Empowerment in India." In *Institutions and Gender Empowerment in the Global Economy*, by Cal Clark, H.C. Blomqvist, and K.C. Roy. In World Scientific Studies in International Economics. (Singapore: World Scientific. (67-102). <http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=57ce53ca-08c4-42a3-9c93-371bcdb3f3fc%40sdc-v-sessmgr02&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=514857&db=nlebk>.
- "Rural population (% of total population)," *The World Bank*, accessed April 3, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=IN>.
- Schaffer, Teresita C., and Howard B. Schaffer. "India in a Changing World." In *India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy*, 293-310. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cr3c.16>.
- "School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross)." *The World Bank*. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR.FE?locations=IN>
- Skard, Torild. *Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers World Wide*. Bristol UK: Policy Press, 2015. <https://ursinuscollege.on.worldcat.org/oclc/916311275>.
- Tarkunde, V.M. "Secularism and the Indian Constitution." *India International Center Quarterly* 22, no.1 (1995): 143-152. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23003717>.
- "The Hindu Succession Act, 1956," *iKanoon*, accessed March 10, 2019, <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/685111/>.
- "The World Factbook: India." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 25, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety." *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993): 227 – 261. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027190>.
- "World Report 2018 – India." *Human Rights Watch*, 2018. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/india>.