Submission Date
7-24-2026
Document Type
Paper
Department
Philosophy
Faculty Mentor
Molly O'Rourke-Friel
Project Description
As Large Language Models and AI chatbots become increasingly prevalent, pressing questions are raised about whether beliefs formed through LLM interactions carry the same epistemic weight as beliefs formed through human testimony. How we answer this question depends on whether LLMs can function as testifiers, a role which is typically assumed to require a human or human-like agent. This assumption has gone largely unexamined, yet its consequences are significant: if LLM outputs cannot constitute testimony, then the justificatory tools of testimonial epistemology are unavailable to any beliefs formed through LLM interaction. This paper challenges that assumption. It first argues that definition of testimony is essential regardless of any position on testimonial justification, as reductionists and non-reductionists alike should advocate for a principled account of what testimony is. It then surveys potential models of testimony and challenges the anthropocentric and biocentric assumptions embedded in them as theoretically unnecessary, as these assumptions reflect intuitive bias as opposed to any structural feature that testimony requires. Finally, the paper assesses whether LLMs satisfy the conditions to be considered a testifier and determines the implications of the conclusion.
Recommended Citation
Cummins, Michael J., "Can Machines Testify? LLMs and the Boundaries of Testimonial Epistemology" (2026). Philosophy Summer Fellows. 20.
https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/phil_sum/20
Open Access
Available to all.
Included in
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Epistemology Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons
Comments
Presented during the 28th Annual Summer Fellows Symposium, July 24, 2026 at Ursinus College.